How Good Are the Presidential Polls?

The results of the final polls in the last five presidential elections have pointed to four winners. Sounds good? You won’t think so after reading this post.

The values depicted in the graphs at the bottom of this post represent 10-poll averages of respondents’ presidential choices in two-way races (i.e., Republican or Democrat). The dates are mid-points of the periods during which the 10-poll samples were conducted.

The solid black lines trace the percentage-point lead (or deficit) for the eventual “winner” of the (meaningless) nationwide tally of the popular vote in each presidential election from 2004 through 2020. The gray lines trace the margins of error claimed by the organizations issuing the polls. (The dashed gray lines for 2004 are estimates derived by assuming a margin of error of 3 percentage points, which is typical of the later polls.) The range from the upper gray line to the lower gray line represents a 95-percent confidence interval; that is, the actual result would be within the range (or at its outer limit) with a probability of 95 percent.

The red diamond at the right in each graph is the “winner’s” actual margin of “victory” in the nationwide tally of popular votes. In every case, the actual margin of “victory” is within or at the outer limit of the final 95-percent confidence interval. (I use “sneer quotes” because there is no “winner” of the nationwide popular vote, which is a meaningless number. Presidential elections are decided State-by-State, and in 48 of 50 cases the candidate with the greatest number of popular votes in that State receives the State’s entire bloc of electoral votes.)

Putting that aside for the moment, the 95-percent confidence interval covers a range of about 6 percentage points. That is, the “winner’s” actual margin in the (meaningless) nationwide popular vote could be as many as 6 percentage points away the final 10-poll average. A margin of 6 percentage points means that the “winner’s” share of the popular vote could be 3 percent higher or lower than the share implied by the final 10-poll average. Given the statistical relationship between popular votes and electoral votes (discussed here), a shift of 3 percent can mean a gain or loss of 30 percent of the electoral vote.

What lies behind such a disproportionate response to such a small shift? It is the fact that a miniscule change in the distribution of a State’s popular vote can (in 48 cases out of 50) cause a 100-percent swing in the allocation of its electoral votes.

To take a concrete example, Trump won the electoral vote in 2016 despite Clinton’s 2.1 percent margin of “victory” in the tally of popular votes cast in the 50 States and District of Columbia. Clinton’s margin of “victory” was 2.9 million popular votes. She won California by 4.3 million popular votes. In other words, she “lost” the rest of the U.S. by 1.4 million popular votes. Crucially, she lost three States with a total of 46 electoral votes — Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin — by margins of 0.2 to 0.8 percent. Those three losses cost her the election.

To take another example, Biden’s 4.5 percent popular-vote “victory” in 2020 was much larger than Clinton’s. His huge win in California (5.1 million votes more than Trump) left him with a “victory” of about 2 million votes in the rest of the country. But Biden wouldn’t have won the election without narrow victories in Arizona (11 EV, margin of 0.3 percent), Georgia (16 EV, 0.2 percent), Pennsylvania (20 EV, 1.18 percent), and Wisconsin (10 EV, 0.63 percent).

Finally, there’s the case of the 2000 election (not represented in the graphs below), which Bush “lost” by more than 500,000 votes. He didn’t really lose the election, of course, because he won the crucial State of Florida by 537 votes when the U.S. Supreme Court put a stop to the illegal manufacture of votes for Gore in several Democrat-controlled jurisdictions.

Is there a fail-safe lead in the polls? Let’s return to 2020, when Biden eked out an electoral-vote win by “beating” Trump nationwide by 4.5 percentage points — a lead that was at the bottom edge of the 95-percent confidence interval for the final 10 polls. The center of that confidence interval — the 10-poll average — was 7.6 percentage points. You might suppose that a lead (in the polls) of that size would guarantee an election victory, but it didn’t. A lot of dirty pool was required.

Finally, the accuracy of the polls is compromised by two other facts: The mid-point of the polling period for the final 10 polls occurs three or four days before election day. Early voting has become more prevalent in this century, and it played a huge role in the election of 2020.

The lesson learned: Don’t bet on the outcome of a presidential election unless a candidate is leading in the final 10 polls by, say, 9 percentage points or more. (See above commentary about Biden’s final poll numbers in 2020.) Don’t bet against that candidate, and don’t expect to win more than a pittance if you bet on him to win. Anything else — like betting on a 3-point favorite — is pure guesswork or hope.

