Where’s the Outrage?

UPDATE (11/18/17): It’s only fair to note that in the three days since I posted this I haven’t seen any objections to the Wumo strip. It’s either too funny for outrage or not on the radar of the easily outraged — perhaps both.

This funny Wumo strip, though dated November 3, appeared in today’s papers:

I expect Wumo and/or many of the newspapers to apologize abjectly for giving offense to transgendered persons. Those who are secure in their adopted sexual identity will find it funny. But there will howls of outrage from “liberals”, whose search for “victims” to defend is never-ending.

Dining with “Liberals”

Yesterday evening my wife and I dined at the Austin home of her female first cousin, once removed. Others in attendance were the cousin’s husband, the cousin’s parents (the father is my wife’s first cousin), the cousin’s brother and his wife, and my wife’s sister and her husband. The cast was white, college-educated, professional (the host and hostess are lawyers), and various shades of left (except for me). The topics of conversation — other than children, grandchildren, and renovations — included Trump, Rand Paul, guns, abortion, stereotyping, and the Austin school-bond proposal, which passed 70-30 on November 7.

You can guess how it went:

Trump is crazy and evil. People who voted for him didn’t know what they were doing.

There was an initial “cover up” about the extent of Rand Paul’s injuries. (Actually, he didn’t realize their extent for quite a while after he was blind-sided by his neighbor, Rene Boucher.) So maybe there’s some hanky-panky involving Paul and the attacker’s wife. That one was pulled out of thin air, but there was no mention of the more credible, widely discussed, political motivation for the attack. As one source puts it, “Boucher is a registered Democrat. He is shown through Facebook postings to be highly critical of President Donald Trump, Boucher is also an advocate for gun control and healthcare reform [i.e., Obamacare].” (I strongly suspect that Boucher is a James Hodgkinson without a rifle, a one-man Antifa mob.)

Guns should be controlled, but not “my” guns.

Men have no business deciding what women do with “their bodies”, as if an unborn child were an appendix.

Stereotyping is bad. This topic was introduced by a woman who recalled that an “ignorant” woman once made anti-Semitic remarks in her presence, not knowing that she is Jewish — because “I don’t look Jewish”, she said. So she was actually stereotyping Jews while objecting to stereotyping. And there was much stereotyping of people who voted for Trump, people who own guns (themselves excepted, of course), rural types, and all the other usual suspects.

It’s wonderful that the school-bond proposal was adopted, even though (no one said this) it will drive more low-income families out of Austin and cause “liberals” to find more ways to subsidize “affordable housing” (i.e., try to keep Austin from becoming entirely white), even though such subsidies will cause taxes to rise even more. (“Liberals” never seem to grasp the connection between their voting habits and their tax bills.)

I kept my mouth shut, of course, having no wish to upset my wife or spoil the feeling of smug unanimity that prevailed. Further, I actually like those people. They are truly nice, and good company when they’re not virtue-signalling to each other.

Down the Memory Hole

The present drive to deny history is part of the broader movement to impose uniformity of thought by denying to the targeted group its sense of uniqueness and its badges of greatness. It is an ages-old and successful strategy. It puts the targeted group on the defensive. And divides the targeted group by seducing many of its members into joining the cause, in the name of “liberalism” and in repudiation of “white supremacy”.

Thus the eagerness of media elites, academicians, collegians, and others who are swayed by “correct” opinion to join the lynch mob that is baying for the blood of heterosexual white males of European descent — retroactively and prospectively. It won’t end with heterosexual white males of European descent, as is already evident. Having succeeded in dominating its primary target group, the lynch mob will begin to purge the “impure” from its ranks, starting with heterosexual white females of European descent.

Asians will be next because they are no longer among the “oppressed”, and are generally just too smart and successful to be “victims” on a par with Hispanics and blacks. An uncivil war will break out between those two groups, which will leave the field open for the real instigators of the whole mess — white elites of European descent and various sexual persuasions.

It is those elites who started the revolution in the Progressive Era, have kept it going for almost 150 years, and have managed to survive (despite their ethnicity and coloration) by dint of their cunning and rhetorical skills. Their persistence and success is a testament to the allure of power, which is far stronger (among them) than the allure of wealth, fame, or liberty.


Related reading:

Bill Vallicella, “Did the U.S. Defeat the S.U. Just to Become Another S.U.?“, Maverick Philosopher, November 11, 2017

Monica Showalter, “The Triumph of Bill Ayers“, American Thinker, November 12, 2017

Related posts:
I Want My Country Back
Undermining the Free Society
The Destruction of Society in the Name of “Society”
Society and the State
Well-Founded Pessimism
America: Past, Present, and Future
IQ, Political Correctness, and America’s Present Condition
The Barbarians Within and the State of the Union
The View from Here
O Tempora O Mores!
A Home of One’s Own
The Criminality and Psychopathy of Statism
Surrender? Hell No!
Romanticizing the State
Democracy, Human Nature, and the Future of America
1963: The Year Zero
Society
How Democracy Works
How Government Subverts Social Norms
Turning Points
The Twilight’s Last Gleaming?
How America Has Changed
Civil War?
The “H” Word, the Left, and Donald Trump
The Hypocrisy of “Local Control”
Red-Diaper Babies and Enemies Within
Suicidal Despair and the “War on Whites”
Death of a Nation
What’s Going On? A Stealth Revolution

The Battle Flag Restored

I had removed the Battle Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia from my sidebar, just to declutter it. But today I read this:

In Austin, Texas, Mayor Steve Adler won’t be marching in Saturday’s Veteran’s Day parade because groups marching in the parade will be carrying the Confederate battle flag.

“Symbols of racism, Civil War secession, and white supremacy should not be forgotten or erased, but they need to be remembered and studied in museums and classrooms, not cheered and applauded in parades,” said Adler.

And so I have restored the Battle Flag to a place of prominance in my sidebar for the reasons that I give below it:

On this blog, as in most places where it appears, the Battle Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia — Lee’s Army — stands for deliverance from an oppressive national government and resistance to political correctness, not racism. For more, see my post, “Defending the Offensive“.

Adler is typical of Austin, a place that commands my taxes and repels my soul.

A (Long) Footnote about Science

In “Deduction, Induction, and Knowledge” I make a case that knowledge (as opposed to belief) can only be inductive, that is, limited to specific facts about particular phenomena. It’s true that a hypothesis or theory about a general pattern of relationships (e.g., the general theory of relativity) can be useful, and even necessary. As I say at the end of “Deduction…”, the fact that a general theory can’t be proven

doesn’t — and shouldn’t — stand in the way of acting as if we possess general knowledge. We must act as if we possess general knowledge. To do otherwise would result in stasis, or analysis-paralysis.

Which doesn’t mean that a general theory should be accepted just because it seems plausible. Some general theories — such as global climate models (or GCMs) are easily falsified. They persist only because pseudo-scientists and true believers refuse to abandon them. (There is no such thing as “settled science”.)

Neil Lock, writing at Watts Up With That?, offers this perspective on inductive vs. deductive thinking:

Bottom up thinking is like the way we build a house. Starting from the ground, we work upwards, using what we’ve done already as support for what we’re working on at the moment. Top down thinking, on the other hand, starts out from an idea that is a given. It then works downwards, seeking evidence for the idea, or to add detail to it, or to put it into practice….

The bottom up thinker seeks to build, using his senses and his mind, a picture of the reality of which he is a part. He examines, critically, the evidence of his senses. He assembles this evidence into percepts, things he perceives as true. Then he pulls them together and generalizes them into concepts. He uses logic and reason to seek understanding, and he often stops to check that he is still on the right lines. And if he finds he has made an error, he tries to correct it.

The top down thinker, on the other hand, has far less concern for logic or reason, or for correcting errors. He tends to accept new ideas only if they fit his pre-existing beliefs. And so, he finds it hard to go beyond the limitations of what he already knows or believes. [“‘Bottom Up’ versus ‘Top Down’ Thinking — On Just about Everything“, October 22, 2017]

(I urge you to read the whole thing, in which Lock applies the top down-bottom up dichotomy to a broad range of issues.)

Lock overstates the distinction between the two modes of thought. A lot of “bottom up” thinkers derive general hypotheses from their observations about particular events. But — and this is a big “but” — they are also amenable to revising their hypotheses when they encounter facts that contradict them. The best scientists are bottom-up and top-down thinkers whose beliefs are based on bottom-up thinking.

General hypotheses are indispensable guides to “everyday” living. Some of them (e.g., fire burns, gravity causes objects to fall) are such reliable guides that it’s foolish to assume their falsity. Nor does it take much research to learn, for example, that there are areas within a big city where violent crime is rampant. A prudent person — even a “liberal” one — will therefore avoid those areas.

There are also general patterns — now politically incorrect to mention — with respect to differences in physical, psychological, and intellectual traits and abilities between men and women and among races. (See this, this, and this, for example.) These patterns explain disparities in achievement, but they are ignored by true believers who would wish away the underlying causes and penalize those who are more able (in a relevant dimension) for the sake of ersatz equality. The point is that a good many people — perhaps most people — studiously ignore facts of some kind in order to preserve their cherished beliefs about themselves and the world around them.

Which brings me back to science and scientists. Scientists, for the most part, are human beings with a particular aptitude for pattern-seeking and the manipulation of abstract ideas. They can easily get lost in such pursuits and fail to notice that their abstractions have taken them a long way from reality (e.g., Einstein’s special theory of relativity).

This is certainly the case in physics, where scientists admit that the standard model of sub-atomic physics “proves” that the universe shouldn’t exist. (See Andrew Griffin, “The Universe Shouldn’t Exist, Scientists Say after Finding Bizarre Behaviour of Anti-Matter“, The Independent, October 23, 2017.) It is most certainly the case in climatology, where many pseudo-scientists have deployed hopelessly flawed models in the service of policies that would unnecessarily cripple the economy of the United States.

As I say here,

scientists are human and fallible. It is in the best tradition of science to distrust their claims and to dismiss their non-scientific utterances.

Non-scientific utterances are not only those which have nothing to do with a scientist’s field of specialization, but also include those that are based on theories which derive from preconceptions more than facts. It is scientific to admit lack of certainty. It is unscientific — anti-scientific, really — to proclaim certainty about something that is so little understood the origin of the universe or Earth’s climate.


Related posts:
Hemibel Thinking
The Limits of Science
The Thing about Science
Science in Politics, Politics in Science
Global Warming and the Liberal Agenda
Debunking “Scientific Objectivity”
Pseudo-Science in the Service of Political Correctness
Science’s Anti-Scientific Bent
“Warmism”: The Myth of Anthropogenic Global Warming
Modeling Is Not Science
Demystifying Science
Analysis for Government Decision-Making: Hemi-Science, Hemi-Demi-Science, and Sophistry
Pinker Commits Scientism
AGW: The Death Knell
The Limits of Science (II)
The Pretence of Knowledge
“The Science Is Settled”
The Limits of Science, Illustrated by Scientists
Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scientific Knowledge
AGW in Austin?
The “Marketplace” of Ideas
Revisiting the “Marketplace” of Ideas
The Technocratic Illusion
The Precautionary Principle and Pascal’s Wager
AGW in Austin? (II)
Is Science Self-Correcting?
“Science” vs. Science: The Case of Evolution, Race, and Intelligence
Modeling Revisited
Bayesian Irrationality
Mettenheim on Einstein’s Relativity
The Fragility of Knowledge
Global-Warming Hype
Pattern-Seeking
Hurricane Hysteria
Deduction, Induction, and Knowledge
Much Ado about the Unknown and Unkownable

Why I Am Anti-Union

Schadenfreude. That was my reaction to a recent piece by Rick Moran:

A week ago, employees at the Gothamist and DNAinfo were celebrating after a successful vote to join the Writers Guild. The Gothamist is a noted New York City website that is devoted to covering local news. They operate affiliated sites in Washington, D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

But the reporters’ celebration was shortlived. Yesterday, the publisher of the Gothamist and its parent website, DNAifno, informed all employees that he was shutting them down.

