An (Imaginary) Interview with Cass Sunstein

This is the last of this series of posts about Cass Sunstein, unless he deigns to reply to me. I have many positive things to say about many subjects, and I have been neglecting other targets of opportunity.

Liberty Corner: Apropos the preceding post, I wish you, Cass Sunstein, would quit beating around the bush. If you want something, you have to spell it out. Don’t be coy, Cass, tell us how you would amend the Constitution to ensure that all internet users are exposed to points of view that they would otherwise eschew.

Cass Sunstein: Let’s start with the First Amendment, which deals with freedom of speech and of the press, among other things. I’m suggesting that we simply recognize that not all speech is protected and use that fact to force the purveyors of extreme points of view to acknowledge opposing points of view.

LC: Tell us how you would restate the First Amendment so that it does the right thing.

CS: I would add the following codicil: Congress, in order to promote a more efficacious deliberative democracy, may require persons to acknowledge opposing points of view when they communicate on a subject. Further, Congress may require communications media to assist in that endeavor and to transmit points of view other than those which they might willingly transmit.

LC: So, in the name of political freedom you would curtail freedom?

CS: I don’t think of it that way. We’re all more free, in an intellectual way, when we’re exposed to a diversity of experiences and points of view. Besides, freedom is something we receive from government; government may therefore withdraw some freedom from us when it’s for our good.

LC: Let’s assume, for the sake of this discussion, that people desire political freedom, and the other types of freedom that flow from it. Would we really be more free if government forced us to hear or at least take part in the transmission of views with which we disagree, or would we simply be encumbered with more rules about how to live our lives?

CS: That’s a negative way of looking at it.

LC: Let me draw an analogy from fiction. Have you read Portnoy’s Complaint?

CS: You aren’t about to slur my ethnicity, are you?

LC: No, not at all. It’s just that the novel’s protagonist, Alex Portnoy, has an experience that reminds me of your proposed codicil to the First Amendment. His mother stood over him with a knife in an effort to make him eat his dinner. Do you think government should act like Alex Portnoy’s mother?

CS: Well, she didn’t need to pull a knife on Alex, but she obviously needed to exert her maternal authority.

LC: You don’t think Alex would have voluntarily eaten his dinner, in a day or two, rather than starve?

CS: Why take chances?

LC: So not doing what’s good for one’s self is the moral equivalent of doing harm to another?

CS: Yes. Alex’s mother obviously suffered from anxiety caused by Alex’s refusal to eat his dinner.

LC: But Alex’s mother — being older and larger than Alex, though evidently not wiser — might have reflected on the ramifications of her threat. She didn’t really save Alex from starvation, but she did cause him to disrespect and hate her.

CS: What does that have to do with my version of the First Amendment?

LC: It has a lot to do with what happens to the cohesiveness of society, which you seem to value, when government forces people to behave in certain, non-neutral ways. You can figure it out if you think about it. But let’s move on. What about the rules that would require the acknowledgement of opposing points of view? Who would make those rules? In particular, with respect to web sites, who would select those “sites that deal with substantive issues in a serious way”? And who would identify “highly partisan” web sites that “must carry” icons pointing to those “sites that deal with substantive issues in a serious way”?

CS: An agency authorized by Congress to do such things.

LC: The FCC, for instance?

CS: The FCC might be the appropriate agency, but Congress would have to take its oversight role more seriously.

LC: Pressuring the FCC to pressure a broadcaster to stifle a certain radio personality isn’t enough for you?

CS: What?

LC: Never mind. Let’s assume it’s the FCC, whose members are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The FCC is essentially a political body, composed of some mix of Democrats and Republicans.

CS: That’s inevitably the case with any regulatory agency.

LC: Right you are. So the FCC, or any agency newly created for the purpose, wouldn’t be neutral about such issues as what constitutes an opposing point of view, which sites deal with substantive issues in a serious way, and which sites are highly partisan.

CS: You have to rely on the judgment of those appointed to perform the task of making such evaluations.

LC: But not the judgment — or preferences — of purveyors of news and views?

CS: No, because they’re likely to be wedded to their positions and not open to opposing ideas.

LC: Unlike the political appointees on the FCC?

CS: Well, those political appointees would be scrutinized by Congress.

LC: Which, of course, is always balanced and neutral in its views, and which never tries to inflict particular points of view on regulatory agencies.

CS: You’re trying to get me to say that my version of the First Amendment would impose the judgment of politicians and their minions on the news and views of corporate and individual communicators.

LC: Isn’t that exactly what would happen?

CS: But we’re better off when our duly elected representatives and their agents make such decisions. That’s how deliberative democracy is supposed to work.

LC: Oh, we elect them to tell us how to live our lives?

CS: If that’s what it takes to make us better citizens, yes.

LC: You think coercion of that sort would make us a more cohesive society and would make us more appreciative of points of view that differ from our own?

CS: It’s worth a try.

LC: And where do you stop?

CS: What do you mean?

LC: How do you know when society is sufficiently cohesive and that an acceptable fraction of its members have become appreciative of differing points of view? What do you do if society simply refuses to cooperate with your program?

CS: Well, as to your first question, the FCC would simply monitor the content of broadcasts and web sites. As to your second question, the FCC might shut down uncooperative outlets or place them in the hands of an appointed operator, much as bankruptcy courts use court-appointed receivers to hand the affairs of bankrupt businesses. In the extreme, the FCC might have to resort to criminal sanctions — fines and imprisonment. But that probably wouldn’t happen more than a few times before communicators began to comply with the law.

LC: Or simply quit trying to communicate.

CS: Well, that’s always an option.

LC: I’m beginning to get the picture. Before we stop, however, I’d like to pose a hypothetical. Suppose the FCC were composed entirely of members who had a peculiar regard for the original meaning of the Constitution. Suppose, further, that we had, at the same time, a president who felt the same way about the Constitution, and that Congress was in the hands of a sympathetic majority. Now, in the course of monitoring web sites the FCC comes across your essay on “The Future of Free Speech” and deems it an extremist screed, subversive of the Constitution. What do you suppose would happen?

CS: The FCC should order The Little Magazine to post a link to Liberty Corner‘s commentary on my essay. Or it might order The Little Magazine to remove my essay from its site.

LC: Suppose the FCC did neither. Suppose the FCC gave the matter some thought and concluded that it would do nothing about your essay. Instead, it would hew to the original meaning of the Constituion and let you bloviate to your heart’s content.

CS: I would turn myself in to the FCC and demand to be sanctioned to the letter of the law.

LC: Oh, really? Can I count on that? I just want to be sure that you’re willing to live by the rules that you would impose on others.

CS: Most assuredly.

LC: Thank you very much for your (imaginary) time. That’s all for now. But don’t worry, I’ll be keeping an eye on you.