That’s reality. And don’t let a pollster tell you otherwise.

Here are the graphs:

Sources and notes — Values derived from the polls of polls at RealClearPolitics.com for the presidential elections of 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. The polls completed entirely in June of each election year were organized chronologically according to the middle date of each polling period. A moving, 10-poll average/lead deficit was then computed, as well as moving 10-poll average margin of error.

The Coming Showdown — As It Would Be if the U.S. Had Leaders Who Care about America

Iran is testing the resolve of the U.S. government by ordering the Houthis to attack shipping in the Red Sea. I doubt that the U.S. government under Biden & Co. will pass the test. But if it did pass the test, here’s what would happen:

  • In response to the attacks, the U.S. would strike Iran directly and with more than token force.
  • The strike wouldn’t decapitate the Irania regime. But the regime would be placed on notice to cease the attacks or face devastation.
  • Russia and China would be told — in no uncertain terms — to butt out of a dispute between the West and iran.
  • That should be the end of it. If it isn’t, all Iranian government and military targets, including “secret” nuclear weapons facility, would be obliterated.

Would Russia and China care to challenge the U.S. after that?  I think not.

Will it happen under Biden & Co.? I think not.

China’s Ascendancy: A Legacy of the Misconduct of the Korean War

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur differed privately and then publicly with President Harry S Truman about the conduct of the Korean War: Truman wanted to settle for stalemate, MacArthur wanted to press on to victory. MacArthur’s reward for presuming that victory was the aim of war came on April 11, 1951, when Truman dismissed him as commander of UN forces in Korea, CinC of the U.S. Far East Command, and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, that, is Japan’s overlord.

The firing of MacArthur — a war hero and acclaimed military leader since the U.S. expedition into Mexico in 1914 — instigated a firestorm of calumny directed at Truman and his administration and paeans of praise and honor for MacArthur.

The highest point of MacArthur’s homecoming was his appearance before a joint session of Congress on April 19, 1951. His speech is perhaps most famous for its concluding lines, described here by William Manchester in American Caesar:

He praised “your fighting sons,” reporting that “they are splendid in every way.… Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.” Then, in words few would forget, he said: “I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day, which proclaimed, most proudly, that ‘Old soldiers never die. They just fade away.’ And like the soldier of the ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.” The last word was a hush: “Good-bye.”

Before reaching that point, MacArthur addressed appeasement (again quoting Manchester):

All his life he had been a daring officer, an advocate of aggressive action, and now he told his listeners why: “History teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means—where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?” He paused histrionically, and his voice dropped to a husky whisper: “I could not answer.”

MacArthur followed his triumphal speech with a tour of cities across the U.S. Here is Manchester again on one stop along the way:

On Saturday, March 22, 1952, MacArthur capped his campaign against the administration. Standing on the steps of the capitol in Jackson, Mississippi, he charged that administration policies were “leading toward a Communist state with as dreadful certainly as though the leaders of the Kremlin were charting the course.” He deplored massive American aid to Europe; charity should begin at home, he said; although billions had been spent on the Continent, he doubted that the United States had “gained a single convert to the cause of freedom or inspired new or deeper friendships” there. Of the Korean truce talks, which had been under way for eight months, he said that “the only noticeable result is that the enemy has gained time,” and he prophesied that “our failure… in Korea will probably mean the ultimate loss of continental Asia.”

What he meant — and which everyone then understood — was the loss of continental Asia (i.e., the People’s Republic of China — the PRC — and the nations on its periphery) to the brand of Communism that then ruled and still rules the PRC.

And so the loss is coming to pass, and so will it extend well beyond continental Asia. Communists play the long game, as they are able to do — unencumbered as they are with fickleness of “democratic” politics.

In addition to the obvious (but as yet unanswered) buildup of naval and military forces and facilities in and around the strategically invaluable South China Sea, and the imminent demise of the Republic of China (a.k.a. Taiwan), there is just as importantly the PRC’s leading if not dominant position in international trade. The latter has been acquired in large part by the acquiescence of Western elites to the trading of the West’s industrial (and thus military) infrastructure for goods made in PRC factories under conditions that those same elites would deplore if found in the West.