Joe Ricketts, who founded Ameritrade, made the announcement in an email….

The question isn’t whether Ricketts was justified in pulling the plug. The question is why employees thought the outcome would be any different?

Many unions in 21st century America offer a fantasy.   Simple arithmetic would show even the dumbest worker that the dream doesn’t add up and that reality wins in the end. The best example of that is the drive for a $15 an hour minimum wage. When you disconnect the cost of labor from the value of labor, the numbers don’t add up and companies end up losing money or, at best, dramatically reducing profits. In the real world, radically increasing the cost of labor means increasing the price of the products sold. In the case of fast food restaurants, that means a reduction  in traffic leading to fewer customers and less profit.

But organized labor has sold the idea that there are no consequences to raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour. We are already seeing franchises moving rapidly to automate their operations as much as possible and reduce the number of employees — leading to job losses and, just as importantly, fewer jobs created.

The Gothamist employees are shocked, shocked I say, to find out that a news website doesn’t make money and even a billionaire can tolerate losing only so much money before throwing in the towel. Unionizing also brings other headaches that are intolerable to management unless they are gluttons for punishment.

The writing was on the wall for these employees, but they were blinded by their own delusions and naivete. [“Publisher Shutters Websites after Journalists Unionize“, American Thinker, November 3, 2017]

Schadenfreude because I have been anti-union for 60 years.

It began while I was in high school. I had a part-time job bagging groceries at a supermarket. The supermarket was unionized, as was the norm in my home State of Michigan. My wage rate was set by a contract between the supermarket chain and the union, which I had to join as a condition of employment.

After I had been on the job for several months, the manager of the supermarket added shelf-stocking to my duties. According to the union contract, I should have received a raise for doing something other than bagging groceries, which was the lowest-paid job in the store. I complained to the manager about my wage rate. He fired me. The head of the local union couldn’t be bothered to defend me because he knew that I was going off to college in the fall. And so I received no benefit for paying union dues out my measly earnings.

Did I owe those measly earnings to the unionization of the store? I doubt it. I was a fast and effective bagger, unlike the baggers who work where my wife does most of her grocery shopping. I filled a grocery bag so that it wasn’t too heavy or too light; I put the heavy items on the bottom and the crushable items on top; I separated produce and frozen foods from soap and other scented items; etc. Given my superior skill as a bagger, the effect of the union contract was to penalize me and transfer some of my earnings to the less efficient baggers who worked with me.

That’s a good enough reason to be anti-union. But there are other reasons, having to do with freedom of association and freedom of contract.

I have nothing against the formation of a union, in principle. The formation of a union as a voluntary organization is an exercise of the unenumerated right of freedom of association, which is contemplated in the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. By the same token, when labor laws force a person to join union, that person’s constitutional right to freedom of association is violated.

Moreover, such laws violate the freedom of contract guaranteed in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States. The violation impinges on the right of the individual worker to negotiate with an employer. By the same token, the violation impinges on the right of the employer to negotiate with each of his employees, taking into account their particular skills and performance.

Further, forced unionization impinges on the employer’s unenumerated constitutional right to the lawful use of his business property.

There is also the effect of unionization on employment. If the contracted wage rate is set below the wage rate that would obtain in the absence of unionization, workers (or many of them) are underpaid. In the more typical case, where a union strives to set a wage rate higher than the market-clearing rate, employers hire fewer workers than they would absent unionization. (There’s an obvious parallel with the minimum wage.)

I am always gladdened when I read that labor-union membership in the United States has declined, not just as a percentage of the labor force, but in absolute numbers. Personal responsibility isn’t dead in the United States, despite the efforts of most of the nation’s politicians an bureaucrats.


Related posts:
Freedom of Contract and the Rise of Judicial Tyranny
The Upside-Down World of Liberalism
The Interest-Group Paradox
Law and Liberty
Negative Rights
Government Failure: An Example
The Left and Its Delusions
Corporations, Unions, and the State
Judicial Supremacy: Judicial Tyranny
Substantive Due Process, Liberty of Contract, and States’ “Police Power”
Why Liberty of Contract Matters
Whiners
Society, Polarization, and Dissent

Much Ado about the Unknown and Unknowable

The “official” GISS set of temperature records (here) comprises surface thermometer records going back to January 1880. It takes a lot of massaging to construct a monthly time series of “global” temperatures that spans 137 years, with spotty coverage of Earth’s surface (even now), and wide variability in site conditions. There’s the further issue of data manipulation, the most recent example of which was the erasure of the pause that had lasted for almost 19 years.

Taking the GISS numbers at face value, for the moment, what do they suggest about changes in Earth’s temperature (whatever that means)? Almost nothing, when viewed in proper perspective. When viewed, that is, in terms of absolute (Kelvin) temperature readings:

Yes, there’s an upward trend of about 1 degree K (or 1 degree C) per century. And, yes, it’s statistically significant. But the statistical significance is due to the strong correlation between time and temperature. The trend doesn’t explain why Earth’s temperature is what it is. Nor does it explain why it has varied over the past 137 years.

Those variations have been minute. The maximum of 288.79K  is only 1.1 percent higher than the minimum of 285.68K. This minuscule difference must be swamped by measurement and estimation errors. It is credible that Earth’s average temperature — had it been measured consistently over the past 137 years — would have changed less (or more) than the GISS record indicates. It is credible that the observed uptrend is an artifact of selective observation and interpretation. It has become warmer over the past 30 years where I live, for example, but the warming is explained entirely by the urban heat-island effect.

A proper explanation of the minute variations in Earth’s temperature — if real — would incorporate all of the factors that influence Earth’s temperature, starting from Earth’s core and going out into the far reaches of the universe (e.g., to account for the influence of cosmic radiation). Among many things, a proper explanation would encompass the effects of the expansion of the universe, the position and movement of the Milky Way, the position and movement of the Solar System, and the position and movement of Earth within the Solar System, and variations in Earth’s magnetic field.

But global climate models (or GCMs) focus entirely on temperature changes and are limited to superficial factors that are hypothesized to cause those changes — but only those factors that can be measured or estimated by complex and often-dubious methods (e.g., the effects of cloud cover). This is equivalent to searching for one’s car keys under a street lamp because that’s where the light is, even though the car keys were dropped 100 feet away.

The deeper and probably more relevant causes of Earth’s ambient temperature are to be found, I believe, in Earth’s core, magma, plate dynamics, ocean currents and composition, magnetic field, exposure to cosmic radiation, and dozens of other things that — to my knowledge — are ignored by GCMs. Moreover, the complexity of the interactions of such factors, and others that are usually included in GCMs, cannot possibly be modeled.

In sum:

  • Changes in Earth’s temperature are unknown with any degree of confidence.
  • At best, the changes are minute.
  • The causes of the changes are unknown.
  • It is impossible to model Earth’s temperature or changes in it.

It is therefore impossible to say whether and to what extent human activity causes Earth’s temperature to change.

It is further impossible for a group of scientists, legislators, or opinionizers to say whether Earth’s warming — if indeed it is warming — is a bad thing. It is a good thing for agriculture — up to some point. It’s a good thing for human comfort (thus the flight of “snowbirds”) — up to some point. But for reasons given above, it’s truly unknown whether those points, and others, will be reached. But as they are, human beings will adapt, as they have in the past — unless their ability to adapt is preempted or hampered by costly regulations and counterproductive resource reallocations.

Science is not on the side of the doom-sayers, no matter how loudly they protest that it is.


Related reading (listed chronologically):
Freeman Dyson, “Heretical Thoughts about Science and Society“, from Many Colored Glass: Reflections on the Place of Life in the Universe, University of Virgina Press, 2007
Ron Clutz, “Temperatures According to Climate Models“, Science Matters, March 24, 2015
Dr. Tim Ball, “Long-Term Climate Change: What Is a Reasonable Sample Size?“, Watts Up With That?, February 7, 2016
The Global Warming Policy Foundation, Climate Science: Assumptions, Policy Implications, and the Scientific Method, 2017
John Mauer, “Through the Looking Glass with NASA GISS“, Watts Up With That?, February 22, 2017
George White, “A Consensus of Convenience“, Watts Up With That?, August 20, 2017
Jennifer Marohasy, “Most of the Recent Warming Could be Natural“, Jennifer Marohasy, August 21, 2017

Related posts:
AGW: The Death Knell (with many links to related reading and earlier posts)
Not-So-Random Thoughts (XIV) (second item)
AGW in Austin?
Understanding Probability: Pascal’s Wager and Catastrophic Global Warming
The Precautionary Principle and Pascal’s Wager
AGW in Austin? (II) (with more links to related reading)
Global-Warming Hype

Deduction, Induction, and Knowledge

Syllogism:

All Greek males are bald.

Herodotus is a Greek male.

Therefore, Herodotus is bald.

The conclusion is false because Herodotus isn’t bald, at least not as he is portrayed.

Moreover, the conclusion depends on a premise — all Greeks are bald — which can’t be known with certainty. The disproof of the premise by a single observation exemplifies the HumeanPopperian view of the scientific method. A scientific proposition is one that can be falsified  — contradicted by observed facts. If a proposition isn’t amenable to falsification, it is non-scientific.

In the Humean-Popperian view, a general statement such as “all Greek males are bald” can never be proven. (The next Greek male to come into view may have a full head of hair.) In this view, knowledge consists only of the accretion of discrete facts. General statements are merely provisional inferences based on what has been observed, and cannot be taken as definitive statements about what has not been observed.

Is there a way to prove a general statement about a class of things by showing that there is something about such things which necessitates the truth of a general statement about them? That approach begs the question. The “something about such things” can be discovered only by observation of a finite number of such things. The unobserved things are still lurking out of view, and any of them might not possess the “something” that is characteristic of the observed things.

All general statements about things, their characteristics, and their relationshships are therefore provisional. This inescapable truth has been dressed up in the guise of inductive probability, which is a fancy way of saying the same thing.

Not all is lost, however. If it weren’t for provisional knowledge about such things as heat and gravity, many more human beings would succumb to the allure of flames and cliffs, and man would never have stood on the Moon. If it weren’t for provisional knowledge about the relationship between matter and energy, nuclear power and nuclear weapons wouldn’t exist. And on and on.

The Humean-Popperian view is properly cautionary, but it doesn’t — and shouldn’t — stand in the way of acting as if we possess general knowledge. We must act as if we possess general knowledge. To do otherwise would result in stasis, or analysis-paralysis.

