Slogans for Our Time

UPDATED BELOW

Republican James G. Blaine probably lost the presidential election of 1884 to Democrat Grover Cleveland because Blaine failed to repudiate a Protestant minister who characterized the Democrat Party as the party of “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion.” (If the significance of that phrase isn’t obvious to you, read this.) The backlash among Irish Catholics apparently tipped New York’s electoral votes, and the election, to Cleveland.

All of that is by way of introduction to these updated versions of “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion”:

“Buggery, Baby-killing, and Bush-bashing”

“Taxes, Terrorism, and Timidity”

Give me a week and I might come up with something equally offensive to Republicans.

UPDATE: It didn’t take a week, though I do have to change the rhetorical style. The Republican Party is the party of

“Mirthless, Mediocre Milquetoasts”

For good measure, the Libertarian Party is the party of

“Pot, Puerility, and Powerlessness”

Legalism vs. Liberty

We have a Constitution that was written by men who knew what it meant to fight for liberty. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote,

we have had recent occasion to quote approvingly the statement of former Chief Justice Hughes that the war power of the Government is ‘the power to wage war successfully.’ . . . Therefore, the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless. To talk about a military order that expresses an allowable judgment of war needs by those entrusted with the duty of conducting war as ‘an unconstitutional order’ is to suffuse a part of the Constitution with an atmosphere of unconstitutionality. The respective spheres of action of military authorities and of judges are of course very different. But within their sphere, military authorities are no more outside the bounds of obedience to the Constitution than are judges within theirs. . . . To recognize that military orders are ‘reasonably expedient military precautions’ in time of war and yet to deny them constitutional legitimacy makes of the Constitution an instrument for dialetic subtleties not reasonably to be attributed to the hard-headed Framers, of whom a majority had had actual participation in war. If a military order such as that under review does not transcend the means appropriate for conducting war, such action . . . is as constitutional as would be any authorized action by the Interstate Commerce Commission within the limits of the constitutional power to regulate commerce.

In spite of that, we now have men and women who seem opposed to the notion that fighting a war in order to win it is every bit as constitutional as regulating interstate commerce in order to dictate the labeling of canned goods. How is it that such men and women can go so wrong? Here’s how:

  • They understand, correctly, that citizens may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law.
  • They twist that principle to mean that due process of law is synonymous with liberty.
  • That leads them to challenge any defense of liberty that — in their view — violates due process, even if the result of their challenge is to enable the enemies of liberty

They have, in other words, mistaken means for ends and come down on the side of means, as opposed to ends. That is to say, they prefer the tokens of libert to liberty, itself. And sometimes they seem downright determined to help the enemies of liberty.

Related posts:

Getting It Wrong: Civil Libertarians and the War on Terror (A Case Study)
More about War and Civil Liberties
The Illogic of Knee-Jerk Civil Liberties Advocates
Torture and Morality
The Constitution and Warrantless “Eavesdropping”
NSA “Eavesdropping”: The Last Word (from Me)
Privacy, Security, and Electronic Surveillance
Privacy: Variations on the Theme of Liberty
Words for the Unwise
Recommended Reading about NSA’s Surveillance Program

I Knew It All the Time

I always hated meetings convened for the purpose of “problem solving.” Here’s why:

So you need some fresh, innovative ideas. What do you do? Get a group of your best thinkers together to bounce ideas of each other…? No, wrong answer. Time and again research has shown that people think of more new ideas on their own than they do in a group. The false belief that people are more creative in groups has been dubbed by psychologists the ‘illusion of group of productivity”. But why does this illusion persist? . . .

[I]t’s because when we’re in a group, other people are talking, the pressure isn’t always on us and so we’re less aware of all the times that we fail to think of a new idea. By contrast, when we’re working alone and we can’t think of anything, there’s no avoiding the fact that we’re failing.

But if you’re constantly coming up with good ideas when you work alone, you know that a group endeavor will simply be a waste of your time. And sure enough — it is.

That’s an INTJ for you.

Wishes Are Not Facts

A utopian syllogism:

1. It is human to err.

2. Humans do not wish to err.

3. Therefore, humans can avoid error by wishing not to err.

By (3), the wish (2) overcomes the fact (1), but only in the imagination. Wishes are not facts.

(Inspired by this post at Imlac’s Journal.)

Liberty, General Welfare, and the State

In an earlier post I said that “the economy isn’t a zero-sum game.” That assertion warrants explanation and elaboration. Here it is.