A realistic reading of the PRC’s intentions and U.S. fecklessness is offered by James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer in “Credible Assurance Is Appeasement by Another Name” (American Greatness, December 11, 2023):

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) mourns the loss of their “old friend” Dr. Henry Kissinger, who passed away on November 29, it is worth noting his influence as the originator of the “Engagement School” of thought towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which remains the dominant voice amongst the “China Hands” of America’s foreign policy establishment. Ironically, this was exemplified the day after his death in the pages of the Council of Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs international relations magazine. It published an article entitled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence: Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China.”…

The authors condemn “ill-advised” statements by former and current U.S. officials who have called for the United States Government (USG) to formally recognize Taiwan. The authors go so far as to demand that USG officials avoid even giving the impression that America is moving toward restoring formal diplomatic relations or a defense alliance with the island, even in the face of the PRC’s military threats against Taiwan that have dramatically spiked in the past year….

[T]hroughout the article the authors provide no acknowledgement for the past 30 years of prior “credible assurances” the USG has made to the PRC through the implementation of the Kissinger School of Engagement by both Democrat and Republican Administrations.

The authors make no mention of the Clinton administration’s efforts to provide the PRC, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), access to sensitive rocket and space technology or for ushering the PRC into the World Trade Organization (WTO) before the PRC’s economy was fully qualified. WTO entry greatly accelerated its military capabilities and thus threat to Taiwan and the U.S. and its allies. Neither still do the authors fully acknowledgement the Bush administration’s very public castigation of former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bien for his comments regarding independence.

What is most egregious is the failure of the authors to acknowledge the decades old policy of the U.S. Department of Defense’s invitations to their PLA counterparts to visit U.S. naval bases in Hawaii, San Diego, and Norfolk and to openly share with them solutions to improving the PLA as a fighting force. Neither do the author’s mention the Obama administration’s dismantlement of the U.S. Navy over an eight-year period that subsequently led to the PRC Navy becoming the largest in the world. In that vein, the authors also make no mention of the current administration’s pleadings to re-establish military-to-military relations to bring down the tensions they claim are so dangerous, and dominate, in U.S.-PRC relations.

The fact is these authors know full well that none of these efforts at “credible assurance” have altered the CCP from achieving its strategic goal of achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the PRC. Its end state demands the degradation of the United States and the post WWII system of peace and stability that most of the world has benefited from like no other time in history.

What is also clear is that the authors’ article has been used by pro-PRC parties in Taiwan to undermine the upcoming Presidential and parliamentary elections on January 13, 2024 and to interfere in Taiwan’s inherent right to pursue their own self-determination. This amounts to election interference, which the pro-PRC Engagement community appears to believe is their duty. Yet, regardless of what the authors claim, the assertion that Washington and Taipei must provide “credible assurances” is appeasement to the CCP and will only lead to more aggression and danger.

Rather than take the advice of these appeasers, American leaders should stand firm against the threat of war from the PRC and instead should get busy building up the hard-power elements of America’s national defense, which the authors dishonestly proclaim has received too much attention. The reality is the opposite—America’s military power vis-à-vis the PRC and our ability to deter a PRC invasion of Taiwan are at their lowest levels ever.

Taiwan is far from the PRC’s only target, of course. This is from Ellen Nakashima and Joseph Nenn’s “China’s Cyber Army Is Invading Critical U.S. Services” (The Washington Post, December 11, 2023):

The Chinese military is ramping up its ability to disrupt key American infrastructure, including power and water utilities as well as communications and transportation systems, according to U.S. officials and industry security officials.

Hackers affiliated with China’s People’s Liberation Army have burrowed into the computer systems of about two dozen critical entities over the past year, these experts said.

The intrusions are part of a broader effort to develop ways to sow panic and chaos or snarl logistics in the event of a U.S.-China conflict in the Pacific, they said.

Among the victims are a water utility in Hawaii, a major West Coast port and at least one oil and gas pipeline, people familiar with the incidents told The Washington Post. The hackers also attempted to break into the operator of Texas’s power grid, which operates independently from electrical systems in the rest of the country.

Several entities outside the United States, including electric utilities, also have been victimized by the hackers, said the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

None of the intrusions affected industrial control systems that operate pumps, pistons or any critical function, or caused a disruption, U.S. officials said. But they said the attention to Hawaii, which is home to the Pacific Fleet, and to at least one port as well as logistics centers suggests the Chinese military wants the ability to complicate U.S. efforts to ship troops and equipment to the region if a conflict breaks out over Taiwan….