The Seven-Game World Series

The Astros and Dodgers have just concluded a seven-game Word Series, the 37th to date. Courtesy of Baseball-Reference.com, here are the scores of the deciding games of every seven-game Series:

1909 – Pittsburgh (NL) 8 – Detroit (AL) 0

1912 – Boston (AL) 3 – New York (NL) 2 (10 innings)

1924 – Washington (AL) 4 – New York (NL) 3 (12 innings)

1925 – Pittsburgh (NL) 9 – Washington (AL) 7

1926 – St. Louis (NL) 3 – New York (AL) 2

1931 – St. Louis (NL) 4 – Philadelphia (AL) 2

1934 – St. Louis (NL) 11 – Detroit (AL) 0

1940 – Cincinnati (NL) 2 – Detroit (AL) 1

1945 – Detroit (AL) 9 – Chicago (NL) 3

1946 – St. Louis (NL) 4 – Boston (AL) 3

1947 – New York (AL) 5 – Brooklyn (NL) 2

1955 – Brooklyn (NL) 2 – New York (AL) 0

1956 – New York (AL) 9 – Brooklyn (NL) 0

1957 – Milwaukee (NL) 5 – New York (AL) 0

1958 – New York (AL) 6 – Milwaukee (NL) 2

1960 – Pittsburgh (NL) 10 – New York (AL) 9 (decided by Bill Mazeroski’s home run in the bottom of the 9th)

1964 – St. Louis (NL) 7 – New York (AL) 5

1965 – Los Angeles (NL) 2 – Minnesota (AL) 0

1967 – St. Louis (NL) 7 – Boston (AL) 2

1968 – Detroit (AL) 4 – St. Louis (NL) 1

1971 – Pittsburgh (NL) 2 – Baltimore (AL) 1

1972 – Oakland (AL) 3 – Cincinnati (NL) 2

1973 – Oakland (AL) 5 – New York (NL) 2

1975 – Cincinnati (AL) 4 – Boston (AL) 3

1979 – Pittsburgh (NL) 4 – Baltimore (AL) 1

1982 – St. Louis (NL) 6 – Milwaukee (AL) 3

1985 – Kansas City (AL) 11 – St. Louis (NL) 0

1986 – New York (NL) 8 – Boston (AL) 5

1987 – Minnesota (AL) 4 – St. Louis (NL) 2

1991 – Minnesota (AL) 1 – Atlanta (NL) 0 (10 innings)

1997 – Florida (NL) 3 – Cleveland (AL) 2 (11 innings)

2001 – Arizona (NL) 3 – New York (AL) 2 (decided in the bottom of the 9th)

2002 – Anaheim (AL) 4 – San Francisco (NL) 1

2011 – St. Louis (NL) 6 – Texas (AL) 2

2014 – San Francisco (NL) 3 – Kansas City (AL) 2

2016 – Chicago (NL) 8 – Cleveland (AL) 7 (10 innings)

2017 – Houston (AL) 5 – Los Angeles (AL) 1

Summary statistics:

34 percent (37) of 109 Series have gone to the limit of seven games (another four Series were in a best-of-nine format, but none went to nine games)

20 of the 37 Series were decided by 1 or 2 runs

14 of those Series decided by 1 run (7 times in extra innings or the winning team’s last at-bat)

19 of the 37 Series were won by the team that was behind after five games

six of the 37 Series were won by the team that was behind after four games.

Does the World Series deliver high drama? It depends on your definition of high drama. If a seven-game series is high drama, the World Series has delivered about one-third of the time. If high drama means a seven-game series where the final game was decided by only 1 run in extra innings or the winning team’s final at-bat, the World Series has delivered only 6 percent of the time. There are other ways to define high drama — take your pick.

Thaler on Discounting

This is a companion to “Richard Thaler, Nobel Laureate” and “Thaler’s Non-Revolution in Economics“. See also the long list of related posts at the end of “Richard Thaler, Nobel Laureate”.

Richard Thaler, the newly minted Noble laureate in economics, has published many papers, including one about discounting as a tool of government decision-making. The paper, “Discounting and Fiscal Constraints: Why Discounting is Always Right”, appeared in August 1979 under the imprimatur of the think-tank where Thaler was a consultant. It was also published in the October 1979 issue of the now-defunct Defense Management Journal (DMJ). Given the lead time for producing a journal, it’s almost certain that there is no substantive difference between the in-house version and the DMJ version. But only the in-house version seems to be available online, so the preceding link leads to it, and the quotations below are taken from it.

The aim of Thaler’s piece is to refute an article in the March 1978 issue of DMJ by Commander Rolf Clark, “Should Defense Managers Discount Future Costs?”. Specifically, Thaler argues against Clark’s conclusion that discounting is irrelevant in a regime of fiscal constraints.*

Clark took the position that a defense manager faced with fiscal constraints should simply choose among alternatives by picking the one with the lowest undiscounted costs. Why? Because the defense manager, unlike a business manager, can’t earn interest by deferring an expenditure and investing the money where it earns interest. To put it another way, deferring an expenditure doesn’t result in a later increase in a defense manager’s budget. Or in the budget of any government manager, for that matter.

Viewed in perspective, the dispute between Thaler and Clark is a tempest in a teaspoon  — a debate about how to arrange the deck chairs on the Titanic. Discounting is of little consequence against this backdrop:

  • uncertainty about future threats to U.S. interests (e.g., their sources, the weapons and tactics of potential enemies, and the timing of attacks)
  • uncertainty about the actual effectiveness of U.S. systems and tactics (e.g., see this)
  • uncertainty bout the costs of systems, especially those that are still in the early stages of development
  • a panoply of vested interests and institutional constraints that must be satisfied (e.g., a strong Marine Corp “lobby” on Capitol Hill, the long dominance of aviation in the Navy, the need to keep the peace within the services by avoiding drastic changes in any component’s share of the budget)
  • uncertainty about the amounts of money that Congress will actually appropriate, and the specific mandates that Congress will impose on spending (e.g., buy this system, not that one, recruit to a goal of X active-duty personnel in the Air Force, not Y).

But the issue is worth revisiting because it reveals a blind spot in Thaler’s view of decision-making.

Thaler begins his substantive presentation by explaining the purpose of discounting:

A discount rate is simply a shorthand way of defining a firm’s, organization’s, or person’s time value of money. This rate is always determined by opportunity costs. Opportunity costs, in turn, depend on circumstances. Consider the following example: An organization must choose between two projects which yield equal effectiveness (or profits in the case of a firm). Project A will cost $200 this year and nothing thereafter. Project B will cost $205 next year and nothing before or after. Notice that if project B is selected the organization will have an extra $200 to use for a year. Whether project B is preferred simply depends on whether it is worth $5 to the organization to have those $200 to use for a year. That, in turn, depends on what the organization would do with the money. If the money would just sit around for the year, its time value is zero and project A should be chosen. However, if the money were put in a 5 percent savings account, it would earn $10 in the year and thus the organization would gain $5 by selecting project B. [pp. 1-2]

In Thaler’s simplified version of reality, a government decision-maker (manager) faces a choice between two projects that (ostensibly) would be equally effective against a postulated threat, even though their costs would be incurred at different times. Specifically, the manager must choose between project A, at a cost of $200 in year 1, and project B, at a cost of $205 in year 2. Thaler claims that the manager can choose between the two projects by discounting their costs:

A [government] manager . . . cannot earn bank interest on funds withheld for a year. . . .  However, there will generally exist other ways for the manager to “invest” funds which are available. Examples include cost-saving expenditures, conservation measures, and preventive maintenance. These kinds of expenditures, if they have positive rates of return, permit a manager to invest money just as if he were putting the money in a savings account.

. . . Suppose a thorough analysis of cost-saving alternatives reveals that [in year 2] a maintenance project will be required at a cost of $215. Call this project D. Alternatively the project can be done [in year 1] (at the same level of effectiveness) for only $200. Call this project C. All of the options are displayed in table 1.

Discounting in the public sector_table 1

[pp. 3-4]

Thaler believes that his example clinches the argument for discounting because the choice of project B (an expenditure of $205 in year 2) enables the manager to undertake project C in year 1, and thereby to “save” $10 in year 2. But Thaler’s “proof” is deeply flawed:

  • If a maintenance project is undertaken in year 1, it will pay off sooner than if it is undertaken in year 2 but, by the same token, its benefits will diminish sooner than if it is undertaken in year 2.
  • More generally, different projects cannot, by definition be equally effective. Projects A and B may be about equally effective by a particular measure, but because they are different they will differ in other respects, and those differences could be crucial in choosing between A and B.
  • Specifically, projects A and B might be equally effective when compared quantitatively in the context of an abstract scenario, but A might be more effective in an non-quantifiable but crucial respect. For example, the earlier expenditure on A might be viewed by a potential enemy as a more compelling deterrent than the later expenditure on B because it would demonstrate more clearly the U.S. government’s willingness and ability to mount a strong defense against the potential enemy. Alternatively, the earlier expenditure on B might cause the enemy to accelerate his own production of weapons or mobilization of troops. These are the kinds of crucial issues that discounting is powerless to illuminate, and may even obscure.
  • For a decision to rest on the use of a particular discount rate, there must be great certainty about the future costs and effectiveness of the alternatives. But there seldom is. The practice of discounting therefore promotes an illusion of certainty — a potentially dangerous illusion, in the case of national defense.
  • Finally, the “correct” discount rate depends on the options available to a particular manager of a particular government activity. Yet Thaler insists on the application of a uniform discount rate by all government managers (p. 6). By Thaler’s own example, such a practice could lead a manager to choose the wrong option.

So even if there is certainty about everything else, there is no “correct” discount rate, and it is presumptuous of Thaler to prescribe one on the assumption that it will fit every defense manager’s particular circumstances.**

Thaler does the same thing when he counsels intervention in personal decisions because too many people — in his view — make irrational decisions.

In the context of personal decision-making — which is the focal point of Thaler’s “libertarian” paternalism — the act of discounting is rational because it serves wealth-maximization. But life isn’t just about maximizing wealth. That’s why some people choose to have a lot of children, when doing so obviously reduces the amount that they can save. That’s why some choose to retire early rather than stay in stressful jobs. Rationality and wealth maximization are two very different things, but a lot of laypersons and too many economists are guilty of equating them.

If wealth-maximization is your goal, just stop drinking, smoking, enjoying good food, paying for entertainment, subscribing to newspapers and magazines, buying books, watering your lawn, mowing the grass, driving your car (except to work if you have no feasible alternative), and on into the night. You will accumulate a lot of money — if you invest wisely (there’s the rub of uncertainty) — but you will live a miserable life, unless you are the rare person who is a true miser.
__________
* If you are unfamiliar with the background of the Clark-Thaler exchange, and the reference to fiscal constraints, here’s the story: Since 1969 the Secretary of Defense has required the military departments to propose multi-year spending programs that are constrained by an explicit ceiling on each year’s spending. Fiscal guidance, as it is called, was lacking before that. But, in reality, defense budgets have always been constrained, ultimately by Congress. Fiscal guidance represents only a rough guess as to the total amount of defense spending that Congress will approve, and a rougher guess about the distribution of that spending among the military departments.

** Thaler’s example of a cost-saving investment is also a stretch, given how government budgets are decided. I gave it a pass in order to make the point that it wouldn’t save Thaler’s argument even if it were realistic. Here’s the missing reality:

Even if the Secretary of Defense (the grand panjandrum of defense managers) makes the kinds of moves counseled by Thaler, and even if his multi-year program sails through the Office and Management and Budget without a scratch, Congress has the final say. And Congress, though it pays attention to the multi-year plans coming from the Executive Branch, still makes annual appropriations. When it does so, it essentially ignores the internal logic of the multi-year plans (assuming that the Defense plan has an internal logic after it has been subjected to Pentagon politics). Instead, Congress divides the defense budget into various spending programs (see the list for national defense, here), and adjusts each program to suit the tastes, preferences, and moods of staffers, committee members, and committee chairman. Thus it is unlikely that the services’ maintenance and procurement budgets will emerge from Congress as they entered, with cross-temporal tradeoffs intact. A more rational budgeting strategy, from the perspective of the Secretary of Defense, is to submit plans that accord with the known preferences of Congress. Such plans may not incorporate the kind of trivial fine-tuning favored by Thaler, but they will more likely serve the national interest by yielding a robust defense.