Cass Sunstein’s Truly Dangerous Mind

UPDATED BELOW

Cass Sunstein’s recent blatherings about FDR’s “Second Bill of Rights” at The Volokh Conspiracy made me want to find out more about his understanding of the proper role of government in our society. I Googled the eminent professor and hit upon “The Future of Free Speech”, which appears in The Little Magazine, a South Asian journal (thus the British English spellings in the quotations below). Hold your nose and follow Sunstein’s argument in these quotations from “The Future of Free Speech”:

My purpose here is to cast some light on the relationship between democracy and new communications technologies. I do so by emphasising the most striking power provided by emerging technologies: the growing power of consumers to “filter” what it is that they see. In the extreme case, people will be fully able to design their own communications universe. They will find it easy to exclude, in advance, topics and points of view that they wish to avoid. I will also provide some notes on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

An understanding of the dangers of filtering permits us to obtain a better sense of what makes for a well-functioning system of free expression. Above all, I urge that in a heterogeneous society, such a system requires something other than free, or publicly unrestricted, individual choices. On the contrary, it imposes two distinctive requirements. First, people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in advance….Second, many or most citizens should have a range of common experiences. Without shared experiences, a heterogeneous society will have a much more difficult time addressing social problems; people may even find it hard to understand one another….

Imagine…a system of communications in which each person has unlimited power of individual design….Our communications market is moving rapidly toward this apparently utopian picture….[A]s of this writing, a number of newspapers allow readers to create filtered versions, containing exactly what they want, and excluding what they do not want….

I seek to defend a particular conception of democracy — a deliberative conception — and to evaluate, in its terms, the outcome of a system with perfect power of filtering. I also mean to defend a conception of freedom, associated with the deliberative conception of democracy, and oppose it to a conception that sees consumption choices by individuals as the very embodiment of freedom….

The US Supreme Court has…held that streets and parks must be kept open to the public for expressive activity. Hence governments are obliged to allow speech to occur freely on public streets and in public parks — even if many citizens would prefer to have peace and quiet, and even if it seems irritating to come across protesters and dissidents whom one would like to avoid….

A distinctive feature of this idea is that it creates a right of speakers’ access, both to places and to people. Another distinctive feature is that the public forum doctrine creates a right, not to avoid governmentally imposed penalties on speech, but to ensure government subsidies of speech….Thus the public forum represents one place in which the right to free speech creates a right of speakers’ access to certain areas and also demands public subsidy of speakers….

[T]he public forum doctrine increases the likelihood that people generally will be exposed to a wide variety of people and views. When you go to work, or visit a park, it is possible that you will have a range of unexpected encounters, however fleeting or seemingly inconsequential. You cannot easily wall yourself off from contentions or conditions that you would not have sought out in advance, or that you would have chosen to avoid if you could. Here too the public forum doctrine tends to ensure a range of experiences that are widely shared — streets and parks are public property — and also a set of exposures to diverse circumstances. A central idea here must be that these exposures help promote understanding and perhaps in that sense freedom. And all of these points can be closely connected to democratic ideals, as we soon see….

The public forum doctrine is an odd and unusual one, especially insofar as to create a kind of speakers’ access right to people and places, subsidised by taxpayers. But the doctrine is closely associated with a longstanding constitutional ideal, one that is far from odd: that of republican self-government. From the beginning, the American constitutional order was designed to be a republic, as distinguished from a monarchy or a direct democracy. We cannot understand the system of freedom of expression, and the effects of new communications technologies and filtering, without reference to this ideal….

The specifically American form of republicanism…involved an effort to create a “deliberative democracy.” In this system, representatives would be accountable to the public at large, but there was also supposed to be a large degree of reflection and debate, both within the citizenry and within government itself. The system of checks and balances — evident in the bicameral system, the Senate, the Electoral College and so forth — had, as its central purpose, a mechanism for promoting deliberation within the government as a whole….

We are now in a position to distinguish between two conceptions of sovereignty. The first involves consumer sovereignty; the second involves political sovereignty. The first ideal underlies enthusiasm for “the Daily Me.” The second ideal underlies the democratic challenge to this vision, on the ground that it is likely to undermine both self-government and freedom, properly conceived.

Of course, the two conceptions of sovereignty are in potential tension. A commitment to consumer sovereignty may well compromise political sovereignty — if, for example, free consumer choices result in insufficient understanding of public problems, or if they make it difficult to have anything like a shared culture….

Group polarisation is highly likely to occur on the Internet. Indeed, it is clear that the Internet is serving, for many, as a breeding ground for extremism, precisely because like-minded people are deliberating with one another, without hearing contrary views….

The most reasonable conclusion is that it is extremely important to ensure that people are exposed to views other than those with which they currently agree, in order to protect against the harmful effects of group polarisation on individual thinking and on social cohesion….

The adverse effects of group polarization…show that with respect to communications, consumer sovereignty is likely to produce serious problems for individuals and society at large — and these problems will occur by a kind of iron logic of social interactions….

The phenomenon of group polarisation is closely related to the widespread phenomenon of ‘social cascades’. No discussion of social fragmentation and emerging communications technologies would be complete without a discussion of that phenomenon….

[O]ne group may end up believing something and another the exact opposite, because of rapid transmission of information within one group but not the other. In a balkanised speech market, this danger takes on a particular form: different groups may be led to dramatically different perspectives, depending on varying local cascades.

I hope this is enough to demonstrate that for citizens of a heterogeneous democracy, a fragmented communications market creates considerable dangers. There are dangers for each of us as individuals; constant exposure to one set of views is likely to lead to errors and confusions. And to the extent that the process makes people less able to work cooperatively on shared problems, there are dangers for society as a whole.

In a heterogeneous society, it is extremely important for diverse people to have a set of common experiences….

This is hardly a suggestion that everyone should be required to participate in the same thing. We are not speaking of requirements at all. In any case a degree of plurality, with respect to both topics and points of view, is also highly desirable. My only claim is that a common set of frameworks and experiences is valuable for a heterogeneous society, and that a system with limitless options, making for diverse choices, will compromise the underlying values.

The points thus far raise questions about whether a democratic order is helped or hurt by a system of unlimited individual choice with respect to communications. It is possible to fear that such a system will produce excessive fragmentation, with group polarisation as a frequent consequence. It is also possible to fear that such a system will produce too little by way of solidarity goods, or shared experiences. But does the free speech principle bar government from responding to the situation? If that principle is taken to forbid government from doing anything to improve the operation of the speech market, the answer must be a simple Yes.

I believe, however, that this is a crude and unhelpful understanding of the free speech principle, one that is especially ill-suited to the theoretical and practical challenges of the next decades and beyond. If we see the Free Speech Principle through a democratic lens, we will be able to make a great deal more progress.

