About Last Night …

… Trump didn’t prevail in the nationwide popular-vote tally by 6+ points as I expected. But a margin of about 4 points ain’t chopped liver. It wasn’t close, despite the prognostications of most pollsters and Nate Silver, the “master” poll masseuse.

Silver’s final forecast put Harris and Trump in a statistical dead heat, with win probabilities of 50.0 percent and 49.6 percent respectively. Silver’s assessment reflects the many polls upon which he draws, both nationwide and statewide. Needless to say, most of the polls got it wrong — many got it very badly wrong.

It’s ironic that Rasmussen Reports, much-derided by Silver, turned in the best performance by a pollster. Its final poll, which spanned October 19-October 29, had Trump up by 3 points, with a margin of error of 1 points. In fact, Rasmussen Reports has an excellent track record when it comes to assessing presidential races.

Trump vs. Harris: 5 (Final Forecast)

UPDATED 11/05/24 @ 12:00 PM (ET)

This post posits two scenarios: an easy win for Trump and a squeaker for Trump. In either case, court actions will probably delay final resolution of the outcome.

In the original version of this post, I failed to emphasize my belief that Trump will win an easy victory. That belief rests not only on the evidence provided here but also on the many signs of disaffection with Harris among traditional sources of support (e.g., minority voters and labor unions). There is also this omen from the midnight votes at Dixville Notch, New Hampshire: 4-2 against Trump in 2016, 5-0 against Trump in 2020, and a 3-3 tie this year. That shift is of a piece with widespread discontent with the course of the nation under the Biden-Harris regime.

Other than that, there’s a slight change in what I expect to be the irrelevant scenario: a squeaker won by Trump. The change is that it will be less of a squeaker than I had expected it to be.

A funny thing happened on the way to November 5, 2024: A bunch of pollsters decided that the race between Trump and Harris is a lot closer than the race between Trump and Biden.

In 2020, for example, the final polls issued by CNN, CNBC, Fox News, Harvard-Harris, Quinnipiac, New York Times/Siena, and USA Today/Suffolk had Biden ahead of Trump by an average of 9.6 points. Those polls overstated Biden’s popular-vote margin by an average of 5 percentage points. It was polling like that which produced an average error of 4.5 points in favor of Biden for polls conducted in the final two weeks of the 2020 campaign. (See this report by the American Association for Public Opinion Research.)

Now, the 2024 iterations of the polls mentioned above have Harris ahead of Trump by an average of 0 (that’s zero) points. And widely cited polling averages (e.g., Real Clear Polling and Silver Bulletin) depict the Trump-Harris race as a virtual dead heat.

Why the dead heat? Did a bunch of pollsters figure out how to reach “shy” Trump supporters, or how to adjust for the fact that Trump supporters are disproportionately unreachable? Or do most polls simply understate Trump’s support, as they did in 2016 and — more egregiously — in 2020?

I believe that the polls continue to understate Trump’s support — and by quite a bit. I base my belief on a relationship that I unveiled in “Trump vs. Harris: 4 (More Good News for Trump)“. It is the relationship between party leanings, as estimated by Gallup, and the allocation of the vote between Democrat and Republican candidates in the presidential elections of 2004 through 2020. (Gallup’s party-affiliation numbers can be found here. Gallup has produced other analyses that also portend a shift toward the GOP).

When Gallup allocates independents based on their leanings toward Democrats or Republicans, the two-party split looks like this:

I plotted the average results for the month before the elections of 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 against the GOP candidates’ shares of the two-party vote in those elections. The result is spuriously precise, given the small number of observations. But it supports the view that the recent high level of GOP-leaning adults (52 percent in October 2024) portends a solid popular-vote majority for Trump:

The projection for the 2024 election (red dot) is that Trump will receive more than 53 percent of the nationwide two-party popular vote. With that share, Trump would win a second term handily.

Why? Suppose that Harris were to win 70 million of 150 million votes (about 47 percent), leaving Trump with 80 million votes. That’s a winning margin of 10 million votes, which is amplified by the fact that an outsized fraction of the Democrat candidate’s vote comes from California and New York. In 2020, Biden won those two states by a total of 7 million votes. That’s 7 million more votes than he needed to secure the electoral votes of those two States. Any total higher than a bare majority in any State can be thought of as a wasted vote. Republicans hold a decided edge in that respect: In 2020, there were 15 million wasted Democrat votes to 8 million wasted Republican votes. I don’t expect that ratio to change markedly in 2024 (or thereafter).