“It is very clear that Chinese attempts to compromise critical infrastructure are in part to pre-position themselves to be able to disrupt or destroy that critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict, to either prevent the United States from being able to project power into Asia or to cause societal chaos inside the United States — to affect our decision-making around a crisis,” said Brandon Wales, executive director of the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “That is a significant change from Chinese cyber activity from seven to 10 years ago that was focused primarily on political and economic espionage.”…

The hackers are looking for a way to get in and stay in without being detected, said Joe McReynolds, a China security studies fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank focused on security issues. “You’re trying to build tunnels into your enemies’ infrastructure that you can later use to attack. Until then you lie in wait, carry out reconnaissance, figure out if you can move into industrial control systems or more critical companies or targets upstream. And one day, if you get the order from on high, you switch from reconnaissance to attack.”

The disclosures to The Post build on the annual threat assessment in February by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which warned that China “almost certainly is capable” of launching cyberattacks that would disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.

“If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide,” the assessment said….

This is far from China’s first foray into hacking critical infrastructure. In 2012, a Canadian company, Telvent, whose software remotely operated major natural gas pipelines in North America, notified customers that a sophisticated hacker had breached its firewalls and stolen data relating to industrial control systems. The cybersecurity firm Mandiant traced the breach to a prolific PLA hacking group, Unit 61398. Five members of the unit were indicted in 2014 on charges of hacking U.S. companies.

At the time, the U.S. government wasn’t sure whether China’s aim was to collect intelligence or pre-position itself to disrupt. Today, based on intelligence collection and the fact that the facilities targeted have little intelligence of political or economic value, U.S. officials say it’s clear that the only reason to penetrate them is to be able to conduct disruptive or destructive actions later….

China “is sitting on a stockpile of strategic” vulnerabilities, or undisclosed security flaws it can use in stealthy attacks, Adamski said last month at the CyberWarCon conference in Washington. “This is a fight for our critical infrastructure. We have to make it harder for them.”

The topic of Chinese cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure was on a proposed list of talking points to raise in Biden’s encounter with Xi, according to people familiar with the matter, but it did not come up in the four-hour meeting [emphasis added].

And so it goes. Appeasement sooner or later yields aggression against the appeasers — and the multitudes of innocent bystanders who are gulled in supporting the appeasers.

Political Conservatism Is Centrist

I have described the spectrum of political ideologies as a circle. But as I rethink my analysis, I conclude that the spectrum should be thought of a straight line. At the left is statism (which is really leftist even when it is said to be rightist), conservatism is in the middle, and pure libertarianism (anarchy) is at the right.

Statism is statism: The ruler or ruling class decides how you should live and ensures, through physical and psychological coercion that you live as you are told to live.

Anarchy is the opposite of statism: No one is in charge of everyone. Whether anarchy is good or bad depends on the morals of the potentially most powerful persons or coalitions.

Conservatism is therefore centrist because it recognizes the need for a state of defined and limited power — just enough power to enforce a benign morality.

Trump vs. Biden: 5a

REVISED METHODOLOGY AND UPDATED RESULTS

RealClearPolitics maintains a running tally of presidential election polls. I construct a moving average of the results, where the average represents Trump’s adjusted margin for the 10 most recent polls (taking the mid-point of each polling period as the date of each poll).

I then convert that 10-poll average to an estimate of Trump’s share of the two-party popular vote. For example, an average margin of +4 indicates a 52-48 split of the popular vote, that is, Trump gets 52 percent of the popular vote.

Finally, I apply my algorithm for the relationship between the GOP candidate’s share of the electoral vote and his share of two-party popular vote. Here is the trend since July 30, 2023:

These basic estimates of popular-vote and electoral-vote shares don’t account for the margin of error in pollsters’ findings or the margin of error in my estimate of electoral votes. When I apply those margins of error, Trump’s share of the electoral vote ranges from 40 percent to 77 percent for the 10 most-recent polls.

CAVEAT: These are not estimates of the outcome of next year’s election. They simply reflect the stated preferences of voters for Trump or Biden when the polls were conducted.