Gains from Specialization and Trade

Imagine a very simple economy in which Jack makes bread and Jill makes butter. Jack also could make butter and Jill also could make bread, but both of them have learned that they are better off if they specialize. Thus:

  • Jack can make 1 loaf of bread or 0.5 pound of butter a day. (The “rate of transformation” is linear; e.g., in Jill’s absence Jack would make 0.5 loaf of bread and 0.25 pound of butter daily.)
  • Jill can make 0.5 loaf of bread or 1 pound of butter a day. (Again, the rate of transformation is linear; e.g., in Jack’s absence Jill would make 0.25 loaf of bread and 0.5 pound of butter daily.)
  • If both Jack and Jill make bread and butter their total daily output might be, to continue the example, 0.75 loaf and 0.75 pounds.
  • Alternatively, if Jack specializes in bread and Jill specializes in butter their total daily output is 1 loaf and 1 pound.

Now, the question for Jack and Jill is this: At what rate should they exchange bread and butter so that both are better off than they would be in the absence of specialization and trade? There is no right answer to that question. The answer depends on Jack and Jill’s respective preferences for bread and butter, and on their respective negotiating skills. But of one thing we can be certain, Jack and Jill will strike a bargain that makes both of them better off than they would be in the absence of specialization and trade.

Consider some possibilities:

  • Jack makes 1 loaf of bread, keeps 0.5 loaf, and trades the other 0.5 loaf to Jill in exchange for 0.25 pound of butter. Jack, with 0.5 loaf and 0.25 pound, is where he would be in the absence of specialization and trade. Jill makes 1 pound of butter and trades 0.25 pound to Jack for 0.5 loaf of bread. Jill, with 0.5 loaf and 0.75 pound, is better off than she would be in the absence of specialization and trade (+0.25 loaf and +0.25 pound). This outcome is unlikely because Jack, seeing his lot unimproved, would have no incentive to specialize in bread and trade with Jill. Jill, therefore, would have an incentive to strike a bargain with Jack that makes both of them better off than they would be in the absence of specialization and trade.
  • At the other end of the spectrum of possible trades, Jill could end up no better off while Jack reaps all the gains to specialization and trade. But this outcome, too, is unlikely because Jill, seeing her lot unimproved, would have no incentive to specialize in butter and trade with Jack. Jack, therefore, would have an incentive to strike a bargain with Jill that makes both of them better off than they would be in the absence of specialization and trade.
  • More realistically, then, Jack and Jill make a trade that leaves both of them better off. For example, Jack trades 0.5 loaf to Jill for 0.5 pound of butter, leaving him ahead by 0.25 pound of butter. Jilll ends up with 0.5 loaf and 0.5 pound of butter, leaving her ahead by 0.25 loaf of bread.

In sum, liberty — which includes the right to engage in voluntary exchange — makes both Jack and Jill better off. Moreover, because they are better off they can convert some of their gains from trade into investments that yield even more output in the future. For example, to continue with this homely metaphor, imagine that Jill — fueled by additional food — is able to produce the usual amount of butter in less time, giving her time in which to design and build a churn that can produce butter at a faster rate.

Liberty advances the general welfare, which means the general well-being — not handouts.

Enter the State

Under a regime of liberty there is no “exploitation” of Jack by Jill, or vice versa, unless one of them cheats or robs the other. In the naïve libertarian view of the world, cheating and theft are irrational. If Jack cheats or steals from Jill, Jill refuses to trade with Jack until he made things right. If he refuses to do so he would face a lifetime of living less well than he could by trading honestly with Jill. Alternatively, Jack would come to understand that this thievery or cheating will weaken Jill and diminish her ability to produce 1 pound of butter a day. That understanding should cause Jack to desist from cheating or thievery.

But Jack would not desist from cheating or thievery if he had a taste for such things, nor would Jill if she had a taste for such things. (Wealth-maximization, contrary to many economists and all naïve libertarians, isn’t necessarily the be-all and end-all of human existence.) Even if neither Jack nor Jill has a taste for cheating or thievery, they must beware predators who have such tastes.

The Delusion of Statelessness (or Anarcho-Libertarianism)

An anarcho-capitalist (or anarcho-libertarian) would have Jack and Jill protect themselves (from each other and outside predators) by hiring a third party to enforce their trading contract and deal with predators. An anarcho-libertarian would call such a third party a private defense agency. But an entity that has the power to enforce contracts and keep the peace is the state, no matter what you call it.