What this means is that with 53 percent of the popular vote, Trump would have an effective margin of not 10 million votes but 20 million votes. There would be no razor-thin finishes to secure 270 electoral votes; the razor-thin finishes (e.g., in New Hampshire and Minnesota) would merely determine the size of Trump’s electoral-vote victory.

To underscore the likelihood of a comfortable margin favoring Trump, I offer the following graph (changed slightly from the original post):

It reeks of pro-Trump momentum.

But let’s not get too excited about the prospect of an easy win.  Let’s go back to the polls and accept the premise that there is roughly an even split in the two-party nationwide popular vote. The following graph puts that split in perspective. Harris’s final position, based on the average of polls conducted within seven days of the election is a 50.4-percent share of the two-party vote (down 0.1 percent from the original post).

Can Harris, at 50.4 percent, do what Clinton failed to do with better polling numbers and what Biden barely did with much better polling numbers? Probably not.

Let’s flip the problem and focus on Trump and stipulate that he will get 49.6 percent of the vote. That number comes with a range of statistical uncertainty (to say nothing of built-in bias). The range is from 48.3 percent to 50.8 percent. How does that range translate into electoral votes? Here’s how, Trump would win 291 to 313 electoral votes:

(See “Trump vs. Biden: 16” for an explanation of the relationship between popular vote/polling margin and electoral votes.)

To get to 291, Trump’s “Red Wall” must hold. (The “Red Wall” comprises the 219 electoral votes that Trump can count on unless there’s an unexpected — and well-concealed — Harris landslide in the offing.) Trump would get to 291 by augmenting the “Red Wall” with wins in Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, while losing Michigan and Nevada. Trump could also hold on for a win, with 272 electoral votes, while losing Georgia as well as Michigan and Nevada. Other winning scenarios include losing Pennsylvania and Michigan while winning Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wisconsin (278 electoral votes). There are other possibilities that I will leave as an exercise for the reader.

What’s my take? Looking at State-by-State polls, and (only for the purpose of this exercise) taking them at face value, I would write off Michigan and mark Georgia as uncertain. The loss of Georgia (in addition to Michigan) would cut Trump’s EV total to 281 — still enough for the win.

On the upside, Trump could get to 313 electoral votes by winning all seven of the swing States and Nebraska’s 2nd Congressional District.

Trump vs. Harris: 4 (More Good News for Trump)

I have been working on other posts, but an update on the state of the race for the presidency can’t wait.

Election day is only 16 days away. The polls have been moving in Trump’s direction lately. By my reckoning, Trump has moved into a clear lead in the electoral-vote count. He may stumble in the home stretch, but given the developments discussed below, it will take a huge October (or early November) surprise to trip him.
I begin with updates of material presented in earlier posts. I follow those updates with some new material.

First, drawing on the presidential polling summaries published at Real Clear Politics (RCP). I track each pollster’s poll-to-poll change in Trump’s lead or deficit. Assuming that each pollster’s bias for or against Trump (mostly against) remains about the same, the poll-to-poll changes indicate the direction of momentum. The “Harris Honeymoon” has come to a bitter end:

Second, I compare Harris’s performance in the polls with the performances of Clinton in 2016 and Biden in 2020.
Note the pro-Democrat (or anti-Trump biases in 2016 and 2020). The biases are reflected in the differences between the final 7-day polling averages (green and black lines) and the final shares of the nationwide two-party vote (green and black diamonds at 0 days). Clinton lost despite garnering 51.05 percent of the nationwide two-party vote. Biden won narrowly — because of razor-thin victories in several states — even though he got 52.25 percent of the two-party vote. Harris’s performance currently lags Clinton’s, which is a good sign for Trump.

The red line at 52.5 percent is my estimate of what it will take for Harris to register a clear victory over Trump. Harris is moving away from that number, not toward it.