There should be no ambiguity on the point: free speech is not an absolute. The government is allowed to regulate speech by imposing neutral rules of property law, telling would-be speakers that they may not have access to certain speech outlets….Government is permitted to regulate unlicensed medical advice, attempted bribery, perjury, criminal conspiracies (“Let’s fix prices!”), threats to assassinate the President, criminal solicitation (“Might you help me rob this bank?”), child pornography, false advertising, purely verbal fraud (“This stock is worth $100,000”), and much more….And if one or more of these forms of speech can be regulated, free speech absolutism is a kind of fraud, masking the real issues that must be confronted in separating protected speech from unprotected speech….

If the discussion thus far is correct, there are three fundamental concerns from the democratic point of view. These include:
• the need to promote exposure to materials, topics, and positions that people would not have chosen in advance, or at least enough exposure to produce a degree of understanding and curiosity;
• the value of a range of common experiences;
• the need for exposure to substantive questions of policy and principle, combined with a range of positions on such questions.

Of course, it would be ideal if citizens were demanding, and private information providers were creating, a range of initiatives designed to alleviate the underlying concerns….But to the extent that they fail to do so, it is worthwhile to consider government initiatives designed to pick up the slack….

1. Producers of communications might be subject…to disclosure requirements….On a quarterly basis, they might be asked to say whether and to what extent they have provided educational programming for children, free airtime for candidates, and closed captioning for the hearing impaired. They might also be asked whether they have covered issues of concern to the local community and allowed opposing views a chance to be heard….Websites might be asked to say if they have allowed competing views a chance to be heard….

2. Producers of communications might be asked to engage in voluntary self-regulation….[T]here is growing interest in voluntary self-regulation for both television and the Internet….Any such code could, for example, call for an opportunity for opposing views to speak, or for avoiding unnecessary sensationalism, or for offering arguments rather than quick ‘sound-bytes’ whenever feasible.

3. The government might subsidise speech, as, for example, through publicly subsidised programming or Websites….Perhaps government could subsidise a ‘public.net’ designed to promote debate on public issues among diverse citizens — and to create a right of access to speakers of various sorts.

4. If the problem consists in the failure to attend to public issues, the government might impose “must carry” rules on the most popular Websites, designed to ensure more exposure to substantive questions. Under such a program, viewers of especially popular sites would see an icon for sites that deal with substantive issues in a serious way….Ideally, those who create Websites might move in this direction on their own. If they do not, government should explore possibilities of imposing requirements of this kind, making sure that no program draws invidious lines in selecting the sites whose icons will be favoured….

5. The government might impose “must carry” rules on highly partisan Websites, designed to ensure that viewers learn about sites containing opposing views….Here too the ideal situation would be voluntary action. But if this proves impossible, it is worth considering regulatory alternatives….

Emerging technologies are hardly an enemy here….But to the extent that they weaken the power of general interest intermediaries, and increase people’s ability to wall themselves off from topics and opinions that they would prefer to avoid, they create serious dangers….

So let’s all put on our brown shirts and march to a public rally at which we will be “allowed” to shout: “Dark is light; black is white; Sunstein is right.”

In an earlier post I said that Cass Sunstein is to the integrity of constitutional law as Pete Rose is to the integrity of baseball. It’s worse than that: Sunstein’s willingness to abuse constitutional law in the advancement of a statist agenda reminds me of Hitler’s abuse of German law to advance his repugnant agenda.

Oops, I should link to an opposing view. Sunstein doesn’t have a blog, so how about this?

UPDATE (04/05/05): Tom G. Palmer has an excellent take on Sunstein at NRO. (Thanks to Freespace for the tip.)

Call Me a Constitutional Lawyer

If Professor Cass Sunstein is a good constitutional lawyer, I’m a flying wombat. In his latest extrusion at The Volokh Conspiracy, he talks about “constitutive commitments” — better known as backdoor amendments to the Constitution. He opens with this:

It’s standard to distinguish between constitutional requirements and mere policies. An appropriation for Head Start is a policy, which can be changed however Congress wishes; by contrast, the principle of free speech overrides whatever Congress seeks to do. But there’s something important, rarely unnoticed, and in between — much firmer than mere policies, but falling short of constitutional requirements. These are constitutive commitments.

It seems that the good professor hasn’t heard that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the provisions of the so-called Campaign Finance Reform Act which suppress free speech as blatantly as it can be suppressed. He nevertheless pushes on, in his ignorance, to tell us that

Constitutive commitments have a special place in the sense that they’re widely accepted and can’t be eliminated without a fundamental change in national understandings….Current examples include the right to some kind of social security program; the right not to be fired by a private employer because of your skin color or your sex; the right to protection through some kind of antitrust law.

That’s what happens when the constitution is amended by judicial acquiescence in legislative malfeasance. The national program of social security is blatantly unconstitutional and a ripoff of the first order (see here and here). The “right” not to be fired because of skin color or gender amounts to the “right” to hold a job regardless of competence. The “right” to the “protection” of anti-trust laws (when all we need is enforcement of laws against fraud, deception, and theft) amounts to a license for government to undermine the dynamism of free markets.

Sunstein then reverts to his main theme, which is FDR’s so-called Second Bill of Rights (see here and here):

[FDR] wasn’t proposing a formal constitutional change; he didn’t want to alter a word of the founding document. He was proposing to identify a set of constitutive commitments. One possible advantage of that strategy is that it avoids a role for federal judges; another possible advantage is that it allows a lot of democratic debate, over time, about what the constitutive commitments specifically entail.

In other words, FDR wanted to amend the constitution by extra-constitutional means. Instead of avoiding a role for federal judges, however, FDR (and his successors) got their way with the help of a cowed and hand-picked Supreme Court.

As for “democratic debate”, we have judges to say what’s debatable (that is, within the scope of the Constitution) and what’s not debatable. When judges fail in their duty to the Constitution, as they often have in the last 70 years, demagogues (like FDR) take over. That’s why people believe in “rights” that aren’t rights: social security, affirmative action, nailing the “big guy” mainly because he’s successful, and many others it pains me too much to mention.

Cass Sunstein is to the integrity of constitutional law as Pete Rose is to the integrity of baseball.

Sunstein at The Volokh Conspiracy

Cass Sunstein, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Chicago, is guest-blogging at The Volokh Conspiracy. His maiden effort, “The Greatest Generation, is about the New Deal. It’s not an auspicious start. Here’s the text of my e-mail to Sunstein:

In your first post at The Volokh Conspiracy, you wrote about FDR’s Second Bill of Rights: “The leader of the Greatest Generation had a distinctive project, running directly from the New Deal to the war on Fascism — a project that he believed to be radically incomplete. We don’t honor him, and we don’t honor those who elected him, if we forget what that project was all about.” I think that most readers of The Volokh Conspiracy know quite well what that project was all about. It was about turning Americans into wards of the welfare state — not intentionally, but in effect. And there were plenty of contemporary critics who knew what it was all about and tried in vain to warn their countrymen.