In an effort to avoid the necessity of the state, the anarcho-libertarian posits competing private defense agencies. But if a generally peaceful and cooperative people cannot control one state (or private defense agency), such a people surely cannot control competing states — or warlords — all of them armed and many of them having a taste for dominance.

For a sample of the consequences of warlordism in the American experience, consider the Civil War. An anarcho-libertarian would be quick to call Abraham Lincoln a warlord. But it takes two warlords to foment a war. And so — with the creation of a rival warlord in the South — there was a civil war: a war that resulted in 50 percent more military deaths than did World War II (twice as many deaths per capita); a war with dire, long-lasting consequences for race relations in America (e.g., Jim Crow and “black redneck” culture); a war that would not have happened if the South had not chosen to form a “competing defense agency.” (For more about anarcho-libertarianism and defense, read this post and the posts linked at the bottom.)

The Busybody State

The lesson here is simple, the best way to reap the benefits of liberty is to create a single, accountable state with limited powers — and to be vigilant about enforcing the limits. When vigilance fails, those who control the levers of power will use that power to interfere with the lives, liberty, and property that they were hired to protect. The Framers of the Constitution knew that well, and so they designed a system of checks and balances to circumscribe the power of the state. (The design is still there, on paper, and — with time and the right Supreme Court — can be re-applied.)

The fact of the matter is that the state has no moral standing with respect to its citizens. For example, a person who “fails” to give money or assistance to a fellow citizen owes an apology to no one, especially not to the busybodies who happen to control the state. The state’s moral judgment in such matters is “superior” only in that it is enforceable through the power of the state. Let us not lose sight of this fact: Edward Kennedy and his ilk (of all political stripes) have no claim whatever to moral superiority.

To return to Jack and Jill, suppose that Jill becomes ill and incapable of producing anything. As a result, Jill has no income and Jack is reduced to providing for himself. It isn’t Jack’s fault that Jill is incapable of working; Jack is worse off because Jill isn’t working. It isn’t Jack’s fault if Jill has not somehow insured herself against illness (e.g., by stockpiling bread and butter). Is Jack nevertheless compelled to give Jill some of his reduce income?

Jack, out of empathy for a fellow human being, may wish to give Jill some of his bread and butter. (In fact, absent the busybody state, Jack would be more willing and able to do just that.) Jack may even make an economic calculation and decide that if he gives some of his bread and butter to Jill she will recover and return to work, making both of them better off. But when the state — namely, the controlling faction of busybodies — is empowered to dictate the terms of Jack’s chartity toward Jill, here’s what happens:

  • The busybody state taxes Jack by taking away some of the bread and butter he produces, which is less than he had when Jill was capable of working (a fact that never occurs to the busybody state).
  • The tax (whether it’s an income tax or a consumption tax) makes work less attractive to Jack, assuming that he is producing more than he needs for subsistence.
  • When work becomes less attractive in relation to leisure, Jack chooses more leisure and therefore produces less.
  • As a result, Jack has less “excess” food to stockpile against misfortune or to sustain himself in efforts to improve his bread-and-butter-making technology (which would enable him to give more aid to Jill).

In sum, when the state becomes Jack’s conscience, it is far more likely to make matters worse than it is to make them better. Jill’s plight is unfortunate, but Jack is the only person who is in a position to make the right decision about how to respond to Jill’s plight. It is false and cheap compassion for the busybody state to tell Jack what to do about Jill.

Moreover, the state’s patent willingness to extort aid from Jack has the effect of (a) blunting Jill’s incentive to build a stockpile of food for a “rainy day” and (b) blunting Jill’s incentive to return to work when she is able to do so.

The state’s busybody ways make both Jack and Jill worse off, in the end.

There’s much more to be said for an economic order of voluntary exchange, in which the state’s only role is to enforce contracts and keep the peace. Here’s some of it:

The Destruction of Income and Wealth by the State (start here)
Why Outsourcing Is Good: A Simple Lesson for Liberal Yuppies
Fear of the Free Market — Part I
Fear of the Free Market — Part II
Fear of the Free Market — Part III
Trade Deficit Hysteria
Social Injustice
The Sentinel: A Tragic Parable of Economic Reality
Why We Deserve What We Earn
Who Decides Who’s Deserving?
The Rationality Fallacy
Brains Sans Borders
Why Class Warfare Is Bad for Everyone
Fighting Myths with Facts
Debunking More Myths of Income Inequality
Free-Market Healthcare
Understanding Economic Growth
Socialist Calculation and the Turing Test
The Social Welfare Function
Funding the Welfare State
A Mathematician’s Insight
Giving Back to the Community
Computer Technology Will Replace Concrete
Second-Guessing, Paternalism, Parentalism, and Choice
A Non-Paradox for Libertarians
“The Private Sector Isn’t Perfect”
Whose Incompetence Do You Trust?
Understanding Outsourcing
Much Ado about Donning
Joe Stiglitz, Ig-Nobelist
A Simple Fallacy
Ten Commandments of Economics
More Commandments of Economics
Three Truths for Central Planners
Bits of Economic Wisdom
Productivity Growth and Tax Cuts
Zero-Sum Thinking
Risk and Regulation
Wal-Mart and Jobs
Economist, Heal Thyself

Recommended Reading about NSA’s Surveillance Program

LINKS ADDED 02/07/06, 02/14/06, 03/07/06, 03/24/06

Buried in the middle of my rather long post about “Privacy: Variations on the Theme of Liberty” is a reading list that I update from time to time:

President had legal authority to OK taps (Chicago Tribune)
Our domestic intelligence crisis (Richard A. Posner)
Many posts by Tom Smith of The Right Coast (start with “Thank You New York Times” on 12/16/05 and work your way to the present)
Eavesdropping Ins and Outs (Mark R. Levin, writing at National Review Online)
The FISA Act And The Definition Of ‘US Persons’ (Ed Morrissey of Captain’s Quarters)
A Colloquy with the Times (John Hinderaker of Power Line)
September 10 America (editorial at National Review Online)
A Patriot Acts (Ben Stein, writing at The American Spectator)
More on the NSA Wiretaps (Dale Franks of QandO)
The President’s War Power Includes Surveillance (John Eastman, writing at The Remedy)
Warrantless Intelligence Gathering, Redux (UPDATED) (Jeff Goldstein, writing at Protein Wisdom)
FISA Court Obstructionism Since 9/11 (Ed Morrissey of Captain’s Quarters)
FISA vs. the Constitution (Robert F. Turner, writing at OpinionJournal)
Wisdom in Wiretaps (an editorial from OpinionJournal)
Under Clinton, NY Times Called Surveillance a Necessity (William Tate, writing at The American Thinker)
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT
(U.S. Department of Justice)
Terrorists on Tap (Victoria Toensing, writing at OpinionJournal)
Letter from Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee, to Chairman and Ranking Member of Senate Judiciary Committee
Letter from H. Bryan Cunningham to Chairman and Ranking Member of Senate Judiciary Committee
Has The New York Times Violated the Espionage Act? (article in Commentary by Gabriel Schoenfeld)
Point of No Return (Thomas Sowell, writing at RealClearPolitics) (ADDED 02/07/06)
Letter from John C. Eastman to Chairman of House Judiciary Committee (ADDED 02/14/06)
FISA Chief Judge Speaks Out, Bamford Misinforms (a post at The Strata-Sphere) (ADDED 03/07/06)
DoJ Responds to Congressional FISA Questions (another post at The Strata-Sphere) (ADDED 03/24/06)

Giving Back to the Community, Redux

I wrote about it here. Don Boudreaux has a very good post, from a slightly different angle, here.

Liberty and "Fairness"

Todd Zywicki at The Volokh Conspiracy posts a question from a student:

I consider myself to be a classical liberal (free trade, freedom of expression, freedom of religion …)with an exceptionally large bleeding heart (there is no excuse for having hungry kids or the mentally ill out on the streets), but I am trying to understand what it means to be a libertarian.

My advice: I recommend Arnold Kling’s Learning Economics, which is available on the web, here. But I would like to deal directly with the student’s implied question, which seems to be how the “less fortunate” would cope under a regime of liberty.

The student implies that there is a tension between liberty and what he or she might call “fairness.” The idea seems to be that some kids are hungry and some mentally ill persons are homeless because . . . because what? Because persons who are not hungry or homeless have taken food and health care from the hungry and homeless? No, that can’t be the answer, if you understand that the economy isn’t a zero-sum game.

Perhaps the hungry are hungry and the homeless are homeless because those who are “more fortunate” aren’t paying enough taxes to provide for our “less fortunate” fellow citizens? On the contrary, taxes (and regulations) stifle economic growth, which benefits everyone who is willing and able to work. That includes the parents of children who might otherwise go hungry. That includes persons who are prone to mental illness but who would have greater access to health care, given a job and/or health-care benefits.