The Ken Burns Apology Tour Continues

Ken Burns, of the Burns-Novick team responsible for The Vietnam War and many other documentaries, is known to be a man of the left. Leftists have many tics. One of them, which Barack Obama exhibited vocally and often, is the habit of apologizing for America’s moral imperfections. It is those imperfections that justify the left’s dismissal of America as just another country — nothing exceptional to see here, folks, so just move along.

One of the exceptional things that leftists dismiss is the written (real) Constitution, with its explicit limits on the power of the central government. The left’s aim — everywhere and always — has been to override those limits, so that government can decide what is best for the people, instead of allowing the people to decide that for themselves.

Also exceptional are the sacrifices that Americans have made — in life, limb, and money — to defend people around the world against tyranny. But leftists have a way of turning those sacrifices into sins.

Which brings me back to Ken Burns, whose first and perhaps most famous series revisited the Civil War. Where better to begin hammering away at America but with the Civil War, which was all about slavery — except when it wasn’t? But why would a leftist bother to give serious consideration to the legitimate, constitutional cause that impelled many Southerners to defend their homeland?

Burns managed to turn his baseball and jazz series into extensions of the Civil War, with their long sermons about America’s racism. Burns’s lop-sided history of baseball included the obligatory (and badly distorted) depiction of Ty Cobb as a vicious ballplayer and a vicious racist.

Then came Burns’s epic about World War II, The War, of which I wrote in 2007 (here, here, here, and here). I draw on those earlier posts in the next several paragraphs.

The War illustrates that, however necessary a war, victory may be attainable only at a very high price. The War also makes the case, graphically, that there can be no alternative but to pay that very high price when one is faced with brutal, fanatical enemies. (These are points that The Vietnam War fails to follow through on.)

But The War also spends a lot of time on issues with racial dimensions; specifically:

  • the forced removal and internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans (62 percent of whom were United States citizens) from the West Coast of the United States during World War II
  • government-enforced racial segregation in the armed forces (and, sometimes, among workers in defense plants), against a backdrop of racial tension.

The War neglects to mention the military considerations that justified the internment. (See these three posts, for example.) Instead, The War engages in the kind of second-guessing eschewed by the U.S. Supreme Court when it opined in the case of Korematsu v. United States (1944). It is right to give time to the internment; it was a significant (and temporary) event arising out of the prosecution of the war. But it is wrong to give a one-sided presentation of that event.

Why hammer away at the segregation of blacks and black-white conflict? They were not central to the conduct of the war. Racial tension is an ineluctable fact of life that had nothing to do with World War II, except as it found its way into the armed forces. But so did other social phenomena, including divisions along the lines of class, religion, and region, for example. But leftists — who are as clannish as they come — just cannot abide the thought that other people are also clannish. And in the case of racial tension, the clannishness is depicted as one-sided — as if blacks aren’t just as clannish and prone to race-based violence as whites.

Forced segregation had been (and would remain, for some years), a government policy. Would it have been too much to expect a government that was battling ferocious enemies abroad to take time out to desegregate the armed forces, desegregate civilian life, and deal with the resulting racial conflict (of which there was already enough)? The short answer is yes. That is not to excuse government-sponsored and government-enforced segregation. It is simply to call, once again, for perspective and balance, which The War does not offer.

The effect of the racial sideshow is to tarnish what was a great and noble undertaking: the defeat of Japan and Germany. Which is to say that the racial sideshow plays into the anti-war message of The War. That message is underscored by the exploration of three other themes.

The first is that “no plan survives contact with the enemy”, according to Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891). But after making that observation (in slightly different words and with the wrong attribution), The War goes on to conflate it with a second theme about defective leadership.

The fact that war is an unpredictable endeavor is a thing entirely apart from the fact that some commanders aren’t fit to lead men in battle. We can thank The War for reminding us that unpredictability and bad decisions can be part of any war. But there is too much about bad leadership (which wasn’t endemic among U.S. forces in World War II), and too little about the unpredictability of war and the necessity of working through it to attain the ultimate strategic objective, which is victory.

The third theme is the horrors of war, especially as expressed by Eugene Sledge and the egregious Paul Fussell (see this). Fussell clearly implies that the war wasn’t worth fighting until the Holocaust came to light, late in the war.

Under the heading of horrors, there is the presentation of “balanced” reactions to the dropping of A-bombs on Japan. One of the “witnesses” who appears throughout the series staunchly defends the act. Another notes its strategic wisdom but still wishes it hadn’t been necessary. But it was necessary — and, really, an act of mercy toward the Japanese as well as to America’s fighting men. Why pander to the nay-sayers, who will go to their graves condemning the act, in spite of its moral necessity?

Finally, there is the film’s subtext, which has two main elements. One element is voiced at the very end of the final episode, in the dedication. It is to those who served in World War II, “that necessary war” — not “a necessary war”, as the first episode has it. The implication is that no later war was or is necessary, including (of course) the war in Iraq which was going strong when The War first aired.

The second element of the subtext reinforces the first one, and it is less subtle. That second element is The War‘s insistence on playing up America’s moral failings (as discussed above). The intended message is that because of America’s moral failings, and because war is hell, World War II was barely worth fighting, although it seemed necessary at the time (even to the left, given that the USSR was an “ally”). The left proclaims an act of war against anyone but Hitler (not a Hitler, but the Hitler) to be an act of hypocrisy and brutality by a morally imperfect nation.

In sum, The War affirms the American left’s anti-defense, anti-war dogmas, which reflect the post-patriotic attitude that America is nothing special. It’s as if Burns and Novick were paving the way for the ascendancy of that post-patriotic president, Barack Obama.

The Vietnam War picks up where The War left off. Yes, The Vietnam War is superficially balanced, but its anti-war, anti-American message is in the subtext — or, rather, the missing subtext. The Vietnam War is an exemplar of propaganda by selection and omission.

The ex-soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen chosen for on-camera roles are notable for their range of views: from being stridently against the war to stolidly neutral. Was it impossible to find anyone who served during the war who thought it a worthwhile cause, a cause that was undermined by the media and poll-driven politicians? Surely it wan’t impossible. But Burns and his production partner, Lynn Novick, nevertheless were unable — unwilling, really — to produce such a person out the tens or hundreds of thousands whose testimony would have conflicted the Burns-Novick story line.

To take a second, glaring example, The Vietnam War glosses over the media’s complicity in drumming up anti-war hysteria, especially in the wake of the Tet Offensive. The fact that it was a defeat for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong is mentioned but not pursued. Why did the U.S. government fail to exploit the U.S.-South Vietnamese victory?

Here’s why: LBJ, who at the time of the offensive, was probably aiming for re-election, gave in to the media-led hysteria in the wake of the offensive. LBJ, anxious as ever about “public opinion”, responded to media-led hysteria by turning victory into defeat.

Does The Vietnam War pursue that line of inquiry? No. Instead the viewer is treated to a monotonous stream of snippets from “news” programs. These feature the oracular, avuncular Walter Cronkite (and his imitators) crying doom and gloom and pushing the polls against the war.

So Burns-Novick gladly second-guess the French, the decisions that led the U.S. into Vietnam, and the wisdom of the war itself. But it’s off-limits (for Burns-Novick) to second-guess LBJ’s reluctant-warrior act after Tet. Despite a further troop buildup, the constraints placed by LBJ on the conduct of the war — especially in the air — led eventually to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the defeat of South Vietnam. It’s as if those ignominious outcomes were inevitable — and perhaps deserved by a nation as flawed as the one the Burns likes to portray.

I am far from alone in my disdain for the Burns-Novick treatment of the Vietnam War:

Lewis Sorley (author of A Better War) appears in The Vietnam War, but if he said anything contrary to the Burns line, it fell to the cutting room floor. Later, in a different setting, Sorley speaks his mind; see the video embedded here, starting at 48:00. There are many other Sorleys out there, I’m sure (e.g., Mark Moyar, author of Triumph Forsaken).

Scott Johnson of Power Line has much to say about The Vietnam War in “Notes on the Ken Burns Version” and “Notes on the Ken Burns Version, Continued“. In both posts he cites and quotes other dissenters from the Burns-Novick narrative.

Another example of informed dissent is George J. Veith’s post at Library of Law and Liberty, “Burns and Novick on Vietnam: A Neutral Film, or a Rifle Butt to the Heart?“, which concludes that The Vietnam War

was at best an imperfect effort to tell an extraordinarily complex story. At worst, it has cemented, perhaps forever, the old stereotypes—the Americans as bumbling interlopers layering mistakes upon bad judgment and governmental deceit; the communists as ardent nationalists simply trying to unify their country; the people in the South as corrupt incompetents not worth the lives of our GIs. The film serves as a stark reminder that, “In war truth is the first casualty.”

And in peace truth is the first casualty when leftists push an agenda.

Another (Big) Problem with “Nudging”

I’ve written recently about Richard Thaler’s Nobel prize and my objections to his (and Cass Sunstein’s) cheerleading for “nudging”. That’s a polite term for the use of business and government power to get people to make the “right” decisions. (“Right” according to Thaler, at least.) It’s the government part that really bothers me. Ilya Somin of The Volokh Conspiracy is of the same mind:

Thaler and many other behavioral economics scholars argue that government should intervene to protect people against their cognitive biases, by various forms of paternalistic policies. In the best-case scenario, government regulators can “nudge” us into correcting our cognitive errors, thereby enhancing our welfare without significantly curtailing freedom.

But can we trust government to be less prone to cognitive error than the private-sector consumers whose mistakes we want to correct? If not, paternalistic policies might just replace one form of cognitive bias with another, perhaps even worse one. Unfortunately, a recent study suggests that politicians are prone to severe cognitive biases too – especially when they consider ideologically charged issues….

Even when presented additional evidence to help them correct their mistakes, Dahlmann and Petersen found that the politicians tended to double down on their errors rather than admit they might have been wrong….

Politicians aren’t just biased in their evaluation of political issues. Many of them are ignorant, as well. For example, famed political journalist Robert Kaiser found that most members of Congress know little about policy and “both know and care more about politics than about substance.”….

But perhaps voters can incentivize politicians to evaluate evidence more carefully. They can screen out candidates who are biased and ill-informed, and elect knowledgeable and objective decision-makers. Sadly, that is unlikely to happen, because the voters themselves also suffer from massive political ignorance, often being unaware of even very basic facts about public policy.

Of course, the Framers of the Constitution understood all of this in 1787. And they wisely acted on it by placing definite limits on the power of the central government. The removal of those limits, especially during and since the New Deal, is a constitutional tragedy.

How’s Your (Implicit) Attitude?

I was unaware of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) until a few years ago, when I took a test at YourMorals.Org that purported to measure my implicit racial preferences. I’ll say more about that after discussing IAT, which has been exposed as junk. That’s what John. J. Ray calls it:

Psychologists are well aware that people often do not say what they really think.  It is therefore something of a holy grail among them to find ways that WILL detect what people really think. A very popular example of that is the Implicit Associations test (IAT).  It supposedly measures racist thoughts whether you are aware of them or not.  It sometimes shows people who think they are anti-racist to be in fact secretly racist.

I dismissed it as a heap of junk long ago (here and here) but it has remained very popular and is widely accepted as revealing truth.  I am therefore pleased that a very long and thorough article has just appeared which comes to the same conclusion that I did. [“Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up to the Job“, Political Correctness Watch, September 6, 2017]

The article in question (which has the same title as Ray’s post) is by Jesse Singal. It appeared at Science of Us on January 11, 2017. Here are some excerpts:

Perhaps no new concept from the world of academic psychology has taken hold of the public imagination more quickly and profoundly in the 21st century than implicit bias — that is, forms of bias which operate beyond the conscious awareness of individuals. That’s in large part due to the blockbuster success of the so-called implicit association test, which purports to offer a quick, easy way to measure how implicitly biased individual people are….