Third, I adjust polling averages for anti-Trump bias. Of the polling organizations surveyed by RCP, 17 released polls in the final week before the 2020 election. Fourteen of the polls overestimated Biden’s popular-vote margin, with overestimates ranging from 0.5 to 7.5 percentage points. Only three pollsters underestimated Biden’s margin, with a range of 0.5 to 3.5 points. The overall average for the 17 pollsters was an overestimate (for Biden) of 3.7 points.

Because Trump is again the GOP nominee, I see no reason to assume that the pro-Democrat bias this year is any smaller than it was in 2020. So I simply add 3.7 points to Trump’s 7-day polling average to get a truer picture of Trump’s electoral appeal. I then compute a 95-percent confidence interval around the current 7-day average. As of today, the range spans a Trump lead of 1 percentage point to a Trump lead of 7 percentage points. I also compute a 95-percent confidence interval around the current 7-day average, unadjusted for bias. As of today, that spans a Trump deficit of 2 percentage points to a Trump lead of 5 percentage points.

How does that range translate into electoral votes? Here’s how, Trump would win 291 to 343 electoral votes if the election were held today:

(See “Trump vs. Biden: 16” for an explanation of the relationship between popular vote/polling margin and electoral votes.)
The fact that the low end of the range exceeds 270 electoral votes should give Trump supporters cause for optimism about the outcome of the election.
Turning to new material, I begin with a Gallup poll (conducted 415 times since January 2004) that probes adults’ party affiliations. When independents are allocated based on their leanings, the two-party split looks like this:
I plotted the average results for the month before each election (2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020) against the GOP candidates’ shares of the two-party vote in those elections. The result is spuriously precise, given the small number of observations, as is any projection based on it. But it supports the inference that the recent high level of GOP-leaning adults (54% thus far in October 2024) portends a popular-vote majority for Trump:
(Gallup’s party-affiliation numbers can be found here. Gallup has produced other analyses that also portend a shift toward the GOP).

Finally, I turn to Nate Silver’s Silver Bulletin. Much of his material is accessible only to subscribers, so I will omit the links in the following quotations. Today’s election forecast begins with this:

Last update: 1:45 p.m., Sunday, October 20. The data continues to be pretty negative for Kamala Harris. There are now three recent high-quality national polls that show Donald Trump leading — a difficult circumstance for Harris, given Democrats’ Electoral College disadvantage — and her edge in our national polling average is down to 1.7 points. National polls don’t influence the model that much, and the race remains basically a toss-up, but it’s not hard to think of reasons that Trump could win.

There’s a link in that passage which leads to 24 reasons why Trump could win:

This election remains extremely close, but Donald Trump has been gaining ground. One of my pet peeves is with the idea that this is Kamala Harris’s election to lose. I could articulate some critiques of her campaign, but if you study the factors that have historically determined elections, you’ll see that she’s battling difficult circumstances.

So, today’s newsletter simply aims to provide a laundry list of factors that favor Trump, with many links to evidence in previous Silver Bulletin posts and elsewhere. These are in no particular order.