So, a regime of liberty would actually be to the advantage of most of the “less fortunate” among us. The “least fortunate” would benefit from private charity, which is stifled by the present regime, which I call the regulatory-welfare state.

For more about the effects of the regulatory-welfare state on the general welfare, go here. For evidence that taxation suppresses private charity, go here and read to the end.

Anarcho-Libertarian "Stretching"

Tim Swanson, writing at the website of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, announces with glee “An Anarchistic Oasis In The Middle Of The Desert.” The “anarchistic oasis” is the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), which, according to an article quoted by Swanson,

is a free trade area, an enclave with no taxes or customs duties and no restrictions on foreign ownership. That, in itself, is nothing special: Dubai has nearly a dozen [free trade areas] already. But what’s unique about the . . . DIFC . . . is that Dubai’s normal civil and commercial laws do not apply within.

Under a formal decree of the United Arab Emirates, and local laws signed by the late Ruler of Dubai, the two authorities that hold absolute power carved out an area from which they withdrew their own system of laws. The concept is breathtaking: here in DIFC, English common law reigns supreme – and under a British chief justice. Although there are some similarities to the Vatican, Hong Kong and even Gaza, it is thought to be the first time that any state has done this.

State sponsorship of English common law under a British chief justice is hardly the stuff of anarchy, or even of Hayekian spontaneous order. Welcome as the rule of common law may be (and I welcome it), the DFIC is not an instance of anarchy in action. State-imposed anarchy is an oxymoron. The DFIC is an instance of state-sponsored liberty, such as Americans enjoyed (more or less) from 1789 until about 1933 — and moreso from 1865 until about 1933.

"Addicted to Oil"

Are Americans “addicted to oil” as President Bush — borrowing a line from environmental extremists — said in his State of the Union message last night? We are “addicted” to many things, for example breathing, eating, and sleeping — which are unavoidable aspects of living. So, let’s boil it down to an “addiction” to living.

President Bush presumably would not deny us the right to live, so he must want to deny us the right to live as well as we can. Of course, living as well as we can should not encompass cheating, lying, fraud, deception, theft, or murder. (I will resist the urge to pronounce here on politicians and the parasites upon whose votes they depend.) Assuming for the moment that Americans generally do not do such things in order to live, it seems that President Bush is telling us that there must be a limit on how well we should live. Moreover, that limit would seem to apply indiscriminately. The relatively poor person who relies on oil (or its derivative forms of energy) for transportation to work, enough light to read by, and enough fuel to cook with is just as “addicted” as the very rich person who relies on oil for jetting about the globe, projecting motion pictures on a home theater screen the size of Rhode Island, and eating food prepared and served by a small army of servants. (Oops, they’re not called “servants” anymore, are they?)

Thus government, in its wisdom, shall punish poor and rich alike for their “addiction” to living — or at least to living as well as they are able. How will it do that? By taxing us all for research into and development of alternative sources of energy. Isn’t it strange that government should have to do that when the “obscene profits” garnered by oil companies will surely call forth from the private sector the very same kinds of research and development?

Not only would private research and development be funded voluntarily, but it would more assuredly pay off. Private actors who have put their own money at risk do not make perfect decisions, but they make better decisions than politicians, lobbyists, and bureaucrats who get to play with taxpayers’ money. It’s not “real” money to politicians, lobbyists, and bureaucrats — but it’s real money to the rest of us.

And most of the rest of us are not very rich. We’re addicted to living, and trying to live as well as we can. President Bush’s program would punish our addiction and make it harder for us to live as well as we can.

Conservatism, Libertarianism, and "The Authoritarian Personality"

The Myth

There is a renewed effort to identify conservatism with racism and authoritarianism. It’s not quite as overt as that (except on the hard Left), but it goes like this (corrective analysis in brackets):