Since the IAT was first introduced almost 20 years ago, its architects, as well as the countless researchers and commentators who have enthusiastically embraced it, have offered it as a way to reveal to test-takers what amounts to a deep, dark secret about who they are: They may not feel racist, but in fact, the test shows that in a variety of intergroup settings, they will act racist….

[The] co-creators are Mahzarin Banaji, currently the chair of Harvard University’s psychology department, and Anthony Greenwald, a highly regarded social psychology researcher at the University of Washington. The duo introduced the test to the world at a 1998 press conference in Seattle — the accompanying press release noted that they had collected data suggesting that 90–95 percent of Americans harbored the “roots of unconscious prejudice.” The public immediately took notice: Since then, the IAT has been mostly treated as a revolutionary, revelatory piece of technology, garnering overwhelmingly positive media coverage….

Maybe the biggest driver of the IAT’s popularity and visibility, though, is the fact that anyone can take the test on the Project Implicit website, which launched shortly after the test was unveiled and which is hosted by Harvard University. The test’s architects reported that, by October 2015, more than 17 million individual test sessions had been completed on the website. As will become clear, learning one’s IAT results is, for many people, a very big deal that changes how they view themselves and their place in the world.

Given all this excitement, it might feel safe to assume that the IAT really does measure people’s propensity to commit real-world acts of implicit bias against marginalized groups, and that it does so in a dependable, clearly understood way….

Unfortunately, none of that is true. A pile of scholarly work, some of it published in top psychology journals and most of it ignored by the media, suggests that the IAT falls far short of the quality-control standards normally expected of psychological instruments. The IAT, this research suggests, is a noisy, unreliable measure that correlates far too weakly with any real-world outcomes to be used to predict individuals’ behavior — even the test’s creators have now admitted as such.

How does IAT work? Singal summarizes:

You sit down at a computer where you are shown a series of images and/or words. First, you’re instructed to hit ‘i’ when you see a “good” term like pleasant, or to hit ‘e’ when you see a “bad” one like tragedy. Then, hit ‘i’ when you see a black face, and hit ‘e’ when you see a white one. Easy enough, but soon things get slightly more complex: Hit ‘i’ when you see a good word or an image of a black person, and ‘e’ when you see a bad word or an image of a white person. Then the categories flip to black/bad and white/good. As you peck away at the keyboard, the computer measures your reaction times, which it plugs into an algorithm. That algorithm, in turn, generates your score.

If you were quicker to associate good words with white faces than good words with black faces, and/or slower to associate bad words with white faces than bad words with black ones, then the test will report that you have a slight, moderate, or strong “preference for white faces over black faces,” or some similar language. You might also find you have an anti-white bias, though that is significantly less common. By the normal scoring conventions of the test, positive scores indicate bias against the out-group, while negative ones indicate bias against the in-group.

The rough idea is that, as humans, we have an easier time connecting concepts that are already tightly linked in our brains, and a tougher time connecting concepts that aren’t. The longer it takes to connect “black” and “good” relative to “white” and “good,” the thinking goes, the more your unconscious biases favor white people over black people.

Singal continues (at great length) to pile up the mountain of evidence against IAT, and to caution against reading anything into the results it yields.

Having become aware of the the debunking of IAT, I went to the website of Project Implicit. When I reached this page, I was surprised to learn that I could not only find out whether I’m a closet racist but also whether I prefer dark or light skin tones, Asians or non-Asians, Trump or a previous president, and several other things or their opposites. I chose to discover my true feelings about Trump vs. a previous president, and was faced with a choice between Trump and Clinton.

What was the result of my several minutes of tapping “e” and “i” on the keyboard of my PC? This:

Your data suggest a moderate automatic preference for Bill Clinton over Donald Trump.

Balderdash! Though Trump is obviously not of better character than Clinton, he’s obviously not of worse character. And insofar as policy goes, the difference between Trump and Clinton is somewhat like the difference between a non-silent Calvin Coolidge and an FDR without the patriotism. (With apologies to the memory of Coolidge, my favorite president.)

Now, what did IAT say about my racism, or lack thereof? I have for years proudly posted these results at the bottom of my “About” page and in the accompanying moral profile:

The study you just completed is an Implicit Association Test (IAT) that compares the strength of automatic mental associations. In this version of the IAT, we investigated positive and negative associations with the categories of “African Americans” and “European Americans”.

The idea behind the IAT is that concepts with very closely related (vs. unrelated) mental representations are more easily and quickly responded to as a single unit. For example, if “European American” and “good” are strongly associated in one’s mind, it should be relatively easy to respond quickly to this pairing by pressing the “E” or “I” key. If “European American” and “good” are NOT strongly associated, it should be more difficult to respond quickly to this pairing. By comparing reaction times on this test, the IAT gives a relative measure of how strongly associated the two categories (European Americans, African Americans) are to mental representations of “good” and “bad”. Each participant receives a single score, and your score appears below.

Your score on the IAT was 0.07.

Positive scores indicate a greater implicit preference for European Americans relative to African Americans, and negative scores indicate an implicit preference for African Americans relative to European Americans.

Your score appears in the graph below in green. The score of the average Liberal visitor to this site is shown in blue and the average Conservative visitor’s score is shown in red.

Moral profile-implicit association test

It should be noted that my slightly positive score probably was influenced by the order in which choices were presented to me. Initially, pleasant concepts were associated with photos of European-Americans. I became used to that association, and so found that it affected my reaction time when I was faced with pairings of pleasant concepts and photos of African-Americans. The bottom line: My slight preference for European-Americans probably is an artifact of test design.

In other words, I believed that my very low score, despite the test set-up, “proved” that I am not a racist. But thanks (or no thanks) to John Ray and Jesse Singal, I must conclude, sadly, that I may be one (or maybe not).

I suspect that I am not a racist. I don’t despise blacks as a group, nor do I believe that they should have fewer rights and privileges than whites. (Neither do I believe that they should have more rights and privileges than whites or persons of Asian or Ashkenazi Jewish descent — but they certainly do when it comes to college admissions and hiring.) It isn’t racist to understand that race isn’t a social construct and that there are general differences between races (see many of the posts listed here). That’s just a matter of facing facts, not ducking them, as leftists are wont to do.

What have I learned from the IAT? I must have very good reflexes. A person who processes information rapidly and then almost instantly translates it into a physical response should be able to “beat” the IAT. And that’s probably what I did in the Trump vs. Clinton test, if not in the racism test. I’m a fast typist and very quick to catch dropped items before they hit the floor. (My IQ, or what’s left of it, isn’t bad either; go here and scroll down to the section headed “Intelligence, Temperament, and Beliefs”.)

Perhaps the IAT for racism could be used to screen candidates for fighter-pilot training. Only “non-racists” would be admitted. Anyone who isn’t quick enough to avoid the “racist” label isn’t quick enough to win a dogfight.

Thaler’s Non-Revolution in Economics

James R. Rogers writes about Richard Thaler and behavioral economics:

[M]edia treatments of Thaler’s work, and of behavioral economics more generally, suggest that it provides a much-deserved comeuppance to conventional microeconomics. Well . . . Not quite….

… Economists, and rational choice theorists more generally, have a blind spot, [Thaler] argues, for just how often their assumptions about human behavior are inconsistent with real human behavior. That’s an important point.

Yet here’s where spin matters: Does Thaler provide a correction to previous economics, underscoring something everyone always knew but just ignored as a practical matter, or is Thaler’s work revolutionary, inviting a broad and necessary reconceptualization of standard microeconomics?…

… No. He has built a career by correcting a blind spot in modern academic economics. But his insight provides us with a “well, duh” moment rather than a “we need totally to rewrite modern economics” moment that some of his journalistic (and academic) supporters suggest it provides….

Thaler’s work underscores that the economist’s rationality postulates cannot account for all human behavior. That’s an important point. But I don’t know that many, or even any, economists very much believed the opposite in any serious way. [“Did Richard Thaler Really Shift the Paradigm in Economics?“, Library of Law and Liberty, October 11, 2017]

I have made the same point:

Even in those benighted days when I learned the principles of “micro” — just a few years ahead of Thaler — it was understood that the assumption of rationality was an approximation of the tendency of individuals to try to make themselves better off by making choices that would do so, given their tastes and preferences and the information that they possess at the time or could obtain at a cost commensurate with the value of the decision at hand.

Highly recommended reading: my previous post about Thaler and the many related posts listed at the end of it.

Richard Thaler, Nobel Laureate

I am slightly irked by today’s news of the selection of Richard Thaler as the 2017 Noblel laureate in economics. (It’s actually the Swedish National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, not one of the original prizes designated in Alfred Nobel’s will.) Granted, Thaler did some praiseworthy and groundbreaking work in behavioral economics, which is nicely summarized in this post by Timothy Taylor.

But Thaler, whom I knew slightly when he was a consultant to the outfit where I worked, gets a lot of pushback when he translates his work into normative prescriptions. He was already semi-famous (or infamous) for his collaboration with Cass Sunstein. Together and separately they propounded “libertarian paternalism”, an obnoxious oxymoron that they abandoned in favor of “nudging”. Thus their book-length epistle to true believers in governmental omniscience, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health and Happiness.

It would be a vast understatement to say that I disagree with Thaler and Sunstein’s policy prescriptions. I have recorded my disagreements in many posts, which are listed below.

Sunstein at the Volokh Conspiracy
More from Sunstein
Cass Sunstein’s Truly Dangerous Mind
An (Imaginary) Interview with Cass Sunstein
Libertarian Paternalism
A Libertarian Paternalist’s Dream World
Slippery Sunstein
The Short Answer to Libertarian Paternalism
Second-Guessing, Paternalism, Parentalism, and Choice
Another Thought about Libertarian Paternalism
Back-Door Paternalism
Sunstein and Executive Power
Another Voice Against the New Paternalism
The Feds and “Libertarian Paternalism”
A Further Note about “Libertarian” Paternalism
Apropos Paternalism
Beware of Libertarian Paternalists
Discounting and Libertarian Paternalism
The Mind of a Paternalist
The Mind of a Paternalist, Revisited
Another Entry in the Sunstein Saga
The Sunstein Effect Is Alive and Well in the White House
Sunstein the Fatuous
Not-So-Random Thoughts (XVI) – first item
The Perpetual Nudger

Altruism, Self-Interest, and Voting

From a previous post:

I am reading and generally enjoying Darwinian Fairytales: Selfish Genes, Errors of Heredity and Other Fables of Evolution by the late Australian philosopher, David Stove. I say generally enjoying because in Essay 6, which I just finished reading, Stove goes off the rails.

The title of Essay 6 is “Tax and the Selfish Girl, Or Does ‘Altruism’ Need Inverted Commas?”. Stove expends many words in defense of altruism as it is commonly thought of: putting others before oneself….

… Stove’s analysis of altruism is circular: He parades examples of what he considers altruistic conduct, and says that because there is such conduct there must be altruism.

I went on to quote an earlier post of mine in which I make a case against altruism, as Stove and many others understand it.

Stove’s attempt to distinguish altruism from self-interest resurfaces in Essay 8, “‘He Ain’t Heavy, He’s my Brother,’ or Altruism and Shared Genes”:

And then, think how easy it is, and always has been, to convince many people of the selfish theory of human nature. It is quite pathetically easy. All it takes, as Joseph Butler pointed out nearly three centuries ago, is a certain coarseness of mind on the part of those to be convinced; though a little bad character on either part is certainly a help. You offer people two propositions: “No one can act voluntarily except in his own interests,” and “No one can act voluntarily except from some interest of his own.” The second is a trivial truth, while the first is an outlandish falsity. But what proportion of people can be relied on to notice any difference in meaning between the two? Experience shows very few. And a man will find it easier to mistake the false proposition for the evidently true one, the more willing he is to believe that everyone is as bad as himself, or to belittle the human species in general.