I know as much as anyone my age (63) can know about the Depression and the fears that it spawned in Americans. My parents and their many siblings were young adults during the Depression, and all of them had to go to work at an early age (when they could find work) because their families were poor. Knowing the members of my parents’ generation as I do, I reject the notion that “true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.” Economic security and independence are always relative matters. I had little economic security when I was 21, but I had plenty of freedom, as did my parents when they were 21. Freedom (in a society that has free political institutions) doesn’t depend on economic security, it depends on inner security (self-reliance) — a trait that many Americans of later generations lack because they have developed the habit of looking to government, instead of themselves, for the solutions to their problems. You are not free if you have sold your soul to the devil in exchange for a bit of gold.

It is fatuous to say that those who are hungry and jobless “are the stuff out of which dictatorships are made.” The United States didn’t become a dictatorship (despite what many Republicans said about FDR). Britain didn’t become a dictatorship, and on, and on. The notable exceptions (Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan) arose from other, pre-Depression causes. Nevertheless, FDR finally got his way — posthumously — as Truman, Johnson, and others completed most of the work of the New Deal.

The New Deal was born of fear. FDR succumbed to that fear. Ironically, FDR said it best: “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.” It was fear that caused FDR to do exactly the wrong thing. Instead of letting the economy work its way out of the Depression, as it would have sooner than it did under FDR’s “stewardship,” he began the long descent into American socialism by turning the tinkerers loose on the economy. (Most of them were — and still are — lawyers and academics with no real idea about the business of business.) At the same time, he seduced most of the masses into dependence on government. The cycle of power and dependence begun by FDR has only gained strength over the years.

I have owned and managed businesses in the regulatory-welfare state of “economic freedom” that is FDR’s legacy. I’m here to tell you that Americans are worse off than they would be if the New Deal had died at birth. That’s FDR’s legacy, and I most decidedly do not want to honor it.

What Has Happened to the Fifth Amendment?

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court has created the usual uproar in the civil liberties hen-house. There is much clucking and flapping about the decision, especially its implications for the Fifth Amendment. First some background: Larry D. Hiibel is a Nevada rancher who was stopped by a deputy sheriff who (as reported in the New York Times)

had responded to a telephone report of a man hitting a woman in the cab of a truck parked along a rural road. Arriving to investigate a possible domestic assault, the deputy found a man who turned out to be Mr. Hiibel standing outside the truck, with a young woman sitting inside the cab. She turned out to be his daughter.

Eleven times, the deputy asked Mr. Hiibel for identification, and 11 times, he refused to provide it….

Eventually, Mr. Hiibel was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor of refusing to identify himself. He was convicted and fined $250. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld his conviction.

As the Times notes, “Twenty states…have such laws on their books, as do a number of cities and towns.” The clincher that has civil libertarians all a-twitter is the effect of the Court’s ruling (from the Times, again):

People who have given the police some reason to suspect that they may be involved in a crime can be required to identify themselves unless their very name would be incriminating….

How did we ever get to such a convoluted reading of the Fifth Amendment? It says, in relevant part, “nor shall any person…be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…”

In other words, if you’re suspected of a crime, the police can’t question you about the crime if you aren’t willing to be questioned. And if you’re charged with a crime, the prosecution can’t compel you to sit in the witness box as a prosecution witness. That seems straightforward enough.

Suppose, however, that by giving your name to a law-enforcement officer you identify yourself as a wanted criminal or suspect in a crime. That is not the same thing as being compelled “to be a witness against” yourself. But some Supreme Court justices (notably Mr. Stevens) and many civil libertarians treat it as if it were the same thing.

Hiibel’s champions didn’t suddenly arrive at such a perverted interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. No, they’ve merely taken what is, for them, the next logical step in a long progression of precedents that has subverted the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

What’s worse is that the majority in Hiibel said, in effect, that Hiibel wasn’t denied the protection of the Fifth Amendment because he wouldn’t have incriminated himself by giving his name. The majority suggested, however, that it might rule otherwise in a case in which a person incriminates himself by giving his name.

What seems to have escaped the majority, the minority, and all the other cluckers and flappers in this case is that a person cannot incriminate himself by giving his name. A person is incriminated by his acts, not by his name. Being forced to state your name is by no stretch of the imagination the same thing as being compelled to answer questions about a crime or to give testimony against yourself in court.

Having said that, I confess that I sympathize completely with Hiibel’s refusal to give his name to the deputy. That would have been my reaction in the same circumstances. Hiibel had done nothing wrong and he was not charged for any crime other than refusing to give his name.

But I’m fed up to my eyebrows with the way the Constitution has been tortured all out of recognition. The Fifth Amendment is merely the most recent part of the Constitution to have been stretched on the rack of jurisprudence.

Tell It to the Judge

Then there’s this:

A student who admits plagiarising throughout his three-year degree, plans to sue his university for negligence after his activities were exposed the day before the final exam….

[The student said:] “I can see there is evidence that I have gone against the rules, but they’ve taken my money for three years and pulled me up the day before I finished. If they had pulled me up with my first essay, and warned me of the problems, it would be fair enough. But all my essays were handed back with good marks and no one spotted it.”

[A university official] said: “The university has robust and well-established procedures in place to combat plagiarism and our students are given clear guidance on this issue… in the faculty and department’s handbooks.”

The former student is thinking of suing the university, of course.

If he wins, think of the useful precedent it will set. For example: I know there are speed limits, but I habitually exceed the speed limits. I finally get caught. Then I tell the judge that because I wasn’t caught the first time I sped it wouldn’t be fair to fine me now. Do you think the judge would buy it?

Unintended Irony from a Few Framers

The constitutional balance, as seen by Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist Papers:

It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. (Hamilton, No. 17)

[T]here is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head than by the federal head upon the members. (Hamilton, No. 31)

The State governments will have the advantage of the federal government…in respect to…the weight of personal influence which each side will possess…the powers respectively vested in them…[and] the…faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. (Madison, No. 45)

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. (Madison, No. 45)

[T]he powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded of a mediated and consequential annihilation of the State governments must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them. (Madison, No. 46)

On the other hand, “Cato” foresaw in 1787 that: “the great powers of the president…would lead to oppression and ruin”; the national government “would be an asylum of the base, idle, avaricious, and ambitious,” a “court [with] language and manners different from [ours]”; and “rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them.”

Things Have Gone Too Far

From AP via Yahoo News:

‘Ladies Night’ Discount Axed in N.J. Bars

TRENTON, N.J. – The state’s top civil rights official has ruled that taverns cannot offer discounts to women on “ladies nights,” agreeing with a man who claimed such gender-based promotions discriminated against men.

David R. Gillespie said it was not fair for women to get into the Coastline nightclub for free and receive discounted drinks while men paid a $5 cover charge and full price for drinks.