  1. Harris is the favorite to win the popular vote, but The Electoral College bias favors Republicans by about 2 percentage points. In an era of intense partisanship and close elections, this is inherently difficult for Democrats to overcome.
  2. Inflation hit a peak of 9.1 percentage points in June 2022. It has abated now, but prices remain much higher than when Biden took office, and voters are historically highly sensitive to inflation. Democrats can also plausibly be blamed for it given intensive increases in government spending during COVID recovery efforts.
  3. Though the reasons for this are much debated, voter perceptions about the economy lag substantially behind objective data, and growth in take-home income has been sluggish for many years for the working class amid rising corporate profits.
  4. Incumbent parties worldwide are doing very poorly, and the historical incumbency advantage has diminished to the point where it may now be an incumbency handicap instead amid perpetually negative perceptions about the direction of the country.
  5. Populism is often a highly effective strategy, and many Trump voters are indeed “deplorable” in the Hillary Clinton sense of the term.
  6. Illegal/unauthorized immigration increased substantially during the first few years of the Biden/Harris administration amid a rising global backlash to immigration.
  7. Harris ran far to her left in 2019, adopting many unpopular positions, and doesn’t really have a viable strategy for explaining her changing stances.
  8. The cultural vibes are shifting to the right, and the left continues to pay a price for the excesses of 2020 on COVID, crime, “wokeness,” and other issues.
  9. Voters have nostalgia for the relatively strong economic performance in the first three years of Trump’s term and associate the problems of 2020 with Democrats, even though they weren’t in charge at the time.
  10. Democrats’ dominance among Black voters and other racial and ethnic minority groups is slipping. It may be unfortunate timing: the memory of the Civil Rights Era is fading. Educational polarization, which implies deteriorating Democratic performance among working-class voters of all races, may also be coming to dominate other factors. It’s possible this works out well for Democrats if Harris makes corresponding gains among white voters, who pack more leverage in the Electoral College, but there’s no guarantee.
  11. Many men, especially young men, feel lost amidst declining college enrollment, contributing to a rightward shift and a growing gender gap.
  12. Joe Biden sought to be president until he was 86. Voters had extremely reasonable objections to this, and it neuters what should have been one of Harris’s best issues about Trump’s age and cognitive fitness.
  13. Harris also got a late start to her race, inheriting most of the staff from the poorly-run Biden campaign. She’s proven to be a good candidate in many respects, but it’s always a big leap when the understudy is suddenly thrust into the spotlight.
  14. Harris is seeking to become the first woman president. In the only previous attempt, undecideds broke heavily against Hillary Clinton, and she underperformed her polls.
  15. Trust in media continues to fall to abysmal levels. One can debate how to attribute blame for this between longstanding conservative efforts to discredit the media, a secular decline in trust in institutions, and various overreaching and hypocrisy in the press. But it’s hard for even legitimate Trump critiques to penetrate the mass public. Trump’s conviction on a series of felony charges hardly made any difference, for instance.
  16. Trump has traits of a classic con man, but con artistry is often effective, and Trump is skilled at convincing voters that he’s on their side even if his election would not be in their best interest. Furthermore, Trump presents Democrats with a Three Stooges Syndrome problem: a range of plausible attacks so vast that they tend to cancel one another out.
  17. Democrats’ college-educated consultant class has poor instincts for how to appeal to the mass public, while Trump has done more to cultivate support among “weird” marginal voting groups.
  18. Democrats’ argument that Trump is a critical threat to democracy is valid and important, given January 6 and Trump’s broad disrespect for the rule of law. But it’s a tough sell: ultimately, January 6 was a near-miss — it could very, very easily have been much, much worse — and Democrats hold the White House, the Senate, and many key governorships now. It isn’t intuitive to voters that democracy is threatened and Democrats may have staked too many chips on this line of attack.
  19. Foreign policy might not matter much to voters, but the world has become more unstable under Biden’s tenure. There has been a decline in democracy worldwide and an increase in interstate conflict, crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, deteriorating US-China relations, increasing immigration flows because of global instability, and a pullout from Afghanistan that negatively impacted Biden’s popularity.
  20. The Israel-Hamas war split the Democratic base in a way no comparable issue has split the GOP base.
  21. There are more left-leaning third-party candidates than right-leaning ones, and the former leading third-party candidate (RFK Jr.) endorsed Trump and undermined Harris’s post-convention momentum.
  22. The richest man in the world, Elon Musk, has become a huge Trump stan and is doing everything in his power to tip the election to him. Twitter/X remains an influential platform among journalists but has shifted far to the right. Elon and Silicon Valley have also created a permission structure for other wealthy elites to advocate for Trump explicitly and provided a new base of money and cultural influence.
  23. Trump was very nearly killed in an assassination attempt, and then there was a second one against him. The first attempt was closely correlated with an increase in favorability ratings for Trump, and polling shows he’s considerably more popular and sympathetic than in 2016 or 2020.
  24. Harris has been running on vibes and has failed to articulate a clear vision for the country. It might have been a good strategy if the “fundamentals” favored her, but they don’t.

Trump vs. Harris: 3 (Some Favorable News for Trump)

I follow the presidential polling summaries published at Real Clear Politics (RCP). I analyze the polling results in various ways. Three of those ways are highlighted here.

