Achilles and the Tortoise Revisited

Myth-buster at work.

My recent foray into logical fallacies reminded me of one that has irked me for many years.

According to Aristotle (restating Zeno):

In a race, the quickest runner [Achilles] can never overtake the slowest [Tortoise], since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started [i.e. the pursued has a head start], so that the slower must always hold a lead.

Ridiculous, of course.

To show what’s wrong with Aristotle’s analysis, I begin with an example that adopts his “logic”:

  • Achilles (A), a quasi-god with a tricky tendon, runs at a mortal speed of 15 miles an hour (a 4-minute miler, he).

  • Tortoise (T) plods at a speed of 1 mile an hour. (I exaggerate for simplicity of illustration.)

  • If A gives T a 15-mile lead, A reaches T’s starting point in 1 hour. T has, in that hour, moved ahead by 1 mile.

  • A covers that mile in 1/15 of an hour, in which time T has moved ahead by 1/15 of a mile.

  • A runs the 1/15 of a mile in 16 seconds, in which time T has moved ahead by another 23.47 feet.

  • And so on.

  • Therefore, A can never catch T.

What’s the catch? It’s verbal sleight-of-hand, much like the “proof” that 1 = 2 (“proof” here; fallacy explained here), or the “proof” that a boost in government spending causes GDP to rise by a “multiplier” (fallacy exposed here).

We know that A must be able to catch T, but we are trapped in a fallacious argument which seems to prove that A can’t catch T. Let’s break out of the trap.

The verbal sleight-of-hand in the Zeno/Aristotle argument is that A’s and T’s movements involve distance but not time. Velocity (distance/time) is ignored. This allows Zeno/Aristotle to imply (a nonsensical) sequence of events: T proceeds to a certain point; A reaches that point and waits for T to proceed to the next point; and so on.

In fact (if a fable may be called a fact) A catches up with T by covering a greater distance than T in the same length of time — that is, A proceeds at a greater velocity than T. Along the way, A passes points already passed by T, but A doesn’t pause at any of those points and allow T to move a bit farther ahead. A keeps on moving and catches up with T.

Going back to the example (A runs 15 miles an hour, etc.), we can determine when and where A catches T simply by describing events correctly. To begin:

  • A’s time (in hours) x A’s velocity (in miles per hour) = A’s distance (in miles).

  • T’s time x T’s velocity + T’s head start = T’s distance.

  • When A catches up with T, A’s time in motion will equal T’s time in motion and A’s distance in motion will equal T’s distance in motion + T’s head start.*

Example:

  • T has a head start of 15 miles.

  • T and A start plodding/running from their respective positions at the same time.

  • When A runs for 15/14 hours at 15 miles an hour he travels a distance of 225/14 miles (16 and 1/14 miles).

  • In that same 15/14 hours, T (plodding at generous 1 mile an hour) travels a distance of 1-1/14 mile.

  • Adding the distance T travels in 15/14 hours to T’s head start of 15 miles, we see that T is exactly 16-1/4 miles from A’s starting point after plodding for 15/14 hours.

  • In sum, A catches up with T when both have been moving for 15/14 hours, at a distance of 16-1/4 miles from A’s starting point.

Moreover, once A catches up with T, A then moves farther ahead of T with each stride because A is running at 15 miles an hour, whereas T is moving at only 1 mile and hour.

There is a variant of the Achilles-Tortoise “paradox” which says that Achilles never reaches a goal because he gets halfway there, then half of the remaining half, and so on; that is, he gets infinitesimally close to the goal but never reaches it. It would be fair to point out that Achilles is able to get halfway to the goal, and halfway might have been chosen as the goal. But let’s proceed as if the Achilles must reach the original goal.

Why can’t he get there? Zeno assumes (without realizing or admitting it) that the goal keeps receding from Achilles, even as he runs toward it. That’s the only explanation that makes sense. Otherwise, if the goal is 15 miles from Achilles and Achilles runs at 15 miles an hour, he’ll be halfway to the goal in 30 minutes, three-fourths of the way to it in 45 minutes, and at it in 1 hour.

It’s true that Achilles will reach the halfway point, the three-fourths point, etc. But it’s not true that Achilles won’t reach the goal — unless, like the mechanical rabbit in dog racing — the goal keeps moving away from Achilles.

Travel involves distance and velocity. Aristotle/Zeno ignored the latter. They were either clever or stupid. Take your pick.