In his ruling Tuesday, J. Frank Vespa-Papaleo, director of the state Division on Civil Rights, rejected arguments by the nightclub that ladies nights were a legitimate promotion.

Later in the story we find that some States have the right idea:

[C]ourts in Illinois and Washington state have said that ladies nights are permissible because they do not discriminate against men but rather encourage women to attend.

James E. McGreevey, the governor of New Jersey, is quoted as saying that the ruling “is an overreaction that reflects a complete lack of common sense and good judgment.”

Not bad for a Democrat.

Putting Hate Crimes in Perspective

Toward the end of a recent post I made this sarcastic observation:

We mustn’t hate other people, mustn’t we? If you do hate a person, and then you kill that person, you’re going to pay extra for it. Why, instead of trying to rehabilitate you we’re going to fry your butt. That’ll teach you.

Well, the last paragraph of “Analysis of Hate Crime” on a site called La Griffe du Lion says this:

In its last complete National Criminal Victimization Survey (1994), the Justice Department revealed blacks to have committed 1,600,951 violent crimes against whites….While blacks were committing these 1.6 million crimes against whites, whites were reciprocating with 165,345 violent offenses against blacks. Blacks, representing thirteen percent of the nation, committed more than 90 percent of the violent interracial crime. Fifty-seven percent of the violent crime committed by blacks had white victims. Less than 3 percent of violence committed by whites had black victims. In 1994, a black was 64 times more likely to attack a white than vice versa. This is the real story of hate in America. It is the media’s well-kept secret.

Hate may be a reason for crime. Hate may grow out of poverty, envy, resentment, or deeper psychological roots. Hate may be learned at home, at school, on the job, or among friends. But hate is not an excuse for crime.

Nor should hate be a reason to compound a criminal’s punishment. I have said this before because I believe that justice should truly be color-blind. I will not change my mind now, even though I am 64 times more likely to be the victim of a true hate crime than is the average black person in America.

Favorite Posts: Affirmative Action and Race

I Agree

Death to the Hackers!

So says Fabio Rojas in this post on the Marginal Revolution:

Steven Landsburg has a clever column…pointing out that the economic damage prevented by executing a murderer is less than damage caused by the author of a wildly successful computer virus. If we’re willing to fry Jack the Ripper, why not send Urkel to the chair?…

For me, Landsburg misses a simple point: human beings are probably hard wired to care about concentrated damages (like murder of a person) rather than diffuse damages (like screwing up everybody’s email for an hour). No cost-benefit analysis will likely persuade people to go against this intuition.

I’m persuaded. Fry ’em and forget ’em.

Getting It Perfect

Have you ever noticed that Americans are perfectionists? It’s true.

It all began with the U.S. Constitution. (For the benefit of the ahistorical reader, the Constitution was drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1788.) The preamble to the Constitution says it was “ordained and established” (a ringing phrase, that) “in order to form a more perfect union” — among other things. It’s been all downhill since then.

The Federalists (pro-Constitution) and anti-Federalists (anti-Constitution) continued to squabble for a decade or so after ratification of the Constitution. The anti-Federalists believed the union to be perfect enough under the Articles of Confederation. But those blasted perfectionist Federalists won the debate. So here we are.

The Federalists were such perfectionists that they left room in the Constitution for amending it. After all, a “more perfect union” can’t be attained in a day. Thus, in our striving toward perfection — Consitution-wise, that is — we have now amended it 27 times. We even adopted an amendment (XVIII, the Prohibition amendment, 1919) and only 14 years later amended it out of existence (XXI, the Repeal amendment, 1933).

But we can be very patient when it comes to perfecting the Constitution through amendments. Amendment XXVII (the most recent amendment) was submitted to the States on September 25, 1789, as part of the proposed Bill of Rights. It wasn’t ratified until May 7, 1992. Not to worry, though, Amendment XXVII isn’t about rights, it merely prevents a sitting Congress from raising its own pay:

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

So now the only group of public servants that can vote itself a pay raise must wait out an election before a raise takes effect. Big deal. Most members of Congress get re-elected, anyway.

Where was I? Oh, yes, perfectionism. Well, after the Constitution was ratified, the next big squabble was about states’ rights. Some politicians from the North preferred to secede rather than remain in a union that permitted slavery. Some politicians from the South said the slavery issue was just a Northern excuse to bully the South; the South, they said, should secede from the union. The union, it seems, just wasn’t perfect enough for either the North or the South. Well, the South won that squabble by seceding first, which so ticked off the North that it dragged the South back into the union, kickin’ and hollerin’. The North had decided that the only perfect union was a whole union, rednecks and all.

The union didn’t get noticeably more perfect with the South back in the fold. Things just went squabbling along through the Spanish-American War and World War I. There was a lot more prosperity in the Roaring ’20s, but that was spoiled by Prohibition. It wasn’t hard to find a drink, but you never knew when your local speakeasy might be raided by Elliot Ness or when you might get caught in a shoot-out between rival bootleggers.

The Great Depression put an end to the Roaring ’20s, and that sent perfection for a real loop. But Franklin D. Roosevelt got the idea that he could help us out of the Depression by creating a bunch of alphabet-soup agencies, including the CCC, the PWA, the FSA, and the WPA. I guess he got his idea from his older cousin, Teddy, who created his own alphabet-soup agencies back in the early 1900s.

Well, Franklin really got the ball rolling, and every president since him has added a bunch of alphabet-soup agencies to the executive branch. And when a president has been unable to think of new alphabet-soup agencies, Congress has stepped in and helped him out. (Don’t need to say “him or her” yet.) It seems that our politicians think we’ll attain perfection when there are enough agencies to use every possible combination of three letters from the alphabet. (That’s only 17,576 agencies; we must be getting close to perfection by now.)

During the Great Depression some people began to think that criminals (especially juvenile delinquents) weren’t naturally bad. Nope, their criminality was “society’s fault” (not enough jobs), and juvenile delinquents could be rehabilitated — made more perfect, if you will — through “understanding”, which would make model citizens of potential killers. That idea was put on hold during World War II because we needed those former juvenile delinquents and their younger brothers to kill Krauts and Japs. (Oops, spell-checker doesn’t like “Japs”; “Nips” is okay, though.)

The idea of rehabilitating JDs through “understanding” took hold after the war. In fact, the idea spread beyond the ranks of juvenile delinquents to encompass every tot and pre-adolescent in the land. Corporal punishment became a no-no. Giving into Johnny and Jill’s every whim became a yes-yes. Guess what? What: Johnny and Jill grew up to be voters. Politicians quickly learned not to say “no” to Johnny and Jill’s demands for — whatever — otherwise Johnny and Jill would throw a fit (and throw a politician out of office). So, politicians just got in the habit of approving things Johnny and Jill asked for. In fact, they even got in the habit of approving things Johnny and Jill might ask for. (Better safe than out of office.) A perfect union, after all, is one that grants our every wish — isn’t it? We’re not there yet, but we’re trying like hell.