First, I track each pollster’s poll-to-poll change in Trump’s lead or deficit. Assuming that each pollster’s bias for or against Trump (mostly against) remains about the same, the poll-to-poll changes indicate the direction of momentum. The “Harris Honeymoon” seems to have ended:

Second, I adjust polling averages for anti-Trump bias. Of the polling organizations surveyed by RCP, 17 released polls in the final week before the 2020 election. Fourteen of the polls overestimated Biden’s popular-vote margin, with overestimates ranging from 0.5 to 7.5 percentage points. Only three pollsters underestimated Biden’s margin, with a range of 0.5 to 3.5 points. The overall average for the 17 pollsters was an overestimate (for Biden) of 3.7 points.

Given that Trump is again the GOP nominee, I see no reason to assume that the pro-Democrat bias this year is any smaller than it was in 2020. So I simply add 3.7 points to Trump’s 7-day polling average to get a truer picture of Trump’s electoral appeal. I then compute a 95-percent confidence interval around the current 7-day average. As of now, the range is from a deficit of 1 percentage point to a lead of 6 percentage points.

How does that range translate into electoral votes? Here’s how, Trump would win 312 to 343 electoral votes if the election were held today:

(See “Trump vs. Biden: 16” for an explanation of the relationship between popular vote/polling margin and electoral votes.)

Third, I compare Harris’s performance in the polls (unadjusted) with the performances of Clinton in 2016 and Biden in 2020.

Note the pro-Democrat (or anti-Trump biases in 2016 and 2020). The biases are reflected in the differences between the final 7-day polling averages (green and black lines) and the final shares of the nationwide two-party vote (green and black diamonds at 0 days). Clinton lost despite garnering 51.05 percent of the nationwide two-party vote. Biden won narrowly — because of razor-thin victories in several states — even though he got 52.25 percent of the two-party vote. Harris’s performance currently lags Clinton’s, which is a good sign for Trump.

The red line at 52.5 percent is my estimate of what it will take for Harris to register a clear victory over Trump. Harris is still a long way from that number.

Trump vs. Harris: 2 (Kamala the Sphinx Gains a Bit of Ground)

Trump’s position vis-a-vis Harris is a bit weaker than it was on August 14, when I published “Trump vs. Harris: 1 (It’s Still Trump’s Election to Lose)“:

(For details of the computation, see “Trump vs. Harris: 1”.)

How does the current range — a deficit of 1 point to a lead of 4 points — translate into electoral votes? As on August 14, Trump would win 313 to 327 electoral votes if the election were held today:

(See “Trump vs. Biden: 16” for an explanation of the relationship between popular vote/polling margin and electoral votes.)

Not only that, but the polls have been swinging back toward Trump, though he isn’t gaining ground:

Translating poll results into shares of the two-party presidential vote yields an interesting comparison between Harris’s performance and those of Clinton and Biden before her:

First of all, note the pro-Democrat (or anti-Trump biases in 2016 and 2020). The biases are reflected in the differences between the final 7-day polling averages (green and black lines) and the final shares of the nationwide two-party vote (green and black diamonds at 0 days). Clinton lost cleanly with 51.05 percent of the two-party vote. Biden won narrowly, requiring close “wins” in several states, even though he got 52.25 percent of the two-party vote. Harris’s performance still lags Clinton’s.

What it the red line at 53.5 percent? That’s my estimate of what it will take for Harris to register a clear victory over Trump — no razor-thing “victory” in any State and no potentially game-changing outcomes that are close enough to warrant recounts or court challenges. Harris is still a long way from that number.

Trump vs. Harris: 1 (It’s Still Trump’s Election to Lose)

Here’s the polling trend since the “debate” on June 27 that ended Biden’s candidacy:

To adjust for bias, I use the 2020 election to estimate the extent to which (most) polling organizations underestimate Trump’s strength among voters. Underestimation is time-dishonored strategem, aimed at dispiriting the opposition and its supporters — the “opposition” being any politician, like Trump, who threatens the power of the deep state and its allies, enablers, and beneficiaries.

I follow the presidential polling summaries published by Real Clear Politics (RCP). Of the polling organizations surveyed by RCP, 17 released polls in the final week before the 2020 election. Fourteen of the polls overestimated Biden’s popular-vote margin, with overestimates ranging from 0.5 to 7.5 percentage points. Only three pollsters underestimated Biden’s margin, with a range of 0.5 to 3.5 points. The overall average for the 17 pollsters was an overestimate (for Biden) of 3.7 points.