* Mathematically:

tA is A’s time in motion and tT is T’s time in motion.

tA = tT = t (the duration of the race) when A catches up with T, both having started at the same time.

dA is A’s distance from his starting point and dT is T’s distance from A’s starting point, which includes T’s head start: h.

dA = dT = d (the distance A travels) when A catches up with T.

dA = (vA)(t), where vA is A’s speed

dT = h + (vT)(t), where vT is T’s speed

Substituting into dA = dT, to find the duration (time) of the race:

  1. (vA)(t) = h + (vT)(t)

  2. (vA)(t) – (vT)(t) = h

  3. t(vA – vT) = h

  4. t = h/(vA – vT)

Given t, vA, and vT, it is trivial to compute d, the distance traveled by A when he catches up with T.

How the Constitution Was Lost

The wages of amorality, immorality, and power-lust.

The Constitution of the United States was a contract between the States that ratified it. The contract became binding not only on the States but also on their creature, the national government. (I use “national” instead of “federal” because the Constitution created a new government of strictly limited but national power.)

This written Constitution — not the minions or edicts of the national government — was to be the supreme law of the land. As the supreme law. It was meant to be a bulwark against the expansion of the powers of the national government beyond those expressly granted to it by the Constitution.

There are many influential parties, justices of the Supreme Court included, who believe that the Constitution means what a majority of the Court says it means. But, as Randy Barnett puts it, the Supreme Court

does not have the power to change the written Constitution, which always remains there to be revived when there is a political and judicial will to do so. For example, after the Supreme Court gutted the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction, it remained a part of the written Constitution for a future more enlightened Supreme Court to put to good use. By the same token, the current Supreme Court can still make serious mistakes about the Constitution. Because the Constitution is in writing, there is an external “there” there by which to assess its opinions.

The real meaning of the Constitution is fixed until it is amended through the process prescribed in the Constitution itself. It is not, unlike the British constitution, a do-it-yourself project. The American Constitution was designed by master architects, who meant it to be executed as it was written. It is a blueprint, not a Rohrschach test. Liberty is still possible under the American Constitution because the document is still there, waiting to be read and enforced correctly.

I don’t expect to see such a turnaround anytime soon, and probably not even in what remains of my lifetime (10 years, more or less). The reason for my pessimism is that the foundation upon which the Constitution was built has eroded badly. The (small “l”) libertarian edifice designed by the architects of the Constitution was meant to stand on a foundation of deeply ingrained Judeo-Christian morality.

Justice Clarence Thomas, speaking a few years ago at the dedication of Christ Chapel at Hillsdale College, quoted John Adams’s address to the Massachusetts militia in 1798:

“Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious People. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.” Thomas underscored the critical point, one that is missing from most lamentations about the failures of the educational establishment. “The preservation of liberty,” he said in his peroration, “is not guaranteed. Without the guardrails supplied by religious conviction, popular sovereignty can devolve into mob rule, unmoored from any conception of objective truth.” [“A Genuinely Transgressive Act: On the Dedication of Christ Chapel at Hillsdale College”, The New Criterion, November 2019]

As Jennifer Roback Morse and Friedrich Hayek rightly argue (here and here), a libertarian order can be sustained only if it is built on a morality that is ingrained in social norms and inculcated by the institutions of civil society. But those norms and institutions have been undermined by a rot that began in the Progressive Era of the late 1800s and early 1900s, was nurtured in public schools and universities, was propagandized by the mass media, and has become enshrined in the edicts of the national government — a government that has accrued power which it was never meant to have. This has been especially true when the national government has held captive by the left, which seeks to replace civil society with an unattainable, dispiriting, and divisive Utopia that dispenses “equity”, “social justice”, and their like.

As traditional social norms and civil society were (and are) being shattered by the left, the destructive results — spelled out here by Malcolm Pollack — have merely invitedthe further growth of the state and the enactment of yet more destructive policies. Failure breeds more failure because the left cares not about consequences of its agenda. Power — absolute power — is its golden calf.

How should sane Americans respond to all of this? Pollack counsels what he calls a “acceleration”:

If things really are as bad as they seem … this whole rotten system may be so far gone, so diseased, and so at odds with the nature of human flourishing, that it must eventually collapse and die of its own accord. If that’s so, then it’s best, for the sake of our children and children’s children, if it happens sooner rather than later: the sooner we can plow Leviathan’s decomposing corpse into the ground, the sooner we can begin the process of organic regrowth….