  • Bush voters (and only Bush voters) are “conservative.” [What kind of “conservative”? A Burkean, limited-government, classical liberal who knows that evolved social traditions contain much wisdom and who therefore opposes change when it is imposed by the state? A neo-isolationist protectionist like Pat Buchanan, who spouts many of the same lines as “liberal” Lou Dobbs? A “redneck” who hates government except when it comes time to pick up his welfare check? A life-long Democrat who goes to church and tries to obey the Ten Commandments? The Burkean is a conservative. The Democrat has conservative tendencies (probably unacknowledged). Pat Buchanan, Lou Dobbs, and the “redneck” simply exude certain attitudes, not coherent philosophies of governance. Define your terms.]
  • Research “shows” that Bush voters are racist. [Actually, an uncontrolled, online “experiment” (see first three links above) purports to find an unspecified degree of correlation between (a) persons whose (unverified) zip codes coincide with congressional districts where Bush prevailed and (b) a somewhat more negative, self-reported (i.e., calculated) reaction to black persons than that of test-takers whose (unverified) zip codes coincide with congressional districts where Bush did not prevail. It would be just as valid to conclude that Bill Clinton is a racist because his daughter did not attend public schools in the mostly black District of Columbia. Actually, Bill Clinton’s condescendion toward black persons does strike me as a form of compensation for latent racist tendencies.]
  • Hitler and his adherents were racist authoritarians. [The part about “racist authoritarians” is an undeniable truth, which — when linked to the myth that Hitler was “conservative” — ties Republicans and “conservatives” (of whatever stripe) to racist authoritarianism. The modern liberal agenda of taxation and regulation is patently authoritarian in nature, yet a “good liberal” — who cannot see that his or her agenda is authoritarian — also denies his or her own racism by bending over backward to seem non-racist, regardless of the truth of the matter.]
  • Therefore, conservatives are racist authoritarians. [The implication here is that conservatism is authoritarian (and therefore racist, by the Hitler analogy). Yet, the reverse is true. Modern liberalism is authoritarian, and Burkean conservatives-classical liberals-libertarians have resisted modern liberalism since its ascendancy in the 1930s.]

The line of “reasoning” that I have just “fisked” illustrates three types of logical fallacy: false dilemma, false choice, and package deal. In this instance, the perpetrators of the fallacies do not know, or care, about their logical failings. Their aim is simply to convey the following message: Conservatism is sociopathic, if not psychopathic. They do not wish to distinguish among brands of conservatism: all are anathema to those who perpetrate and pertpetuate the myth that conservatism is a psychological illness on a par with Hitler’s pathological racist authoritarianism.

Academic Origins and Echoes

The effort to portray conservativism as an aberrant psychological disorder goes back to the publication in 1950 of The Authoritarian Personality, about which I was instructed by Prof. Milton Rokeach, author of The Open and Closed Mind (related links). Here is how Alan Wolfe, who is sympathetic to the thesis of The Authoritarian Personality, describes its principal author:

Theodor Adorno, the senior author, was a member of the influential Frankfurt school of “critical theory,” a Marxist-inspired effort to diagnose the cultural deformities of late capitalism.

Hmm. . . . Very interesting.

Wolfe continues:

Unlike much postwar social science, The Authoritarian Personality did not present data showing the correlations between authoritarianism and a variety of variables such as social class, religion, or political affiliation. Instead the authors tried to draw a composite picture of people with authoritarian leanings: Perhaps their most interesting finding was that such people identify with the strong and are contemptuous of the weak. Extensive case studies of particular individuals were meant to convey the message that people who seemed exceptionally conventional on the outside could be harboring radically intolerant thoughts on the inside.

Despite its bulk, prestigious authors, and seeming relevance, however, The Authoritarian Personality never did achieve its status as a classic. Four years after its publication, it was subject to strong criticism in Studies in the Scope and Method of “The Authoritarian Personality” (Free Press, 1954), edited by the psychologists Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda.Two criticisms were especially devastating, one political, the other methodological.

How, the University of Chicago sociologist Edward A. Shils wanted to know, could one write about authoritarianism by focusing only on the political right? In line with other works of the 1950s, such as Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace, 1951), Shils pointed out that “Fascism and Bolshevism, only a few decades ago thought of as worlds apart, have now been recognized increasingly as sharing many very important features.” The United States had its fair share of fellow travelers and Stalinists, Shils argued, and they too worshiped power and denigrated weakness. Any analysis that did not recognize that the extremes of left and right were similar in their authoritarianism was inherently flawed.

Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, survey-research specialists, scrutinized every aspect of The Authoritarian Personality’s methodology and found each wanting. Sampling was all but nonexistent. The wording of the questionnaire was flawed. The long, open-ended interviews were coded too subjectively. No method existed for determining what caused what. Whatever the subjects said about themselves could not be verified. The F scale lacked coherence.