Given that Trump is again the GOP nominee, I see no reason to assume that the pro-Democrat bias this year is any smaller than it was in 2020. So I simply add 3.7 points to Trump’s 7-day polling averages to get a truer picture of Trump’s electoral appeal. Thus the values plotted in the preceding graph. (I am being generous to anti-Trump pollsters; the average anti-Trump bias in 2020, according to the American Association for Public Opinion Research, was 4.5 points for all.)

How does the current range — a lead of 1 to 4 points — translate into electoral votes? Here’s how, Trump would win 313 to 327 electoral votes if the election were held today:

(See “Trump vs. Biden: 16” for an explanation of the relationship between popular vote/polling margin and electoral votes.)

Not only that, but the “Harris honeymoon” may be coming to an end. The polls are swinging (modestly) back toward Trump:

All in all, things still look good for Trump. But there are question marks. Will Harris’s momentum continue? Will a “black swan” event upend the election? What about the upcoming sentencing in Trump’s “hush money” case? Will any other anti-Trump trials be completed by election day?

Stay tuned.

The Biden Plan

Why did Biden decide to debate Trump? Most likely because Biden and those whose advice he takes (or whose direction he follows) believed that he would lose the election and had nothing to lose by debating Trump.

Why would Biden or his advisers believe that he would lose when nationwide polls have put him in a virtual tie with Trump? Because they have done something like the analysis that I’ve done, which suggests a virtual tie in the polls means that Biden is actually running at least 3 percentage points behind Trump nationwide. That deficit portends spells certain defeat given that Biden would run up huge, superfluous margins in deep-Blue states.

In rehearsing for the debate, Biden’s performance must have seemed at least passable. If it hadn’t, a plausible excuse for postponement or cancellation would have been found, and it would have done less damage to Biden’s chances than his actual performance did. But the rehearsals, which included a stand-in for Trump, weren’t the real thing.

Biden’s performance in the actual debate must have come as a shock to himself, to Jill, to those who advised him to debate, and to those who helped him prepare for the debate. Biden’s performance certainly came as huge shock to the millions who planned to vote for him and who saw the real person in action, not the mummy whose condition has been hidden (as much as possible) from public view by aides and compliant corporate media.

Now what? Top Democrats (the Clintons, Obama, major donors, etc.) may have concluded that Trump will win no matter whom he faces. If they have concluded that, they are almost certainly right — barring a shockingly adverse development for Trump between now and when voting starts.

For example, they may be betting that Judge Merchan (of the “hush money” case) will announce a prison sentence or house arrest when he sentences Trump on July 11. First, any sentence will be anti-climactic — voters have long since factored the guilty verdicts into their voting plans. Second, Trump can appeal, and failure at the State level is almost certain to result in a speedy hearing and decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, will any court (other than Judge Merchan’s) want to legitimize DA Bragg’s blatant act of election interference: the prosecution of Trump on charges with a flimsy legal foundation? I think not. Fourth, in any event, a sentence of some kind for Trump might be just the trigger that’s needed to evoke a tidal wave of GOP voters in the fall, swamping not only Biden but Democrats down the ticket — including, more importantly, races for U.S. Senate and House seats.

Given all of that, why would the Democrats in charge want to replace Biden? The result would be to burden a new candidate with a loss, when he or she could run in 2028 as a “fresh face” who hasn’t lost a presidential race.

So, barring a development that I can’t foresee (which might include death or a crippling disability), I expect to see Trump and Biden at the head of their parties’ tickets in November. If Biden isn’t the Democrat nominee, the nod will go to the equally expendable Kamala.

Trump vs. Biden: 15 (Counting Chickens That Haven’t Hatched)

Tonight’s debate could undo Trump’s momentum — or it could reinforce it. Whatever the case, Biden is facing formidable odds against re-election (as of now).