Sometimes you can’t attain perfection through legislation. Then you go to court. Remember a few years ago when an Alabama jury awarded millions (millions!) of dollars to the purchaser of a new BMW who discovered that its paint job was not pristine? (Maybe it’s true that most Alabamans can’t count.) Or how about the small machine-tool company that was sued by a workman who lost three fingers while using (or misusing) the company’s product, even though the machine had been rebuilt at least once and had changed hands four times. (Somebody’s gotta pay for my stupidity.) Then there was the infamous case in which a jury found in favor of a woman who had burned herself with hot coffee (what did she expect?) dispensed by a fast-food chain.

The upshot of our litigiousness? The politicians elected by Johnny and Jill — ever in the pursuit of more perfection — have mandated warning labels for everything. THIS SAW IS SHARP. THIS COFFEE IS HOT. DON’T PUT THIS PLASTIC BAG OVER YOUR HEAD, STUPID. DON’T STICK YOUR HAND DOWN THIS GARBAGE DISPOSAL, YOU MORON. THIS TOY GUN WON’T KILL AN ARMED INTRUDER (HA, HA, HA, YOU GUN NUT!).

You may have noticed a trend in my tale: Politicians quit trying some years ago to perfect the union; their aim is to perfect US. That’s why they keep raising cigarette taxes. Everyone knows that smoking is a slovenly redneck habit (movie stars excepted, of course).

Own a gun? Are you nuts? You might be too stupid to handle it properly. What are the police for, after all? Oh, I have a tax-supported security detail and you don’t? Well, the members of my security detail needs their guns, of course.

We mustn’t hate other people, mustn’t we? If you do hate a person, and then you kill that person, you’re going to pay extra for it. Why, instead of trying to rehabilitate you we’re going to fry your butt. That’ll teach you.

Ah, perfection at last.

Getting It Wrong: Civil Libertarians and the War on Terror (A Case Study)

Michael Ignatieff opens his essay, “Lesser Evils” (New York Times Magazine, May 2, 2004), by asking “Could we actually lose the war on terror?” But, to Ignatieff, defeat in the war on terror isn’t

the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude.

In Ignatieff’s view, which seems to be au courant among civil libertarians, defeat looks like this:

A succession of large-scale attacks would pull at the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime friends.

That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples.

What a nifty rhetorical trick. Ignatieff paints the darkest possible picture of official and unofficial reaction to a hypothetical succession of large-scale terrorist attacks. He then characterizes that reaction as a defeat — as if sustaining a string of major terrorist attacks weren’t a defeat.

Ignatieff shortly buttresses his rhetorical trick by invoking the evil John Ashcroft: “Other conservatives, like Attorney General John Ashcroft, simply refuse to believe that any step taken to defend the United States can be called an evil at all.” Oh, really? Did I miss Mr. Ashcroft’s call for the summary execution of all Muslims resident in the United States? Well, it’s Ignatieff, not Ashcroft, who says:

To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even pre-emptive war. These are evils because each strays from national and international law and because they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process. They can be justified only because they prevent the greater evil. The question is not whether we should be trafficking in lesser evils but whether we can keep lesser evils under the control of free institutions. If we can’t, any victories we gain in the war on terror will be Pyrrhic ones.

Okay, maybe we’re getting somewhere. Maybe Mr. Ignatieff will tell us how we might prevent the hypothetical string of terrorist attacks that will turn us into a ravening pack of jackals, led by John Ashcroft.

Sorry, false start. Back to Civil Liberties 101:

Civil liberties are not a set of pesky side constraints, pettifogging legalisms tying democracy’s hands behind its back. Ask what the American way of life is, and soon we are talking about trial by jury, a free press, habeas corpus and democratic institutions. Soon we are talking about that freedom and that confident sense of an entitlement to happiness that the Europeans find so strange in this country. Civil liberties are what America is.

Well not quite all. There is life itself. There is freedom from fear. But Ignatieff just rolls on:

Civil liberties may define us, but we have a bad record of jettisoning them when we get scared….Indeed, by comparison with the Red Scare or later shameful episodes like Roosevelt’s detention of Japanese during World War II, there have been no mass detention camps in the United States since Sept. 11 and no imprisonments for dissent. Not yet anyway.

“In spite of John Ashcroft,” he might as well have said. But let’s keep reading:

Even so, after 9/11 we were frightened, and Congress and the government weren’t always thinking straight. After the attack, it may have made sense to detain more than 700 aliens on one immigration pretext or another until we could figure out whether there were other sleeper cells at work. But it made a lot less sense to hold them for months (80 days on average) and to deny them lawyers and public due process before we tossed most of them out of the country.

How does he know how long we should have held the detainees, unless he’s privy to what we learned about and from them while they were detained? Well, it doesn’t matter, because he’s just looking for an excuse to introduce this non sequitur: “It was shameful, as a Justice Department report found, that many Arab and Muslim detainees were abused and harassed in confinement.” Yes, it was shameful, but that doesn’t negate the wisdom of detention — just as the shameful acts toward detainees in Iraq don’t negate the wisdom of our efforts there.

Might Ignatieff, finally, talk about efforts to prevent further terrorist attacks in the U.S? Well, sort of:

…Obviously it’s a good idea to keep recipes for ricin off government-financed research Web sites, and it’s not a good idea to have target detail on critical infrastructure available for download. But adversarial review, as intended by the founding fathers, can’t work if ordinary citizens are denied the information they need.

And what information is that — the names and addresses of persons under investigation, of persons being held for questioning as material witnesses? Why don’t we just post that information on the White House’s web site for the terrorists who remain at large, and cut out the middle man?

Ignatieff just goes on — and on — about the things President Bush has done wrong: designating “American citizens as ‘enemy combatants'”; imprisoning “foreign combatants at Guantanamo beyond the reach of American courts”; creating “military tribunals “to try foreign combatants” but keeping those tribunals “free from review by federal courts and free of the due process safeguards that apply in U.S. military courts-martial.”

Nor does he neglect the things President Bush might do wrong: targeted assassination (okay if there are rules for it, but it probably wouldn’t do much good); torture (okay as long there are strict rules about it and detainees can’t be held without access to counsel and judicial process).

Then there’s the ever-looming “out-of-control presidency”: “A war on terror, declared against a global enemy, with no clear end in sight, raises the prospect of an out-of-control presidency.” Well, the war on terror was declared almost three years ago and the presidency still seems under control to me.

Oh, here’s the out-of-control bit, it’s the war in Iraq:

Pre-emptive war can be justified only when the danger that must be pre-empted is imminent, when peaceful means of averting the danger have been tried and have failed and when democratic institutions ratify the decision to do so. If these are the minimum tests pre-emptive war has to meet, the Iraq war failed to meet all three.