Composite pictures, case studies, exclusion of Leftist dogmas, not to mention seriously flawed methods. Wolfe nevertheless defends the flawed methods by saying “social science being what it is, fault can be found with any methodology” — which is really a condemnation of social science, not its critics. (One might use Wolfe’s reasoning to excuse murder.)

Wolfe then tries to deflate Shils’s “political” criticism by arguing as follows:

Certainly the criticisms of Edward Shils seem misplaced 50 years on. Communism really did have some of the authoritarian characteristics of fascism, yet Communism is gone from the Soviet Union and without any influence in the United States. . . .

If one could find contemporary “authoritarians of the left” to match those on the right, the authors of The Authoritarian Personality could rightly be criticized for their exclusive focus on fascism.

Wolfe would have us believe that Communism and fascism are essentially different. They are not, in that both are extreme manifestations of authoritarianism. Wolfe also would have us believe that the official demise of Communism somehow precludes the rise of “authoritarians of the left.” But Wolfe, like a fish in water, is unable to see that liberty in the United States has receded largely because of the efforts of the Democrat Party. “Democrat” simply has a nicer ring than “Communist.” (It’s like the Ministry of Peace in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.) Wolfe sees authoritarianism only when it seems to emanate from the Republican Party. Actually, now that the Communist Party is safely beyond criticism, Wolfe is free to apply the label “authoritarian” in the same undisriminating way that John Birchers used to apply the label “Communist.”

How does Rokeach’s work relate to Adorno’s? Here’s Rokeach, in his own words:

The Open and Closed Mind grew out of my need to better understand and thus to better resist
continuing pressures during my earlier years on my intellectual independence, on the one side from orthodox religion and on the other side from orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

Research as a continuation of adolescent rebellion? Hmm. . . . I wonder what Dr. Freud would make of that?

An Academician’s Corrective

Let’s turn to Australian psychologist John J. Ray, who assesses The Authoritarian Personality, The Open and Closed Mind, and related works in “Does Authoritarianism of Personality Go With Conservatism?“:

The problem that has plagued 30 years of work on authoritarianism is doubt about the validity of the scales used to measure it. From the start there was the apparently inexplicable fact that authoritarian governments on the world scene were at least as likely to be Left wing as Right wing. . . .

We now have data from three separate societies which suggest that when authoritarianism of personality is validly measured, it shows no association with political ideology. To reconcile this with previous findings we must insist on the distinction between authoritarianism of attitudes and authoritarianism of personality. One refers to how a person habitually feels and the other refers to how he behaves. . . .

It was because they failed to make such a distinction that Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) [The Authoritarian Personality] mistakenly identified the person who tended to admire traditional authority with the person who himself liked to dominate others. . . . One group admires authority because they would like to exercise it themselves while the other group admires it because they are so incapable of exercising it themselves. It is the former group that most of us would identify as authoritarian but the latter group which gets high scores on the F and related scales [devised by Adorno, Rokeach, and others]. . . .

It would seem, then, that if we wish to detect people something like the ones Adorno et al. (1950) had in mind, we need to know their scores on both a scale of authoritarian attitudes and a scale of authoritarian personality. It is only high scorers on both who fit their image of the Fascist personality. Authoritarian personalities alone are equally likely to be found on either side of the Left-Right divide. [All emphasis added by me.]

There’s more in Ray’s article about “Libertarians and the Authoritarian Personality.” Keep in mind, as you read the following excerpts, the proximity of Burkean conservatism to libertarianism:

The literature starts out with the now-famous book by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality. This book had its genesis in an attempt by these four Jewish scholars to explain the rise of German Nazism. Most of the research reported in the book, however, was done in California.

These authors constructed a “scale” (list) of authoritarian attitudes which they administered to a wide variety of population samples. They found that those who “scored high” on this scale (endorsed most items on the list) tended to be sympathetic to the political Right and in fact showed “pre-fascist” personalities. . . .

A follow-up book by Christie and Jahoda challenged the California findings on both methodological and substantive grounds. . . . Methodologically, the point was raised that Adorno et al. had included in their list of attitudes only pro-authority items. There were no actual pro-liberty items. One could only express pro-liberty attitudes by rejecting pro-authority statements. . . . A high scorer could be either simply agreeable or a genuine authoritarian; in such circumstances, one could never be sure whether it was acquiescence which was correlating with right-wing attitudes or whether it was genuine authoritarianism.