Perhaps, then, it is best in the long run not to slow this process by incremental and ineffective political resistance. It may be that such an approach, by making the decay more gradual, will also make it somehow more bearable, day by day, and might turn it from an acute and intolerable affliction to a slow and chronic decline — a creeping Brazilification, a great national frog-boiling. Perhaps we would be wiser simply to let the cleansing fire of fever run its course, and burn itself out. It will be painful, and surely debilitating for a while, but then it will be over. And then, at last, we can awaken, blink our eyes, and get back on our feet.

Another term for the Big Guy might be all it takes. Four more years!!

I am less sanguine. Because of the extensive destruction of traditional morality and civil society that has already taken place, I doubt that America can be restored to a semblance of its pre-1960s character. (See “1963: The Year Zero”.) I doubt that the fourth “great awakening” in which America is presently mired can be succeeded by a fifth one that undoes the damage wrought by number four.

But if it could be, it would only be because of massive resurgence of traditional morality under the aegis of religion, especially religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The core of that morality is outlined in the Catholic Encyclopedia:

The precepts [of the last six of the Commandments] are meant to protect man in his natural rights against the injustice of his fellows.

  • His life is the object of the Fifth;

  • the honour of his body as well as the source of life, of the Sixth;

  • his lawful possessions, of the Seventh;

  • his good name, of the Eighth;

  • And in order to make him still more secure in the enjoyment of his rights, it is declared an offense against God to desire to wrong him, in his family rights by the Ninth;

  • and in his property rights by the Tenth.

Though I am a deist, I would gladly live in a society in which most of my fellow citizens believed in and adhered to the Ten Commandments, especially the last six of them. I reject the notion, promoted by nihilistic leftists, that religion per se breeds violence. In fact, a scholarly, non-sectarian meta-study, “Religion and its effects on crime and delinquency” (Medical Science Monitor, 2003; 9(8):SR79-82), offers good evidence that religiosity leads to good behavior:

[N]early all [reports] found that that there was a significant negative correlation between religiosity and delinquency. This was further substantiated by studies using longitudinal and operationally reliable definitions. Of the early reports which were either inconclusive or found no statistical correlation, not one utilized a multidimensional definition or any sort of reliability factor. We maintain that the cause of this difference in findings stemmed from methodological factors as well as different and perhaps flawed research strategies that were employed by early sociological and criminological researchers.The studies that we reviewed were of high research caliber and showed that the inverse relationship [between religiosity and delinquency] does in fact exist. It therefore appears that religion is both a short term and long term mitigat[o]r of delinquency.

But a society in which behavior is guided by the Ten Commandments seems to be receding into the past. As one headline puts it, “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace”. And the degree of religious belief probably is overstated because respondents tend to say the “right” thing, which (oddly) continues to be a profession of religious faith (in the hinterlands, at least).

Historian Niall Ferguson, a Briton, writes about the importance of religiosity in “Heaven Knows How We’ll Rekindle Our Religion, but I Believe We Must”:

I am not sure British people are necessarily afraid of religion, but they are certainly not much interested in it these days. Indeed, the decline of Christianity — not just in Britain but across Europe — stands out as one of the most remarkable phenomena of our times.

There was a time when Europe would justly refer to itself as “Christendom.” Europeans built the Continent’s loveliest edifices to accommodate their acts of worship. They quarreled bitterly over the distinction between transubstantiation and consubstantiation. As pilgrims, missionaries and conquistadors, they sailed to the four corners of the Earth, intent on converting the heathen to the true faith.

Now it is Europeans who are the heathens. . . .

The exceptionally low level of British religiosity was perhaps the most striking revelation of a recent … poll. One in five Britons claim to “attend an organized religious service regularly,” less than half the American figure. [In light of the relationship between claimed and actual church attendance, discussed above, the actual figure for Britons is probably about 10 percent: ED.] Little more than a quarter say that they pray regularly, compared with two-thirds of Americans and 95 percent of Nigerians. And barely one in 10 Britons would be willing to die for our God or our beliefs, compared with 71 percent of Americans. . . .

Chesterton feared that if Christianity declined, “superstition” would “drown all your old rationalism and skepticism.” When educated friends tell me that they have invited a shaman to investigate their new house for bad juju, I see what Chesterton meant. Yet it is not the spread of such mumbo-jumbo that concerns me as much as the moral vacuum that de-Christianization has created. Sure, sermons are sometimes dull and congregations often sing out of tune. But, if nothing else, a weekly dose of Christian doctrine helps to provide an ethical framework for life. And it is not clear where else such a thing is available in modern Europe.