Therein lies the source of Stove’s confusion. Restating his propositions, he says it is false to believe that a person always acts voluntarily in his own interest, while it is (trivially) true to believe that a person always acts voluntarily from an interest of his own.

If a man’s interest of his own is to save his drowning child, because he loves the child, how is that different from acting in his own interest? There is “a part of himself” — to put it colloquially — which recoils at the though of his child’s death. Whether that part is love, empathy, or instinct is of no consequence. The man who acts to save his drowning child does so because he can’t bear to contemplate the death of his child.

In sum, there is really no difference between acting in one’s own interest or acting from an interest of one’s own.

It isn’t my aim to denigrate acts that are called altruistic. With more such acts, the world would be a better place in which to live. But the veneration of acts that are called altruistic is a backhanded way of denigrating acts that are called selfish. Among such acts is profit-seeking, which “liberals” hold in contempt as a selfish act. But it is not, as Adam Smith pointed out a long time ago:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. [An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776]

The moral confusion of “liberals” (Stove wasn’t one) about matters of self-interest is revealed in their condescension toward working-class people who vote Republican. I have pointed this out in several posts (e.g., here and here). Keith Stanovich takes up the cause in “Were Trump Voters Irrational?” (Quillette, September 28, 2017):

Instrumental rationality—the optimization of the individual’s goal fulfillment–means behaving in the world so that you get what you most want…. More technically, the model of rational judgment used by decision scientists is one in which a person chooses options based on which option has the largest expected utility…. [U]tility refers to the good that accrues when people achieve their goals….

More important for discussions of voter rationality, however, is that utility does not just mean monetary value…. For instance, people gain utility from holding and expressing specific beliefs and values. Failing to realize this is the source of much misunderstanding about voting behavior….

Failure to appreciate these nuances in rational choice theory is behind the charge that the Trump voters were irrational. A common complaint about them among Democratic critics is that they were voting against their own interests. A decade ago, this was the theme of Thomas Frank’s popular book What’s the Matter with Kansas? and it has recurred frequently since. The idea is that lower income people who vote Republican (not necessarily for Trump—most of these critiques predate the 2016 election) are voting against their interests because they would receive more government benefits if they voted Democratic….

[L]eftists never seem to see how insulting this critique of Republican voters is. Their failure to see the insult illustrates precisely what they get wrong in evaluating the rationality of the Trump voters. Consider that these What’s the Matter with Kansas? critiques are written by highly educated left-wing pundits, professors, and advocates…. The stance of the educated progressive making the What’s the Matter with Kansas? argument seems to be that: “no one else should vote against their monetary interests, but it’s not irrational for me to do so, because I am enlightened.”

As I say here,

it never ceases to amaze the left that so many of “the people” turn their backs on a leftist (Democrat) candidate in favor of the (perceived) Republican rightist. Why is that? One reason, which became apparent in the recent presidential election, is that a lot of “the people” don’t believe that the left is their “voice” or that it rules on their behalf.

A lot of “the people” believe, correctly, that the left despises “the people” and is bent on dictating to them. Further, a lot of “the people” also believe, correctly, that the left’s dictatorial methods are not really designed with “the people” in mind. Rather, they are intended to favor certain groups of people — those deemed “victims” by the left — and to advance pet schemes (e.g., urban rail, “green” energy, carbon-emissions reductions, Obamacare) despite the fact that they are unnecessary, inefficient, and economically destructive.

It comes as a great shock to left that so many of “the people” see the left for what it is: doctrinaire, unfair, and dictatorial. Why, they ask, would “the people” vote against their own interest by rejecting Democrats and electing Republicans? The answer is that a lot of “the people” are smart enough to see that the left does not represent them and does not act in their interest.


Related posts:
A Leftist’s Lament
Leftist Condescension
Altruism, One More Time
The Left and “the People”

What about North Korea?

A correspondent writes:

There is a time to hit the bear and a time to run. We’ve had many opportunities to hit the North Korean bear and have not, and are now left with poor choices.

I agree that the U.S. now seems to be left with poor choices, having failed to act decisively in the past.

I doubt that any U.S. president, even including Trump, wants to be responsible for the devastation that would follow a preemptive attack (of any kind) on North Korea. Therefore, I believe that an ICBM-equipped North Korea is probably in our future.

Does that mean a nuclear exchange with North Korea is in our future? It depends on whether Kim Jong-un is actually crazy or just a canny loudmouth. (I suspect the latter to be true.)  However, if Kim does get trigger-happy, the resulting war will be a short one. North Korea will be devastated; South Korea will suffer greatly; and there may be collateral damage to Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and even the U.S. mainland.

How far the damage spreads will depend on how soon Kim pulls the trigger. The sooner he does, the less time there will be for the installation of effective missile defenses, but the less time there will be for Kim to deploy effective long-range missiles. So if he is going to pull the trigger, it’s probably best (at least for mainlanders) if he pulls it sooner rather than later.

But if Kim is really canny, as I suspect, he will never pull the trigger. Instead, he will use his growing offensive capability as blackmail in any military or economic confrontations with his Asian neighbors. The fact that he seems crazy gives him an advantage in such situations; it leads people to believe that he will actually pull the trigger.


Related posts:
A Grand Strategy for the United States
The Folly of Pacifism
Why We Should (and Should Not) Fight
Rating America’s Wars
Transnationalism and National Defense
The Folly of Pacifism, Again
Patience as a Tool of Strategy
The War on Terror, As It Should Have Been Fought
Preemptive War
Preemptive War and Iran
Some Thoughts and Questions about Preemptive War
The World Turned Upside Down
The Old Normal
My Defense of the A-Bomb
Pacifism
Today’s Lesson in Economics: How to Think about War
Much Ado about Civilian Control of the Military
Presidents and War
LBJ’s Dereliction of Duty

Not-So-Random Thoughts (XXI)

An occasional survey of web material that’s related to subjects about which I’ve posted. Links to the other posts in this series may be found at “Favorite Posts,” just below the list of topics.

Fred Reed, in a perceptive post worth reading in its entirety, says this:

Democracy works better the smaller the group practicing it. In a town, people can actually understand the questions of the day. They know what matters to them. Do we build a new school, or expand the existing one? Do we want our children to recite the pledge of allegiance, or don’t we? Reenact the Battle of Antietam? Sing Christmas carols in the town square? We can decide these things. Leave us alone….

Then came the vast empire, the phenomenal increase in the power and reach of the federal government, which really means the Northeast Corridor. The Supreme Court expanded and expanded and expanded the authority of Washington, New York’s store-front operation. The federals now decided what could be taught in the schools, what religious practices could be permitted, what standards employers could use in hiring, who they had to hire. The media coalesced into a small number of corporations, controlled from New York but with national reach….

Tyranny comes easily when those seeking it need only corrupt a single Congress, appoint a single Supreme Court, or control the departments of one executive branch. In a confederation of largely self-governing states, those hungry to domineer would have to suborn fifty congresses. It could not be done. State governments are accessible to the governed. They can be ejected. They are much more likely to be sympathetic to the desires of their constituents since they are of the same culture.

Tyranny is often justified by invoking “the will of the people”, but as I say here:

It is a logical and factual error to apply the collective “we” to Americans, except when referring generally to the citizens of the United States. Other instances of “we” (e.g., “we” won World War II, “we” elected Barack Obama) are fatuous and presumptuous. In the first instance, only a small fraction of Americans still living had a hand in the winning of World War II. In the second instance, Barack Obama was elected by amassing the votes of fewer than 25 percent of the number of Americans living in 2008 and 2012. “We the People” — that stirring phrase from the Constitution’s preamble — was never more hollow than it is today.

Further, the logical and factual error supports the unwarranted view that the growth of government somehow reflects a “national will” or consensus of Americans. Thus, appearances to the contrary (e.g., the adoption and expansion of national “social insurance” schemes, the proliferation of cabinet departments, the growth of the administrative state) a sizable fraction of Americans (perhaps a majority) did not want government to grow to its present size and degree of intrusiveness. And a sizable fraction (perhaps a majority) would still prefer that it shrink in both dimensions. In fact, The growth of government is an artifact of formal and informal arrangements that, in effect, flout the wishes of many (most?) Americans. The growth of government was not and is not the will of “we Americans,” “Americans on the whole,” “Americans in the aggregate,” or any other mythical consensus.


I am pleased to note that my prognosis for Trump’s presidency (as of December 2016) was prescient:

Based on his appointments to date — with the possible exception of Steve Bannon [now gone from the White House] — he seems to be taking a solidly conservative line. He isn’t building a government of bomb-throwers, but rather a government of staunch conservatives who, taken together, have a good chance at rebuilding America’s status in the world while dismantling much of Obama’s egregious “legacy”….

Will Donald Trump be a perfect president, if perfection is measured by adherence to the Constitution? Probably not, but who has been? It now seems likely, however, that Trump will be a far less fascistic president than Barack Obama has been and Hillary Clinton would have been. He will certainly be far less fascistic than the academic thought-police, whose demise cannot come too soon for the sake of liberty.

In sum, Trump’s emerging agenda seems to resemble my own decidedly conservative one.

But anti-Trump hysteria continues unabated, even among so-called conservatives. David Gelertner writes:

Some conservatives have the impression that, by showing off their anti-Trump hostility, they will get the networks and the New York Times to like them. It doesn’t work like that. Although the right reads the left, the left rarely reads the right. Why should it, when the left owns American culture? Nearly every university, newspaper, TV network, Hollywood studio, publisher, education school and museum in the nation. The left wrapped up the culture war two generations ago. Throughout my own adult lifetime, the right has never made one significant move against the liberal culture machine.

David Brooks of The New York Times is one of the (so-called) conservatives who shows off his anti-Trump hostility. Here he is writing about Trump and tribalism:

The Trump story is that good honest Americans are being screwed by aliens. Regular Americans are being oppressed by a snobbish elite that rigs the game in its favor. White Americans are being invaded by immigrants who take their wealth and divide their culture. Normal Americans are threatened by an Islamic radicalism that murders their children.

This is a tribal story. The tribe needs a strong warrior in a hostile world. We need to build walls to keep out illegals, erect barriers to hold off foreign threats, wage endless war on the globalist elites.

Somebody is going to have to arise to point out that this is a deeply wrong and un-American story. The whole point of America is that we are not a tribe. We are a universal nation, founded on universal principles, attracting talented people from across the globe, active across the world on behalf of all people who seek democracy and dignity.

I am unaware that Mr. Trump has anything against talented people. But he rightly has a lot against adding to the welfare rolls and allowing jihadists into the country. As for tribalism — that bugbear of “enlightened” people — here’s where I stand:

There’s a world of difference between these three things:

  1. hating persons who are different because they’re different
  2. fearing persons of a certain type because that type is highly correlated with danger
  3. preferring the company and comfort of persons with whom one has things in common, such as religion, customs, language, moral beliefs, and political preferences.

Number 1 is a symptom of bigotry, of which racism is a subset. Number 2 is a sign of prudence. Number 3 is a symptom of tribalism.

Liberals, who like to accuse others of racism and bigotry, tend to be strong tribalists — as are most people, the world around. Being tribal doesn’t make a person a racist or a bigot, that is, hateful toward persons of a different type. It’s natural (for most people) to trust and help those who live nearest them or are most like them, in customs, religion, language, etc. Persons of different colors and ethnicities usually have different customs, religions, and languages (e.g., black English isn’t General American English), so it’s unsurprising that there’s a tribal gap between most blacks and whites, most Latinos and whites, most Latinos and blacks, and so on.