Who says that the danger must be imminent? It’s stupid to wait until danger is imminent if you can do something about it before it becomes imminent. (Or should we have waited until Hitler had launched an amphibious invasion of New York before going to war against Nazi Germany?) Peaceful means of averting the danger were tried — but the United Nations failed, after exhaustive diplomacy on our part, to confront the danger that it had already recognized. The Congress of the United States — surely a far more democratic institution than the United Nations — ratified the war in Iraq. Tests passed.

Oh well, at last we come to the predictably fatuous peroration:

The chief ethical challenge of a war on terror is relatively simple — to discharge duties to those who have violated their duties to us. Even terrorists, unfortunately, have human rights. [Oh, really? Where is that written? Why “unfortunately” if they really have human rights?] We have to respect these because we are fighting a war whose essential prize is preserving the identity of democratic society and preventing it from becoming what terrorists believe it to be. [That’s not a problem, as I’ll explain below. The problem is preventing terrorists from killing us.] Terrorists seek to provoke us into stripping off the mask of law in order to reveal the black heart of coercion that they believe lurks behind our promises of freedom. [When was this revealed to Ignatieff, and by whom?] We have to show ourselves and the populations whose loyalties we seek that the rule of law is not a mask or an illusion. It is our true nature. [We also have to show ourselves and others that we have the will to defeat terror, which means killing or capturing terrorists before they kill us. That, too, is part of our nature, and a part that we must accept and others must respect.]

Let’s now talk seriously about waging war and why we can do bad things in wartime without permanently revoking our commitment to freedom. I’ll take a real example from a real war, namely the internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans during World War II. Before I do, though, I feel that I must say this once more: The objective of war is to defeat the enemy, whether the enemy is a nation-state (as were the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire) or an elusive band of terrorists.

Now, here is how Wikipedia describes the internment:

[T]he exclusion and subsequent removal of approximately 112,000 to 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans, officially described as “persons of Japanese ancestry”, 62% of whom were United States citizens, from the west coast of the United States during World War II to hastily constructed housing facilities called War Relocation Camps in remote portions of the nation’s interior. The government of the United States officially apologized for this action in the 1980s and has paid reparations to survivors.

The last sentence summarizes how most American citizens had come to feel about the internment years after it had ended. But here’s what a 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court had to say about it in 1944, in the case of Korematsu v. United States, with Justice Black writing for the Court:

It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers — and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies — we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders — as inevitably it must — determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot — by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight — now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.

Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion says, in part:

The provisions of the Constitution which confer on the Congress and the President powers to enable this country to wage war are as much part of the Constitution as provisions looking to a nation at peace. And we have had recent occasion to quote approvingly the statement of former Chief Justice Hughes that the war power of the Government is “the power to wage war successfully.”…Therefore, the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.

That we later came to regret the relocation of some 112,000 to 120,000 souls is merely evidence that the vicissitudes of wartime will not deflect us from our essential commitment to civil liberties. In the aftermath of World War II — and despite the excesses committed by our side in the quest for victory (and surely there were many excesses that have never been revealed) — our government has put an end to legal segregation (which is the most that government can do), guaranteed suffrage for blacks, and opened the door of opportunity for minority groups, women, the handicapped, and homosexuals.

Nevertheless, in wartime you have to do what you have to do, and sometimes it ain’t pretty. As Justice Frankfurter also said in Korematsu v. United States:

To recognize that military orders are “reasonably expedient military precautions” in time of war and yet to deny them constitutional legitimacy makes of the Constitution an instrument for dialectic subtleties not reasonably to be attributed to the hard-headed Framers, of whom a majority had had actual participation in war.

And so those war-hardened Framers moved on to give us the Constitution and Bill of Rights. And so we will move on to the preservation and expansion of civil liberties in the United States. But, first, we must try — sometimes in unpalatable ways — to capture and kill terrorists before they kill us.

By Their Supreme Court Appointments Ye Shall Know Them

Nixon: Rehnquist (later appointed Chief Justice by Reagan) — Belongs in the second tier, all by himself. His instincts are statist rather than libertarian, but he tries to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution.

Ford: Stevens — What do you expect from Ford? A Republican in name only who interprets the Constitution the way a blind umpire interprets the strike zone.

Carter: He made no appointments, luckily for the nation.

Reagan: O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy — O’Connor and Kennedy make up the third tier; they vacillate between libertarianism and statism. Scalia’s originalism usually overcomes his instinctive statism; he’s in the top tier with Thomas.

Bush I: Souter, Thomas — Typically conflicted Bush I appointments; from another John Paul Stevens to the best appointment since the 1920s.

Clinton: Ginsburg, Breyer — Clinton failed to nationalize health care, but stuck us with these two crypto-socialists.

Justice Is Dead, Even in Texas

From FoxNews.com:

Texas woman who claimed God ordered her to bash in heads of her three children — two of whom died — acquitted of all charges.

I’ll Never Understand the Insanity Defense

Headline at FoxNews.com:


Mom Describes Stoning Sons on Tape

Psychiatrist says woman delusional when she killed sons with rocks

It’s impossible to know a person’s “state of mind” at the time he or she committed a crime. It follows that “innocent by reason of insanity” is — pun intended — an insane verdict.

And so what if a person was “insane” at the time he or she committed a crime? A crime was committed and, therefore, someone must be “guilty” of it. If not the “insane” person, then who, Harvey the Rabbit?

The Erosion of the Constitutional Contract

Contracts come in many forms and serve many purposes. They may be as informal and ephemeral as the understanding between barber and customer that the barber will cut the customer’s hair and the customer will pay the barber a certain amount of money for the haircut. They may be as solemn and hopefully eternal as marriage vows.

In the public realm there is no more solemn contract than the Constitution of the United States. But the great national crises of the Twentieth Century — especially the Depression and World War II — fostered the habit of giving illegitimate power to the federal government. Thus the constitutional contract and the pillars of the Constitution — the States and citizenry — have been undermined.

The immense, illegitimate power that has accrued to the federal government cannot be found in the Constitution. It arises from the cumulative effect of generations of laws, regulations, and court rulings — each ostensibly well-meant by its perpetrators.

The habit of recourse to the federal government has become a destructive cycle of dependency. Elected representatives and non-elected elites have vested unwarranted power in the federal government to deal with problems “we” face — problems the federal government cannot, for the most part, begin to solve and which it demonstrably fails to solve many more times than not. The conditioned response to failure has been to cede more power (and money) to the federal government in the false hope that the next increment will get the job done.

There has been much bold talk in recent times about making the federal government smaller and devolving federal power to the States. The bottom line is that the executive branch still regulates beyond its constitutional license, Congress still passes laws that give unwarranted power to the federal government, and federal spending still consumes about the same fraction of economic output that it did two decades ago.

To break out of this cycle of addiction, we must restore the constitutional contract and thus enable the States and citizens — especially citizens — to realize their economic, social, and spiritual potential.