… Britons have heard a great deal from Tony Blair and others about the threat posed to their “way of life” by Muslim extremists such as Muktar Said Ibrahim. But how far has their own loss of religious faith turned Britain into a soft target — not so much for the superstition Chesterton feared, but for the fanaticism of others?

Yes, what “way of life” is being threatened — and is therefore deemed worth defending — when people do not share a strong moral bond?

I cannot resist adding one more quotation in the same vein as those from Clarence Thomas and Niall Ferguson. This comes from Theodore Dalrymple (Anthony Daniels), a no-nonsense psychiatrist who, among his many intellectual accomplishments, has thoroughly skewered John Stuart Mill’s fatuous essay, On Liberty. Without further ado, here is Dalrymple on religion (“Why Religion Is Good for Us”, New Statesman, April 21, 2003):

I remember the day I stopped believing in God. I was ten years old and it was in school assembly. It was generally acknowledged that if you opened your eyes while praying, God flew out of the nearest window. That was why it was so important that everyone should shut his eyes. If I opened my eyes suddenly, I thought, I might just be quick enough to catch a glimpse of the departing deity….

Over the years, my attitude to religion has changed, without my having recovered any kind of belief in God. The best and most devoted people I have ever met were Catholic nuns. Religious belief is seldom accompanied by the inflamed egotism that is so marked and deeply unattractive a phenomenon in our post-religious society. Although the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions are said to have given man a more accurate appreciation of his true place in nature, in fact they have rendered him not so much anthropocentric as individually self-centred….

[T]he religious idea of compassion is greatly superior, both morally and practically, to the secular one. The secular person believes that compassion is due to the victim by virtue of what he has suffered; the religious person believes that compassion is due to everyone, by virtue of his humanity. For the secular person, man is born good and is made bad by his circumstances. The religious person believes man is born with original sin, and is therefore imperfectible on this earth; he can nevertheless strive for the good by obedience to God.

The secularist divides humanity into two: the victims and the victimisers. The religious person sees mankind as fundamentally one.

And why not? If this life is all that you have, why let anything stand in the way of its enjoyment? Most of us self-importantly imagine that the world and all its contrivances were made expressly for us and our convenience….

The secularist de-moralises the world, thus increasing the vulnerability of potential victims and, not coincidentally, their need for a professional apparatus of protection, which is and always will be ineffective, and is therefore fundamentally corrupt and corrupting.

If a person is not a victim pure and simple, the secularist feels he is owed no compassion. A person who is to blame for his own situation should not darken the secularist’s door again: therefore, the secularist is obliged to pretend, with all the rationalisation available to modern intellectuals, that people who get themselves into a terrible mess – for example, drug addicts – are not to blame for their situation. But this does them no good at all; in fact it is a great disservice to them.

The religious person, by contrast, is unembarrassed by the moral failings that lead people to act self-destructively because that is precisely what he knows man has been like since the expulsion from Eden. Because he knows that man is weak, and has no need to disguise his failings, either from himself or from others, he can be honest in a way that the secularist finds impossible.

Though I am not religious, I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible for us to live decently without the aid of religion. That is the ambiguity of the Enlightenment.

The weakening of the Judeo-Christian tradition in America is owed to enemies within (established religions trying in vain to be “relevant”) and to enemies without (leftists and nihilistic libertarians who seek every opportunity to denigrate religion). Thus the opponents of religiosity seized on the homosexual scandals in the Catholic Church not to attack homosexuality (which would go against the attackers’ party line) but to attack the Church, which teaches the immorality of the acts that were in fact committed by a relatively small number of priests.

Then there is the relentless depiction of Catholicism as an accomplice to Hitler’s brutality, about which an esteemed critic writes in a review of Rabbi David G. Dalin’s The Myth of Hitler’s Pope: How Pius XII Rescued Jews from the Nazis:

Despite the misleading nature of the controversy — one which Dalin questions from the outset — the first critics of the wartime papacy were not Jews. Among the worst attacks were those of leftist non-Jews, such as Carlo Falconi (author of The Silence of Pius XII), not to mention German liberal Rolf Hochhuth, whose 1963 play, The Deputy, set the tone for subsequent derogatory media portrayals of wartime Catholicism. By contrast, says Dalin, Pope Pius XII “was widely praised [during his lifetime] for having saved hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives during the Holocaust.” He provides an impressive list of Jews who testified on the pope’s behalf, including Albert Einstein, Golda Meir and Chaim Weizmann. Dalin believes that to “deny and delegitimize their collective memory and experience of the Holocaust,” as some have done, “is to engage in a subtle yet profound form of Holocaust denial.”