Tribalism has deep evolutionary-psychological roots in mutual aid and mutual defense. The idea that tribalism can be erased by sitting in a circle, holding hands, and singing Kumbaya — or the equivalent in social-diplomatic posturing — is as fatuous as the idea that all human beings enter this world with blank minds and equal potential. Saying that tribalism is wrong is like saying that breathing and thinking are wrong. It’s a fact of life that can’t be undone without undoing the bonds of mutual trust and respect that are the backbone of a civilized society.

If tribalism is wrong, then most blacks, Latinos, members of other racial and ethnic groups, and liberals are guilty of wrong-doing.

None of this seems to have occurred to Our Miss Brooks (a cultural reference that may be lost on younger readers). But “liberals” — and Brooks is one of them — just don’t get sovereignty.


While we’re on the subject of immigration, consider a study of the effect of immigration on the wages of unskilled workers, which is touted by Timothy Taylor. According to Taylor, the study adduces evidence that

in areas with high levels of low-skill immigration, local firms shift their production processes in a way that uses more low-skilled labor–thus increasing the demand for such labor. In addition, immigrant low-skilled labor has tended to focus on manual tasks, which has enabled native-born low-skilled labor to shift to nonmanual low-skilled tasks, which often pay better.

It’s magical. An influx of non-native low-skilled laborers allows native-born low-skilled laborers to shift to better-paying jobs. If they could have had those better-paying jobs, why didn’t they take them in the first place?

More reasonably, Rick Moran writes about a

Federation for American Immigration Reform report [which] reveals that illegal aliens are costing the U.S. taxpayer $135 billion.  That cost includes medical care, education, and law enforcement expenses.

That’s a good argument against untrammeled immigration (legal or illegal). There are plenty more. See, for example, the entry headed “The High Cost of Untrammeled Immigration” at this post.


There’s a fatuous argument that a massive influx of illegal immigrants wouldn’t cause the rate of crime to rise. I’ve disposed of that argument with one of my own, which is supported by numbers. I’ve also dealt with crime in many other posts, including this one, where I say this (and a lot more):

Behavior is shaped by social norms. Those norms once were rooted in the Ten Commandments and time-tested codes of behavior. They weren’t nullified willy-nilly in accordance with the wishes of “activists,” as amplified through the megaphone of the mass media, and made law by the Supreme Court….

But by pecking away at social norms that underlie mutual trust and respect, “liberals” have sundered the fabric of civilization. There is among Americans the greatest degree of mutual enmity (dressed up as political polarization) since the Civil War.

The mutual enmity isn’t just political. It’s also racial, and it shows up as crime. Heather Mac Donald says “Yes, the Ferguson Effect Is Real,” and Paul Mirengoff shows that “Violent Crime Jumped in 2015.” I got to the root of the problem in “Crime Revisited,” to which I’ve added “Amen to That” and “Double Amen.” What is the root of the problem? A certain, violence-prone racial minority, of course, and also under-incarceration (see “Crime Revisited”).

The Ferguson Effect is a good example of where the slippery slope of free-speech absolutism leads. More examples are found in the violent protests in the wake of Donald Trump’s electoral victory. The right “peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” has become the right to assemble a mob, disrupt the lives of others, destroy the property of others, injure and kill others, and (usually) suffer no consequences for doing so — if you are a leftist or a member of one of the groups patronized by the left, that is.

How real is the Ferguson effect? Jazz Shaw writes about the rising rate of violent crime:

We’ve already looked at a couple of items from the latest FBI crime report and some of the dark news revealed within. But when you match up some of their numbers with recent historical facts, even more trends become evident. As the Daily Caller reports this week, one disturbing trend can be found by matching up locations recording rising murder rates with the homes of of widespread riots and anti-police protests.

As we discussed when looking at the rising murder and violent crime rates, the increases are not homogeneous across the country. Much of the spike in those figures is being driven by the shockingly higher murder numbers in a dozen or so cities. What some analysts are now doing is matching up those hot spots with the locations of the aforementioned anti-police protests. The result? The Ferguson Effect is almost undoubtedly real….

Looking at the areas with steep increases in murder rates … , the dots pretty much connect themselves. It starts with the crime spikes in St. Louis, Baltimore and Chicago. Who is associated with those cities? Michael Brown, Freddie Gray and Laquan McDonald. The first two cities experienced actual riots. While Chicago didn’t get quite that far out of hand, there were weeks of protests and regular disruptions. The next thing they have in common is the local and federal response. Each area, rather than thanking their police for fighting an increasingly dangerous gang violence situation with limited resources, saw municipal leaders chastising the police for being “too aggressive” or using similar language. Then the federal government, under Barack Obama and his two Attorney Generals piled on, demanding long term reviews of the police forces in those cities with mandates to clean up the police departments.

Small wonder that under such circumstances, the cops tended to back off considerably from proactive policing, as Heather McDonald describes it. Tired of being blamed for problems and not wanting to risk a lawsuit or criminal charges for doing their jobs, cops became more cautious about when they would get out of the patrol vehicle at times. And the criminals clearly noticed, becoming more brazen.

The result of such a trend is what we’re seeing in the FBI report. Crime, which had been on the retreat since the crackdown which started in the nineties, is back on the rise.


It is well known that there is a strong, negative relationship between intelligence and crime; that is, crime is more prevalent among persons of low intelligence. This link has an obvious racial dimension. There’s the link between race and crime, and there’s the link between race and intelligence. It’s easy to connect the dots. Unless you’re a “liberal”, of course.

I was reminded of the latter link by two recent posts. One is a reissue by Jared Taylor, which is well worth a re-read, or a first read if it’s new to you. The other, by James Thompson, examines an issue that I took up here, namely the connection between geography and intelligence. Thompson’s essay is more comprehensive than mine. He writes:

[R]esearchers have usually looked at latitude as an indicator of geographic influences. Distance from the Equator is a good predictor of outcomes. Can one do better than this, and include other relevant measures to get a best-fit between human types and their regions of origin?… [T]he work to be considered below…. seeks to create a typology of biomes which may be related to intelligence.

(A biome is “a community of plants and animals that have common characteristics for the environment they exist in. They can be found over a range of continents. Biomes are distinct biological communities that have formed in response to a shared physical climate.”)

Thompson discusses and quotes from the work (slides here), and ends with this:

In summary, the argument that geography affects the development of humans and their civilizations need not be a bone of contention between hereditarian and environmentalist perspectives, so long as environmentalists are willing to agree that long-term habitation in a particular biome could lead to evolutionary changes over generations.

Environment affects heredity, which then (eventually) embodies environmental effects.


Returning to economics, about which I’ve written little of late, I note a post by Scott Winship, in which he addresses the declining labor-force participation rate:

Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) makes the argument that the decline in prime-age male labor is a demand-side issue that ought to be addressed through stimulative infrastructure spending, subsidized jobs, wage insurance, and generous safety-net programs. If the CEA is mistaken, however, then these expensive policies may be ineffective or even counterproductive.

The CEA is mistaken—the evidence suggests there has been no significant drop in demand, but rather a change in the labor supply driven by declining interest in work relative to other options.

  • There are several problems with the assumptions and measurements that the CEA uses to build its case for a demand-side explanation for the rise in inactive prime-age men.
  • In spite of conventional wisdom, the prospect for high-wage work for prime-age men has not declined much over time, and may even have improved.
  • Measures of discouraged workers, nonworkers marginally attached to the workforce, part-time workers who wish to work full-time, and prime-age men who have lost their job involuntarily have not risen over time.
  • The health status of prime-age men has not declined over time.
  • More Social Security Disability Insurance claims are being filed for difficult-to-assess conditions than previously.
  • Most inactive men live in households where someone receives government benefits that help to lessen the cost of inactivity.

Or, as I put it here, there is

the lure of incentives to refrain from work, namely, extended unemployment benefits, the relaxation of welfare rules, the aggressive distribution of food stamps, and “free” healthcare” for an expanded Medicaid enrollment base and 20-somethings who live in their parents’ basements.


An additional incentive — if adopted in the U.S. — would be a universal basic income (UBI) or basic income guarantee (BIG), which even some libertarians tout, in the naive belief that it would replace other forms of welfare. A recent post by Alberto Mingardi reminded me of UBI/BIG, and invoked Friedrich Hayek — as “libertarian” proponents of UBI/BIG are wont to do. I’ve had my say (here and here, for example). Here’s I said when I last wrote about it:

The Basic Income Guarantee (BIG), also known as Universal Basic Income (UBI), is the latest fool’s gold of “libertarian” thought. John Cochrane devotes too much time and blog space to the criticism and tweaking of the idea. David Henderson cuts to the chase by pointing out that even a “modest” BIG — $10,000 per adult American per year — would result in “a huge increase in federal spending, a huge increase in tax rates, and a huge increase in the deadweight loss from taxes.”

Aside from the fact that BIG would be a taxpayer-funded welfare program — to which I generally object — it would necessarily add to the already heavy burden on taxpayers, even though it is touted as a substitute for many (all?) extant welfare programs. The problem is that the various programs are aimed at specific recipients (e.g., women with dependent children, families with earned incomes below a certain level). As soon as a specific but “modest” proposal is seriously floated in Congress, various welfare constituencies will find that proposal wanting because their “entitlements” would shrink. A BIG bill would pass muster only if it allowed certain welfare programs to continue, in addition to BIG, or if the value of BIG were raised to a level that such that no welfare constituency would be a “loser.”

In sum, regardless of the aims of its proponents — who, ironically, tend to call themselves libertarians — BIG would lead to higher welfare spending and more enrollees in the welfare state.


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Competitiveness in Major-League Baseball (III)

UPDATED 10/04/17

I first looked at this 10 years ago. I took a second look 3 years ago. This is an updated version of the 3-year-old post, which draws on the 10-year-old post.

Yesterday marked the final regular-season games of the 2014 season of major league baseball (MLB), In observance of that event, I’m shifting from politics to competitiveness in MLB. What follows is merely trivia and speculation. If you like baseball, you might enjoy it. If you don’t like baseball, I hope that you don’t think there’s a better team sport. There isn’t one.

Here’s how I compute competitiveness for each league and each season:

INDEX OF COMPETITIVENESS = AVEDEV/AVERAGE; where

AVEDEV = the average of the absolute value of deviations from the average number of games won by a league’s teams in a given season, and

AVERAGE =  the average number of games won by a league’s teams in a given season.

For example, if the average number of wins is 81, and the average of the absolute value of deviations from 81 is 8, the index of competitiveness is 0.1 (rounded to the nearest 0.1). If the average number of wins is 81 and the average of the absolute value of deviations from 81 is 16, the index of competitiveness is 0.2.  The lower the number, the more competitive the league.

With some smoothing, here’s how the numbers look over the long haul:


Based on statistics for the National League and American League compiled at Baseball-Reference.com.

The National League grew steadily more competitive from 1940 to 1987, and has slipped only a bit since then. The American League’s sharp climb began in 1951, peaked in 1989, slipped until 2006, and has since risen to the NL’s level. In any event, there’s no doubt that both leagues are — and in recent decades have been — more competitive than they were in the early to middle decades of the 20th century. Why?

My hypothesis: integration compounded by expansion, with an admixture of free agency and limits on the size of rosters.

Let’s start with integration. The rising competitiveness of the NL after 1940 might have been a temporary thing, but it continued when NL teams (led by the Brooklyn Dodgers) began to integrate by adding Jackie Robinson in 1947. The Cleveland Indians of the AL followed suit, by adding Larry Doby later in the same season. By the late 1950s, all major league teams (then 16) had integrated, though the NL seems to have integrated faster. The more rapid integration of the NL could explain its earlier ascent to competitiveness. Integration was followed in short order by expansion: The AL began to expand in 1961 and the NL began to expand in 1962.