The substantive point raised against the California studies [by Adorno et al.] was that they were simply obviously false. Right-wingers such as Nazis and Fascists may be authoritarians but equally so are Communists such as Mao and Stalin. Authoritarianism was to be found not at one end of the political spectrum but rather at both ends. . . .

A new proposal that substantially helped to resolve this dilemma was a long overdue reconceptualization of political allegiance along two dimensions rather than one. This reconceptualization was associated with the names of Rokeach and Eysenck. . . . They rightly identified authoritarianism/libertarianism as being at right angles to (unrelated to) the normal radical-conservative dimension of politics. . . .

Communists and Fascists could be shown to fall at opposite ends of the first dimension (radicalism-conservatism) but at the same end (authoritarian) of the second dimension. Democrats and Republicans on the other hand could be shown to fall also on opposite sides of the radicalism-conservatism divide but in the same position on the authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension (half-way between the two). . . .

Neat as this schema was, however, there proved to be a great deal of difficulty in showing that people’s individual attitudes could in fact be ordered in accordance with it. . . .

Rokeach’s scale (the “D” scale) also shared with the Adorno et al. “F” scale, the problem of one-way wording. Again there were no explicitly libertarian items.

Three attempts to remedy this problem were made by [me] using Australian data. . . . Three new scales were constructed wherein there were equal numbers of authoritarian and libertarian items. . . . The results obtained with balanced scales are then much more trustworthy than results from one-way-worded scales.

Thus, at this point, although we have seen that there are theoretical inadequacies in a one-dimensional description of political options and although there have been methodological inadequacies in much of the research in the area, the overall conclusion when all these are taken into account is still the same as that originally drawn by Adorno et al. — it is authoritarians, not libertarians, who tend to be politically right-wing and fascist.

In fact [I] showed that both by the mechanical/statistical procedures of factor analysis and by the criteria of various historical definitions, the Adorno et al. “F” scale was indistinguishable from a measure of conservatism. . . .

There are two very important ways, however, in which the Adorno et al. account has not been shown to be true. First, authoritarians /conservatives can not be shown to be psychologically sick, and, second, authoritarian attitudes can not be shown to go with authoritarian behaviour.

Various measures of authoritarianism have repeatedly been found not to correlate with various measures of maladjustment. . . . Attributes that authoritarianism has been found to correlate with (e.g., rigidity, dogmatism) are obviously not always maladaptive. As “stick-to-it-iveness”, such attributes might in some circumstances be, in fact, rather admired. . . .

The failure of authoritarian attitudes to relate to authoritarian behaviour is . . . a more serious failure of the Adorno et al. account. In fact, to psychologists the attitude/behaviour discrepancy is a familiar phenomenon. It is certainly true in other fields such as racism. . . . One cannot even guess whether the acknowledged motivation is the real motivation or not. . . .

Since a distinction is necessary between authoritarian attitudes and behaviour, a very obvious question becomes: Given that we have seen authoritarian attitudes to be characteristically conservative, is it also true that those who behave in an authoritarian way are conservative? The evidence on this question is not yet extensive but so far all available results show no relationship between the two whatever. . . . People who behave in an authoritarian way are equally likely to be from the Left, the Right or the center. [All emphasis added by me.]

In sum, the authors of The Authoritarian Personality define conservatism to be authoritarian. They then wrongly assert that “authoritarians” (conservatives) are psychologically “sick” and that they behave in an authoritarian manner. The fact, however, is that authoritarian behavior knows no ideological bounds. The histories of Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, Britain (under Labour), and the U.S. (beginning especially with the New Deal) amply demonstrate that fact.

Obiter Dicta

One can be a rigid Democrat, a rigid Republican, and even a rigid libertarian. Rigidity, like compromise, is sometimes a useful way to approach the world, and sometimes a self-defeating way to approach the world. As a Burkean conservative-libertarian, I find anarcho-libertarianism especially rigid and self-defeating. Anarcho-libertarians are loathe to face the reality that government is unlikely to go away. Their answer to all problems, it seems, is to wish government away. All would be better in their best of all imaginary worlds.

Other libertarians (those whose beliefs are closer to mine) take the prosaic view that half a loaf is better than none. For example, in the best of all possible anarcho-libertarian worlds there would be no Social Security. That “best” world being an extremely unlikely one, pragmatic libertarians applaud Social Security reforms — such as private accounts — that would at least make Social Security something more like a real investment program and something less than the transfer-payment Ponzi scheme that it is.

Rigid, impractical libertarianism is no defense against the authoritarianism of Left and Right.