The most obvious source of the black legend about the papacy emanated from Communist Russia, a point noted by the author. There were others with an axe to grind. As revealed in a recent issue of Sandro Magister’s Chiesa, liberal French Catholic Emmanuel Mounier began implicating Pius XII in “racist” politics as early as 1939. Subsequent detractors have made the same charge, working (presumably) from the same bias.

While the immediate accusations against Pius XII lie at the heart of Dalin’s book, he takes his analysis a step further. The vilification of the pope can only be understood in terms of a political agenda — the “liberal culture war against tradition.” . . .

Rabbi Dalin sums it up best for all people of traditional moral and political beliefs when he urges us to recall the challenges that faced Pius XII in which the “fundamental threats to Jews came not from devoted Christians — they were the prime rescuers of Jewish lives in the Holocaust — but from anti-Catholic Nazis, atheistic Communists, and… Hitler’s mufti in Jerusalem.”

I believe that the incessant attacks on religion have helped to push people — especially impressionable adolescents and young adults — away from religion, to the detriment of liberty. It is not surprising that leftists tend to be anti-religious, for — as Dalrymple points out — they disdain the tenets of personal responsibility and liberty that are contained in the last six of the Ten Commandments.

Humans need no education in aggression and meddling, which come to us naturally. But we do need to learn to take responsibility for our actions and to leave others alone — and we need to learn those things when we are young. Such things will not be taught in public schools. They could be taught in homes, but are less likely to be taught there as Americans drift further from their religious roots.

Am I being hypocritical because I am unchurched and my children were not taken to church? Perhaps, but my religious upbringing imbued in me a strong sense of morality, which I tried — successfully, I believe — to convey to my children. But as time passes the moral lessons we older Americans learned through religion will attenuate unless those lessons are taught anew to younger generations.

Rather than join the left in attacking religion and striving to eradicate all traces of it from public discourse, those who claim to love liberty ought to accommodate themselves to it and even encourage its acceptance — for liberty’s sake.

A Lawyerly Variation of a Fallacious "Proof"

Under-thinking the problem.

A legal scholar (?) has made a claim that reminds me of the famous “proof” that 1 = 2 (“proof” here; fallacy explained here). The “proof” is invalid because it relies on the multiplication of both sides of an equation by zero. But anything multiplied by zero equals zero. It is therefore possible to “prove”, for example, that 1 = 1,000,000.

I come now to Perry Dane, who seems to have “proved” that the interpretation of laws by consulting their original public meaning is “incoherent”. This is from the abstract of his paper on the subject:

The method of original public meaning has a distinct, deadly, bit of intractable incoherence: It is, uniquely, largely useless in interpreting the meaning of contemporaneous legal enactments. If we, today, are trying to figure out the meaning, not of a provision enacted years ago, but of a text enacted today or recently, then looking to original public meaning will usually be a circular, empty, effort. After all, we – the interpreters of a contemporaneous text – are the original public.

Do you see what he’s done? He has noted, correctly, that a person today who interprets a contemporary text adds no meaning to that text because its meaning is obvious, having (presumably) been written with today’s meanings in mind. He then assumes, insidiously, that the value added by interpreting the meaning of texts is always zero, regardless of the age of the texts.

How ridiculous is that? What do you think of when you read “sidearms”? Because you are a contemporary of mine, you probably think of pistols or revolvers, generally, and pistols or revolvers that can be carried in holsters (usually at the waist), specifically. Do you think of military weapons of any kind that are worn at the side, especially the swords of officers? Well, you would if you were interpreting the meaning of “sidearm” in a text from the late 1700s.

A word that is no longer in use or which has changed meaning will not be understood properly until research reveals the meaning of the word in today’s language.

To put it mathematically:

  • The interpretive multiplier on a contemporary text is one (not zero): uninterpreted text (1) x interpretation (1) = meaning (1).