The first piece of evidence is general direction of the polls, as measured by changes in each pollster’s results:

That looks good for Trump. This looks even better:

Biden is running well behind his pace of four years ago. And four years ago, despite “winning” the (mythical) nationwide popular vote by 4.5 percentage points, Biden eked out an electoral-vote victory on the basis of narrow wins in key States. That’s because Biden’s “victory” by 7 million votes was accounted for by his popular-vote margins in two solid-Blue States: California and New York. The huge — and superfluous victories — in those States masked a tie in the rest of the country. That’s why Biden had to rely on chicanery to squeak by in Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. If Biden continues to under-perform his 2020 showing, the elections in key States won’t be close enough to steal.

Trump vs. Biden: 14 (Another Way to Read the Polls)

In 2016, Clinton’s lead over Trump in the final seven days of polling averaged 2.5 percentage points (or those polls covered by RealClearPolitics (RCP). Clinton’s edge in the nationwide tally of popular votes was 2.1 percentage points. Despite her (meaningless) nationwide edge, she lost to Trump because he won Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin — each by less than 1 percentage point. Those states’ 46 electoral votes gave Trump the win over Clinton.

In 2020, Biden’s lead over Trump in the final seven days of polling averaged 7.9 percentage points for those polls covered by RCP. Biden’s edge in the nationwide tally of popular votes was 4.5 percentage points; that is, slightly below the bottom of the 95-percent confidence interval around the apparent 7.9-point lead. Despite his (meaningless) 4.5-point lead in the popular vote, Biden won the election only because he edged out Trump in both Georgia and Wisconsin by less that 1 percentage point and in Pennsylvania by a little more than 1 percentage point. Those states’ electoral votes gave Biden his win over Trump.

Hypothesis: Clinton and Biden underperformed at the ballot box vs. their poll numbers because the polls (on average) were biased somewhat toward Clinton in 2016 and much more so toward Biden in 2020. This hypothesis is supported by a report issued by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AAPOR-Task-Force-on-2020-Pre-Election-Polling_Report-FNL.pdf):

● The 2020 polls featured polling error of an unusual magnitude: It was the highest in 40 years for the national popular vote….

● The polling error was much more likely to favor Biden over Trump. Among polls conducted in the last two weeks before the election, the average signed error on the vote margin was too favorable for Biden by 3.9 percentage points in the national polls and by 4.3 percentage points in statewide presidential polls.

● The polling error for the presidential election was stable throughout the campaign. The average error matched closely for polls conducted in the last two weeks, in the final week, and even in the final three days. The challenges polls faced in 2020 did not diminish as Election Day approached.

● Beyond the margin, the average topline support for Trump in the polls understated Trump’s share in the certified vote by 3.3 percentage points and overstated Biden’s share in the certified vote by 1.0 percentage point. When undecided voters are excluded from the base, the two-candidate support in the polls understated Trump’s certified vote share by 1.4 percentage points and overstated Biden’s vote share by 3.1 percentage points.

The report also concludes that the bias wasn’t due to the massive surge in early voting and mail-in voting in 2020.

The foregoing suggests that if the polls remain strongly biased toward Biden in 2024, and if he polls much worse than he did in 2020, his candidacy is doomed.

With that background, I refer you to the following graph, which compares results of polls reported by RCP for the elections of 2016, 2020, and 2024. The results represent polls conducted between June 1 and election day of each election year. We’re a long way from election day 2024, but the results to date are ominous for Biden; he is running behind Clinton’s losing pace of 2016. Stay tuned.

Trump vs. Biden: 13 (A Glimmer of Hope)

If you have read “Election 2024: The Bottom Line” or “Election 2024 in Perspective” you will understand why I use “glimmer of hope” to refer to a possible Trump victory in November. The glimmer of hope that I see is Trump’s standing in the polls this time around compared with his standing in the polls at this point in 2016 and 2020. Specific

I collected all of the two-way polling results reported at realclearpolitics.com for the elections of 2016 and 2020. I weeded out all of the polls that were conducted before June of each election year and plotted the numbers for the rest: the Democrat candidates’ polling lead or deficit vs. number of days before the election. I have also begun to plot similar numbers for this year’s election. Here are the results as of today:

The plot points represent the Democrat candidates’ lead or deficit vs. Trump. Two polls with the same average date (June 4) gave Biden and average lead of 0.5 point. A third poll with an average date gave Trump a narrow lead of 1 point, which converts to a Biden deficit of 1 point.