The Constitutional Contract, Its Reach, and Its Principles

The Constitution is a contract between the States. In it, the States cede certain powers to a government of the united States, created by the States on behalf of the States and their citizens. Thus, for example, in Section 10 of Article I, the States voluntarily deny themselves certain powers that in Section 9 they vest in Congress — creation of money, regulation of trade among the States and between the States and other nations, conduct of foreign relations, and conduct of war.

The Preamble lists the States’ reasons for entering into the constitutional contract, which are “…to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity….” These are ends desired, not outcomes promised.

To further these ends, the Constitution establishes a government of the united States, and authorizes it to enact, execute, and adjudicate laws within a delimited sphere of authority. The Constitution not only delimits the federal government’s authority but also diffuses it by dividing it among the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The Framers knew what we are now only re-learning: A government is a power-hungry beast — even a representative government. More power in the hands of government means less power for individuals. Individuals are better off when they control their own lives than when government, directly or indirectly, controls their lives for them.

Thus the limited scope of the constitutional contract provides for:

• primacy of the federal Constitution and of constitutional laws over those of the States (This primacy applies only within the limited sphere of authority that the Constitution grants to the federal government. The federal government is not, and was not intended to be, a national government that supersedes the States.)

• collective obligations of the States, as the united States, and individual obligations of the States to each other

• structure of the federal government — the three branches, elections and appointments to their offices, and basic legislative procedures

• powers of the three branches

• division of powers between the States and federal government

• rights and privileges of citizens

• a process for amending the Constitution.

The principles embodied in the details of the contract are few and simple:

• The Constitution and constitutional laws are the supreme law of the land, within the clearly delimited scope of the Constitution.

• The federal government has no powers other than those provided by the Constitution.

• The rights of citizens include not only those rights specified in the Constitution but also any unspecified rights that do not conflict with powers expressly granted the federal government or reserved by the States in the creation of the federal government.

The Limits of Federal Power

The Constitution may be the “supreme law of the land” (Article VI), but as the ardent federalist Alexander Hamilton explained, the Constitution “expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution…[Federalist number 33].”

Thus the authority of the federal government — the government formed by the united States — enables the States to pursue common objectives. But that authority is limited so that it does not usurp the authority of States or the rights of citizens.

Moreover, the “checks and balances” in the Constitution limit the federal government’s ability to act, even within its sphere of authority. In the legislative branch neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate can pass a law unilaterally. In his sole constitutional role — as head of the executive branch — the President of the United States must, with specified exceptions, sign acts of Congress before they become law, and may veto acts of Congress — which may, in turn, override his vetoes. From its position atop the judicial branch, the Supreme Court is supposed to decide cases “arising under” (within the scope of) the Constitution, not to change the Constitution without benefit of convention or amendment.

The Constitution itself defines the sphere of authority of the federal government and balances that authority against the authority of the States and the rights of citizens. Although the Constitution specifies certain powers of the federal executive and judiciary (e.g., commanding the armed forces and judging cases arising under the Constitution), federal power rests squarely and solely upon the legislative authority of Congress, as defined in Article I, Sections 8, 9, and 10. The intentionally limited scope of federal authority is underscored by Amendments IX and X; to repeat:


The rights of citizens include not only those rights specified in the Constitution but also any unspecified rights that do not conflict with powers expressly granted the federal government or reserved by the States in the creation of the federal government.

The Rise of Unconstitutional Laws and Regulations

The generations of laws and regulations that have seized the powers and rights of States and citizens are, to put it plainly, unconstitutional. Most such laws and regulations seem to rest on these foundations:

• the phrase “promote the general welfare” in the Preamble. This was a desired result of the adoption of the Constitution, not an edict to redistribute income and wealth.

• the power of Congress “to regulate commerce…among the several states [Article I, Section 8].” This power was meant to prevent the States from restricting or distorting the terms of trade across their borders, not to enable the federal government to dictate what is traded, how it is made, or how businesses operate.

• the authority of Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof [Article I, Section 8].” The words “necessary and proper” have been wrenched out of their context and used to turn the meaning of this clause upside down. It was meant to limit Congress to the enactment of constitutional legislation, not to give it unlimited legislative authority.

• the “equal protection” clause of Amendment XIV: “…nor shall any State…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Amendment XIV was meant to secure the legal equality of those former slaves whose freedom had been secured by Amendment XIII. Amendment XIV became, instead, the basis for Supreme Court decisions and federal laws and regulations that have given special “rights” to specific, “protected” groups by curtailing the constitutional rights of the many who cannot claim affiliation with one or another of the “protected” groups. As the proponents of such groups might ask, is it fair?

Restoring the Constitutional Contract

The constitutional contract charges the federal government with keeping peace among the States, ensuring uniformity in the rules of inter-State and international commerce, facing the world with a single foreign policy and a national armed force, and assuring the even-handed application of the Constitution and of constitutional laws. That is all.

It is clear that the contract has been breached. Only by restoring it and reversing generations of federal encroachment on the rights and powers of the States and people can we “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”

In a future post I will link to a restored constitutional contract, one that would undo the damage that has been done to the Framers’ great work.

The Rule of Law

So, the Cailfornia Supreme Court has ordered San Francisco not to issue any more marriage licenses to gay couples. Although the court didn’t rule on the legality of gay marriage in California, it has, in effect, upheld a state law and voter referendum that say marriage is a union between a man and a woman. Perhaps, in its subsequent decision on the merits of the case, the court will find authority for gay marriage in California’s constitution.

Whatever the outcome of the case, California’s high court has upheld the rule of law. The court — not the impetuous mayor of San Francisco — should decide the legality of gay marriage. And if the citizens of California don’t like the court’s ruling, they can strive to negate the ruling by amending California’s constitution.

First Principles

A society is formed by the voluntary bonding of individuals into overlapping, ever-changing groups whose members strive to serve each others’ emotional and material needs. Government — regardless of its rhetoric — is an outside force that cannot possibly replicate societal bonding, or even foster it. At best, government can help preserve society — as it does when it deters aggression from abroad or administers justice. But in the main, government corrodes society by destroying bonds between individuals and dictating the terms of social and economic intercourse — as it does through countless laws, regulations, and programs, from Social Security to farm subsidies, from corporate welfare to the hapless “war” on drugs, from the minimum wage to affirmative action. On balance, the greatest threat to society is government itself.

The constitutional contract charges the federal government with keeping peace among the States, ensuring uniformity in the rules of inter-State and international commerce, facing the world with a single foreign policy and a national armed force, and assuring the even-handed application of the Constitution and of constitutional laws. That is all.

The business of government is to protect the lawful pursuit and enjoyment of income and wealth, not to redistribute them.

Liberty is the right to make mistakes, to pay for them, and to profit by learning from them.

The most precious right is the right to be left alone.