I have defended judicial review, albeit reluctantly, on several occasions.* But I have never defended judicial review as a way to make law, which is the ground on which Erwin Chemerinsky stands in the current debate at the Legal Affairs Debate Club: Should We Get Rid of Judicial Review? For example, in one posting Chemerinsky responds to his opponent, Mark Tushnet, as follows:
I do have substantive value preferences. These include that the Supreme Court was right in ordering desegregation and striking down Jim Crow laws, in protecting reproductive privacy including abortion rights, in finding a right to privacy for consenting adults in their bedroom.
The catch is that the Supreme Court’s decisions ordering desegregation (Brown v. Board of Education), legalizing abortion (Roe v. Wade), and finding various zones of privacy (e.g., a right to buy contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut; a right to commit homosexual acts in Lawrence v. Texas) were based on extra-legal, sociological flim-flam and tortured readings of the Constitution. Why? Because the majority in each case wanted to make law, not apply the Constitution.
You may like the outcomes in Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut, and Lawrence v. Texas. But it should bother you that the Supreme Court can so blithely turn the law on its head to enact its own beliefs, on the pretext of finding rights in “penumbras, formed by emanations” of the Constitution. It all reminds me of this exchange from Act I, Scene 6, of Robert Bolt’s play about Sir Thomas More, A Man for All Seasons:
Roper: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law.
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that.
More: Oh? And when the last law was down–and the Devil turned round on you–where would you hide? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.
Chemerinsky’s defense of judicial review is opportunistic. He wants a Court that will make his kind of law, not a court that will apply the meaning of the Constitution to the law. We need judicial review to hold legislatures and executives in check, but it must be judicial review that is grounded in the meaning of the Constitution. As I argued here:
Something resembling [liberty] will come about only if a Republican president, aided by a strongly Republican Senate, is able to stock the courts with judges who are committed to the restraint of government power — at all levels of government. (Janice Rogers Brown is that kind of judge.)
Certainly not all decisions by all Republican appointees to the bench will satisfy all libertarians, many of whom seem to focus on narrowly tailored “rights,” such as abortion and gay marriage (both of which are in fact threats to liberty, as I argue here and here). But by siding with the Left on such issues, libertarians effectively abjure more basic rights — rights that broadly affect the ability of most Americans to pursue happiness — such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of contract.
In the real world there are real choices. The real choice for libertarians is between what seems “best” for a few and what is actually “better” for the many. I choose the latter, without hesitation.
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* Links to my previous posts about judicial review:
When Must the Executive Enforce the Law?
More on the Debate about Judicial Supremacy
Another Look at Judicial SupremacyIs Nullification the Answer to Judicial Supremacy?
The Alternative to Nullification
Politics and Prosperity 