  • The interpretive multiplier on a text from long ago is greater than one (in the hands of a good interpreter): uninterpreted text (<1) x interpretation (>1) = meaning (1).

The Supreme Court Recognizes the Legality of Secession

Red States take heart.

I argue in “The Constitution: Myths and Realities” that the Constitution doesn’t forbid secession and therefore allows it. A couple of key points (though not the only ones) are these:

James Madison, known as the Father of the Constitution, characterized it as a contract, though he used an older word, namely, compact:

The [third Virginia] resolution declares, first, that “it views the powers of the federal government as resulting from the compact to which the states are parties;” in other words, that the federal powers are derived from the Constitution; and that the Constitution is a compact to which the states are parties. [Report on the Virginia Resolutions to the Virginia House of Delegates, January 1800]

What else could it be? Romantic rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the Constitution is not the equivalent of the Ten Commandments or the Bible, handed directly from God or inspired by Him. The Constitution represents a practical arrangement through which the States that ratified it agreed to establish a national government with some degree of power over the States, but power that was carefully limited by enumeration.

In fact,

[t]he Constitution supplanted the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, by the will of only nine of the thirteen States. Madison says this in Federalist No. 43 regarding that event:

On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? . . .

The . . . question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed.

Moreover, in a letter to Alexander Rives dated January 1, 1833, Madison says that

[a] rightful secession requires the consent of the others [other States], or an abuse of the compact, absolving the seceding party from the obligations imposed by it.

An abuse of the compact most assuredly legitimates withdrawal from it, on the principle of the preservation of liberty, especially if that abuse has been persistent and shows no signs of abating. The abuse, in this instance, has been and is being committed by the national government.

Was the Constitution intended to operate forever? On the surface, the answer is “no” because it superseded an agreement of “perpetual union” without specifying that it was also an agreement of “perpetual union” — an omission that could hardly have been lost on the delegates to the convention of 1787 or the States’ ratifying conventions. There is also contemporary evidence that the Constitution wasn’t expected to be “perpetual”; for example:

At the end of the Constitutional Convention, George Washington said, “I do not expect the Constitution to last for more than 20 years.” (Source here.)

Thomas Jefferson [proposed] that the nation adopt an entirely new charter every two decades. A constitution “naturally expires at the end of 19 years,” he wrote to James Madison in 1789. “If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right.” (Source here.)

Moreover, according today’s unanimous opinion in New York v. New Jersey, a State need not prove abuse of the constitutional compact by the national government in order to withdraw from the compact, though proof of abuse (of which there is plenty) would prove valuable in the “court of public opinion”. All that as State must do (Lincoln et al. to the contrary notwithstanding) is to withdraw (secede) from the compact.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, author of the Court’s unanimous opinion, spells it out:

The question presented is straightforward: Does the Waterfront Commission Compact allow New Jersey to unilaterally withdraw from the Compact notwithstanding New York’s opposition? The answer is yes….

Because the Compact’s text does not address whether a State may unilaterally withdraw, we look to background principles of law that would have informed the parties’ understanding when they entered the Compact. This Court has long explained that interstate compacts “are construed as contracts under the principles of contract law.”… To that end, the Court has looked to “background principles of contract law” to interpret compacts that are silent on a particular issue….

Under the default contract-law rule at the time of the Compact’s 1953 formation, as well as today, a contract (like this Compact) that contemplates “continuing performance for an indefinite time is to be interpreted as stipulating only for performance terminable at the will of either party.”… Parties to a contract that calls for ongoing and indefinite performance generally need not continue performance after the contractual relationship has soured, or when the circumstances that originally motivated the agreement’s formation have changed, for example….

In sum, background principles of contract law, reinforced here by principles of state sovereignty and the fact that the States did not intend for the Compact to operate forever, indicate that New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact. To be clear, the contract-law rule that we apply today governs compacts (like this Compact) that are silent as to unilateral withdrawal and that exclusively call for ongoing performance on an indefinite basis.

There you have it: a precedent that any State can use to argue that it has the right to withdraw from the compact known as the Constitution, and therefore from the confederation known as the United States of America.

To Pay or Not to Pay …

… that is the question.