How did expansion and integration combine to make the leagues more competitive? Several years ago, I opined:

[G]iven the additional competition for talent [following] expansion, teams [became] more willing to recruit players from among the black and Hispanic populations of the U.S. and Latin America. That is to say, teams [came] to draw more heavily on sources of talent that they had (to a large extent) neglected before expansion.

Further, free agency, which began in the mid-1970s,

made baseball more competitive by enabling less successful teams to attract high-quality players by offering them more money than other, more successful, teams. Money can, in some (many?) cases, compensate a player for the loss of psychic satisfaction of playing on a team that, on its record, is likely to be successful.

Finally,

[t]he competitive ramifications of expansion and free agency [are] reinforced by the limited size of team rosters (e.g., each team may carry only 25 players until September 1). No matter how much money an owner has, the limit on the size of his team’s roster constrains his ability to sign all (even a small fraction) of the best players.

It’s not an elegant hypothesis, but it’s my own (as far as I know). I offer it for discussion.

UPDATE

Another way of looking at the degree of competitiveness is to look at the percentage of teams in W-L brackets. I chose these seven: .700+, .600-.699, .500-.599, .400-.499, .300-.399, and <.300. The following graphs give season-by-season percentages for the two leagues:

Here’s how to interpret the graphs, taking the right-hand bar (2017) in the American League graph as an example:

  • No team had a W-L record of .700 or better.
  • About 13 percent (2 teams) had records of .600-.699; the same percentage, of course, had records of .600 or better because there were no teams in the top bracket.
  • Only one-third (5 teams) had records of .500 or better, including one-fifth (3 teams) with records of .500-.599.
  • Fully 93 percent of teams (14) had records of .400 or better, including 9 teams with records of .400-.499.
  • One team (7 percent) had a record of .300-.399.
  • No teams went below .300.

If your idea of competitiveness is balance — with half the teams at .500 or better — you will be glad to see that in a majority of years half the teams have had records of .500 or better. However, the National League has failed to meet that standard in most seasons since 1983. The American League, by contrast, met or exceeded that standard in every season from 2000 through 2016, before decisively breaking the streak in 2017.

Below are the same two graphs, overlaid with annual indices of competitiveness. (Reminder: lower numbers = greater competitiveness.)

I prefer the index of competitiveness, which integrates the rather jumbled impression made by the bar graphs. What does it all mean? I’ve offered my thoughts. Please add yours.

Disposition and Ideology

In two recent posts (here and here), I’ve drawn a line (perhaps a fuzzy one) between disposition and ideology. I claim that conservatism is first of all a disposition, that is, a temperament or tendency. By contrast, such “isms” as libertarianism, modern (statist) “liberalism”, straight-out socialism (undisguised as “liberalism”), and faux conservatism are ideologies, that is, doctrines or beliefs — though often inchoate and malleable.

An analogous and useful distinction is the one between process and outcome. Temperament is a mental process, a way of approaching politics (among other things). Ideology expresses the desired outcome(s) of the political process. Thus it is that many (most?) “conservatives” in this country are really ideologues who apply the label to themselves, even though they are not conservative by temperament.

In this post I will explore that distinction more rigorously than I have in previous posts. But first I must explain what I mean by politics. It is not just the formal politics of elections, law-making, and other governmental acts. Politics, in its broadest sense, is the means by which human beings regulate their behavior, which usually (but unnecessarily) is divided into social and economic components.

The purpose of regulating behavior — whether the regulation is explicit or implicit, imposed or voluntary — is to sustain or change the modes of human interaction, and the outcomes that derive from human interaction. Politics predates government, and it usually operates independently of government, in accordance with evolved social norms.

In the rest of this post I will address the types of political disposition and the connection between political disposition and political ideology.

MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

Moral Foundations Theory is a good place to start. The Wikipedia article about Moral Foundations describes it (accurately, I believe) as

a social psychological theory intended to explain the origins of and variation in human moral reasoning on the basis of innate, modular foundations. It was first proposed by the psychologists Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham, building on the work of cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder; and subsequently developed by a diverse group of collaborators, and popularized in Haidt’s book The Righteous Mind.

Further:

Researchers have found that people’s sensitivities to the five moral foundations [Care/Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity] correlate with their political ideologies. Using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, Haidt and Graham found that liberals [i.e., leftists] are most sensitive to the Care and Fairness foundations, while conservatives are equally sensitive to all five foundations.

(These seem to be solid findings. See “Robustness of Liberal-Conservative Moral Foundations Questionnaire Differences” at YourMorals.org blog.)

This does not mean that disposition and ideology are the same thing. It means only that persons of a certain disposition are likely to hold a particular ideology. Further, Haidt and Graham are wrong to characterize conservatism (properly defined) as an ideology. Granted, it has certain policy implications, but it is not an ideology.

An instrument with five dimensions can yield many different outcomes. Certainly there are persons who are neither fish nor fowl, scoring high on, say, three or four dimensions but not on all five; or scoring low on most or all dispositions.

It’s also certain that many people score high on certain dimensions because they want to give the “right” answers. Do leftists, for example, (a) really “care” or (b) do they respond as they do because (for them) “caring” justifies government intervention? The right answer is probably (b), in most cases.

(For more about Moral Foundations and my score — which conforms to my conservatism — go to “My Moral Profile” and scroll down to Moral Foundations Questionnaire.)

POLITICAL DISPOSITIONS

I posit three coherent political dispositions: anarchistic, conservative, and authoritarian. Persons of the anarchistic disposition probably score low on all five dimensions, with the possible exception of Purity. Conservatives, as noted above, tend to score high on all five dimensions, while “liberals” score high only on Care/Harm and Fairness.

That leaves the field open for the wide swath of “centrist” Americans whose dispositions are as incoherent as their stance on political issues. They are in company with legions of opportunistic politicians, who either lack a substantive disposition or submerge it for the sake of attaining political power and prestige.

Although the incoherent disposition is dominant, it is uninteresting with respect the the connection between disposition and ideology. I will therefore focus on the anarchistic, conservative, and authoritarian dispositions.

THE THREE DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Anarchistic

The anarchistic disposition rejects authority. This disposition is rarely held, even among persons who proclaim themselves anarchists. Most self-styled anarchists really belong in the authoritarian camp. Theirs is the authoritarianism of violence.

The true anarchist is not only one by disposition but also one by ideology. That is, he believes that there should be no government of any kind. More than that, he believes that rules, including social norms, are oppressive. The true anarchist wouldn’t belong to an organization that promotes anarchy. To do so would contradict his temperament. A true anarchist would live alone, à la Unabomber, fending for himself and avoiding the encumbrances of social intercourse, paid employment, credit cards, etc.

There is nothing more to be said about the anarchistic personality because it is so rare and so withdrawn as to be an insignificant force in matters of governance.

Conservative

The conservative disposition is cautious, but not stuck in the mud. As Michael Oakeshott puts it,

a disposition to be conservative in respect of government would seem to be pre-eminently appropriate to men who have something to do and something to think about on their own account, who have a skill to practise or an intellectual fortune to make, to people whose passions do not need to be inflamed, whose desires do not need to be provoked and whose dreams of a better world need no prompting. Such people know the value of a rule which imposes orderliness without directing enterprise, a rule which concentrates duty so that room is left for delight. [“On Being Conservative” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, New and Expanded Edition]

A conservative (by disposition) will respect — or at least inspect — the views of others. A conservative’s default position is to respect prevailing social norms, taking them as a guide to conduct that will yield productive social and economic collaboration. Conservatism isn’t merely a knee-jerk response to authority. It reflects an understanding, if only an intuitive one, that tradition reflects wisdom that has passed the test of time. It also reflects a preference for changing tradition — where it needs changing — from the inside out, a bit at a time, rather from the outside in. The latter kind of change is uninformed by first-hand experience and therefore likely to be counterproductive, that is, destructive of social and economic cohesion and cooperation.

The essential ingredient in conservative governance is the preservation and reinforcement of the beneficial norms that are cultivated in the voluntary institutions of civil society: family, religion, club, community (where it is close-knit), and commerce. When those institutions are allowed to flourish, much of the work of government is done without the imposition of taxes and regulations, including the enforcement of moral codes and the care of those who unable to care for themselves.

In the conservative view, government would then be limited to making and enforcing the few rules that are required to adjudicate what Oakeshott calls “collisions”. And there are always foreign and domestic predators who are beyond the effective reach of voluntary social institutions and must be dealt with by the kind of superior force wielded by government.

By thus limiting government to the roles of referee and defender of last resort, civil society is allowed to flourish, both economically and socially. Social conservatism is analogous to the market liberalism of libertarian economics. The price signals that help to organize economic production have their counterpart in the “market” for social behavior. That behavior which is seen to advance a group’s well-being is encouraged; that behavior which is seen to degrade a group’s well-being is discouraged.

If there is an ideology that comports with a conservative disposition, it should be libertarianism. But I reject the label, as do many (perhaps most) persons of conservative disposition. I reject the label because libertarianism and self-styled libertarians are too often dismissive of the wisdom and social cohesion the flows from voluntarily evolved social norms.

I have dealt with the defects of libertarian ideology at length elsewhere, as I have also explained that true libertarianism is to be found in conservatism. (See this post, for example, and follow the links therein. See also a later post, which takes up the theme.)

If there is an ideology to which I can subscribe, because it suits my conservative disposition, it is a particular branch of libertarianism known as right-minarchism. (See this post for a discussion of right-minarchism in the context of a taxonomy of political philosophies.)

Authoritarian

The authoritarian disposition has no patience for caution. The authoritarian insists on overriding social norms to fulfill his ideology.

What is that ideology? The specifics change with the winds of elite opinion. At bottom, the ideology is a belief that people must be made to behave correctly (whatever that means at the moment). There is no place for trial-and-error. “Reason” and “science” (which are really neurotic emotion and magical thinking) must be made to prevail. Thus force is the preferred instrument of the authoritarian — whether it is the force of mob rule or the force of government.

You will have guessed by now that it is leftists (“liberals“) who are usually authoritarian by temperament. This is no news to anyone who has read about “liberal” fascism. I have written much about it, from many angles. (See this, also.)

Why, then, do leftists score high on Care/Harm and Fairness? I suggested earlier that leftists “care” because “caring” justifies government intervention. By the same token, “fairness” is important to leftists, because once having defined it they can then marshal the power of the state to enforce it.

Even faux libertarians fall back on government to ensure outcomes that they define as “fair”, such as same-sex marriage.

THE LIE THAT WILL NOT DIE

I must end this post by addressing, not for the first time, the myth that conservatives are authoritarian. The source of this canard is psychological projection by leftists. One of the left’s favorite examples of a “conservative” authoritarian is Adolf Hitler. This is a risible example because Hitler was a leftist.

For much more on these points, see “Leftism“, the associated bibliography., and “Liberty in Chains“.


Normally, I would now add a list of related posts, but the list would be intolerably long. If you want to read more of what I’ve had to say about politics and personality, go to these sections of my “Favorite Posts” page:

I. The Academy, Intellectuals, and the Left

IV. The Constitution and the Rule of Law

VI. Economics: Principles and Issues

VIII. Infamous Thinkers and Political Correctness

IX. Intelligence and Psychology<

X. Libertarianism and Other Political Philosophies

XI. Politics, Politicians, and the Consequences of Government

Because I often build on earlier posts, it’s best to start with the more recent posts in each section, and work your way toward older posts.