It’s tax time. Let’s celebrate with a bit of revisionist literary history. William Shakespeare was a tax protestor. Think about the message hidden in the titles of several of his plays:

A Midsummer Night’s Dream is about a man who hopes soon to repay the money he borrowed to meet his tax bill. Winter’s Tale follows him through months of overtime work as he struggles to save money for his old age. In Love’s Labor’s Lost he confronts the ugly reality that his savings will go to the IRS. A Comedy of Errors depicts his travails with Form 1040 and its many schedules. In Much Ado About Nothing he discovers, alas, that he owes the IRS even more than he had feared. Stunned by the discovery, he decides in Twelfth Night (April 12) not to file a tax return and tears it into tiny pieces. He reconsiders, and The Tempest recounts his struggle to complete a new return by the deadline for filing. As You Like It celebrates his triumphal march to the Post Office, armed with a return that shows him even with the IRS. All’s Well That Ends Well is a fantasy in which the IRS finds no fault with our hero’s return.

Then there is the real text of Hamlet’s soliloquy:

To file or not to file — that is the question;
Whether ‘tis nobler in the pocketbook to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous taxes,
Or to take arms against a sea of instructions
And by ignoring evade them. To file — to pay —
No more; and by not paying to say we end
The headache and the burdensome debts
That Uncle Sam is heir to — ‘tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish’d. To run — to hide —
To hide! Perchance in Bimini! Ay there’s the spot;
For in that sunny isle what dreams may come
When we have eluded the revenue agent
Must give us pause; there’s the reality
That makes mockery of such simple plans;
For who would bear the heat and hard bunks of Leavenworth;
The cell-block bully’s fist, the guard’s glare
The bagginess of prison garb, the sad children’s tears,
The righteousness of neighbors, and the spurns
That the gray-faced ex-con takes
When he himself might his quietus make
With a simple check? Who would these taxes bear,
To grunt and sweat under a glaring desk lamp,
But that the dread of something after mid-April,
The uncelebrated penitentiary from whose walls
No inmate leaves, without parole,
And makes us rather bear those taxes we must
Than fly to Bimini or other exotic places?
Thus conscience does make taxpayers of us all….

How Will Civil War II Start?

This is a trick question.

Donald Trump was indicted not only to “get Trump” — and end in itself for the left — but also to ensure his nomination as the GOP candidate for president in 2024. With a riled-up “base”, Trump is sure to be nominated, even if he is in prison — especially if he is in prison.

Trump will then lose the election because almost no one will vote for him other than his hard-core supporters, who probably comprise one-third of the electorate. I voted for Trump twice because he was the lesser of two evils — by a long shot — but he is now unelectable. Worse than that, his nomination will secure a Democrat victory.

A lot of otherwise GOP-leaning voters will stay home out of disgust with Trump’s crudity and resignation to a Democrat victory. That will leave a solid majority of voters — including NeverTrumpers, independents, and other pearl-clutching types — to join Yellow-Dog Democrats (there ain’t no other kind no more) to deliver a landslide victory to Joe Biden or to his successor after his influence-peddling while VP becomes undeniable or he is declared mentally incompetent, whichever comes first. It is even possible that the Dems will forgo electoral fraud, which the GOP will be better-equipped to detect in 2024, thus “legitimizing” the victory of the Dems’ nominee.

With the election of 2024 out of the way and a Democrat still in the White House, all hell will break loose. By “all hell”, I mean the full-scale construction of a fascistic state, which will be accomplished by executive fiat and friendly judges even if the GOP somehow controls at least one chamber of Congress despite Trump’s resounding defeat. It’s more likely, however, that Democrats will securely hold both chambers of Congress and will enact whatever fascistic and economically destructive legislation comes out of the White House, thus coating it with a veneer of legality that would not accrue to executive orders. The only possible bulwark of liberty — a conservative-controlled Supreme Court — will be breached by a successful court-packing plan that FDR would have envied. (This will be supplemented by packing district and appellate courts.)

All hell having broken loose, (solid) Red State governors and legislatures will engage in acts of resistance of the legalistic variety. These will fail because (a) their success would require judicial support, which will be lacking, and (b) the Democrat administration will simply ignore rulings that are unfavorable to its agenda. (The Biden administration’s flouting of immigration law, work-arounds to blunt the effect of Dobbs, and refusal to protect conservative Supreme Court justices’ homes are harbingers of the lawlessness to come.)

Red State hot-heads will then be unable to resist the urge to engage in futile acts of violence against the regime. The effect will be to justify harsh “anti-terroristic” measures that will result in unbridled censorship and jailing of conservatives for the mere “crime” of pointing out the regime’s lawlessness. But that would just be the start of full-scale suppression of dissent.

Red State governments that try to resist the regime will be found to be unconstitutional according to some kind of legalistic argumentation. The central government will then declare them null and void, invoking the Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government….” (Article IV, Section 4). Armed resistance, where it is attempted, will be squashed by superior force and rewarded with draconian punishments.

So … the answer to the question posed by the title of this post is that Civil War II won’t start. It will be aborted by the pro-abortion party.

The moral of this depressing look into the future? The GOP must find a way to deny Trump the nomination and keep him off the ballot as a third-party candidate. If those things can be done, and if the GOP is able to thwart excessive electoral chicanery, the dire picture I have drawn may not come to pass.

But … it is also quite possible that the Dems will simply refuse to concede the election and find a way (backed by force) to nullify it.

Thoughts about Jack Teixeira

With commentary about unequal justice before the law.

You know about Jack Teixeira, of course. He’s the Air National Guardsman who published a “trove” highly classified information on the internet in recent months.

Unfortunately, execution is no longer contemplated as a punishment for crime, except in a few still-enlightened States. And if Hillary is allowed to flout the law and store classified information on a server in her home, why should Teixeira be held to a different standard? He will be, of course, but it won’t be done in the kind of swift and harsh way that discourages emulators. If he had wanted to do something subversive without being punished, he should have worn a dress and bombed the home of a conservative justice.

A Baseball Memory

When games were short and ballparks were fan-friendly.

I bought a pair of tickets for a Detroit-Baltimore day-night doubleheader to be to be played at Detroit on August 15, 1961. The friend who had planned to go with me dropped out. I asked my father if he’d like to go and he snapped up the invitation.

Before I tell you about the games, I must set the stage.

Tiger Stadium, formerly Navin Field and Briggs Stadium, was a gem of a ballpark. It was double-decked all the way around and roofed all the way around, except for the bleachers in deep center field. The playing field was maintained meticulously and sparkled in the bright lights when the Tigers played night games.

Here’s a daytime photo of Tiger Stadium from 1961 (Tony Spina, Detroit Free Press.)

The best seats were in the upper deck. They were the best seats because the upper deck was stacked above the lower deck (not set back as in modern ballparks), affording fans who wisely opted for the upper deck a bird’s eye view of the action on the field and a clear view of the trajectory of high fly balls. On August 15, 1961, my father and I were seated in the upper deck behind third base (and in front of the columns that supported the roof).

The 1961 Tigers were making their best run at an American League pennant since the 1950 team finished 3 games behind the hated Yankees. The Tigers had led the league as recently as July 24. Going into the doubleheader, the Tigers were only 3-1/2 games behind the Yankees.

The 1961 team featured future Hall-of-Famer Al Kaline, who was enjoying another outstanding year in right field. He was joined in the outfield by wide-ranging center-fielder Bill Bruton and slugging left-fielder Rocky Colavito. (Kaline and Colavito both possessed powerful throwing arms.) Colavito’s home-run output (45 in 1961) was supplemented by the first-baseman Norm Cash a slick fielder with power (41 home runs in 1961) whose once-in-a-career batting average (.361) won him the AL batting title and helped to keep the Tigers in contention.

What made the doubleheader so memorable for me — aside from being with my father in a beautiful “green cathedral” — was the excitement of the two games. The Tigers won the first one 2-0, on 7th inning 2-run homer by Cash (with Colavito on first with a single). The Tigers came back to win the second game 3-2; Kaline singled to drive in the winning run in the bottom of the 9th. They double-header sweep narrowed left the Tigers only 2 games behind the Yankees. (They stayed close for another few weeks, and were only 1-1/2 games behind on September 1. They then faded and finished in second place by 8 games.)

The double victory was made all the more enjoyable by the swiftness of the games: the first one was clocked at 2:15; the second one at 2:25. Now, 62 years later, major-league baseball is striving to match such celerity by resorting to the artifice of the pitch clock. (The application of the rule book would do the trick.)

But that’s not the end of the story. Baseball games of that day were for real fans; they weren’t substitutes for trips to Disney World. To be sure, there were groups of Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, etc., but those groups were confined to distant outfield seats. For most fans, the aisles were devoid of children running up and down and being escorted endlessly to rest rooms (as they were in my later visits to ball parks). And the ear-splitting music of today and recent decades was blissfully absent; between-inning music, when there was any, was supplied by a rather tame electronic organ.

The good old days of baseball (and much else) really were good.