Clearly, Trump is doing a lot better in the polls this year than he was doing at this time in 2016 and 2020. But a lot can happen between now and when voting starts. A lot did happen to Clinton (2016) and Biden (2020) — and it wasn’t good for them.

Clinton’s polling was all over the place, but she ended up 2.9 points ahead of Trump for polls conducted in the seven days before the election. She “won” the nationwide popular vote by 2.1 percentage points (plotted on the right axis). But she lost the electoral vote because of Trump’s narrow wins in a few key States.

Biden never relinquished his lead in the polls. He ended up 7.6 points ahead of Trump for polls conducted in the seven days before the election. He “won” the nationwide popular vote by 4.6 percentage points (plotted on the right axis). But he won the electoral vote only because of narrow wins in a few key States.

If there’s a pattern, it’s this: Polls, in the aggregate, overstate Democrats’ shares of the nationwide popular vote — at least when they’re up against Trump. Further, because of the electoral college, it takes a large margin in the final polls to be certain of victory — if you’re a Democrat. The necessary margin is greater than final Biden’s 7.6-point lead in the 2020 polls.

Conclusion: Biden is in deep trouble, as of now. But election day is five months away. Thus: a glimmer of hope.

Election 2024 in Perspective

The federal government, since the latter part of the 19th century has grown vastly in size, cost, and power. It has done so by blatantly exceeding the limited role for it that is set forth in the Constitution.

The growth of the federal government (which has necessitated and spurred the growth of state and local governments) absorbs resources that (with the exception of national defense) could be put to better use by private companies responding to the needs of consumers.

One aspect of government growth, at all levels, has been the promulgation of an ever-growing number of regulations, ordinances, and codes (they must number in the millions). The net effect of those regulations, ordinances, and codes is to stifle entrepreneurship and innovation. This comes at great cost to American workers and consumers.

The economic effect of government spending and regulation (by its various names) is the loss of well over a trillion dollars a year in economic output. Given the many years in which Americans have lived with big, heavy-handed government, the overall cost of its unconstitutional aggrandizement has been almost unimaginable – it is certainly in the tens of trillions of dollars. The arrogation of legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial functions by regulatory agencies adds the loss of liberty to that massive economic cost.

The heavy burden of regulation has been compounded in recent years by the emphasis on so-called renewable sources of energy. The shift away from fossil fuels – according to the models used and touted by climate “scientists” – will have almost no effect on global temperatures. Yet, the cost in dollars and misery will be huge. As for those models, they are simplistic relative to the many and complex (and little understood) factors that influence climate. And they do a poor job of reconstructing the past, so how can they possibly produce accurate forecasts of the future? Also overlooked in the rush to substitute models for science is the fact that the geological and historical record – despite the efforts of some climate “scientists” to revise and erase it – clearly shows that Earth has been warmer in the past 2000 years than it is now, and that it often warmed more rapidly in the past than it has been warming in the past 40 years.

Another recent development has been the failure to enforce immigration laws, which has resulted in a flood of illegal immigrants. Whatever reasons those immigrants may have for entering the U.S., it is a fact that they are in many places overwhelming various social services (hospitals, public housing, etc.) at a heavy cost to taxpayers. Regardless of the law-abiding nature of most illegal immigrants, the flood has brought with it violent criminals, dangerous drugs, drug dealers, and quite possibly spies and terrorists. It is no secret – though Democrats tend to deny it – that the impetus for untrammeled immigration is to create new voters, by amnesty and other means, most of whom are expected to vote for Democrats. One dire effect of such a development would be even bigger government, even lower economic growth, and even higher taxes.

Then there are the social changes that have been embraced and pushed by Democrats. Same-sex marriage is now a given, so I won’t bother to discuss it (though I could write an essay about the legal persecution of tradespeople who have been penalized for their refusal to “celebrate” it). But I will discuss transgenderism, with its various ill effects: allowing and encouraging impressionable and not-yet-developed children to undergo life-changing medical treatments and surgeries; forcing girls and women to compete with so-called transgender women, who seem not to have lost the superior size and strength that goes with being male; allowing the same “women” to invade the privacy and bodies of girls and women in locker rooms, dormitories, prison cells, etc.

There is also a strong push by government institutions to discriminate in favor of blacks (by means ranging from special loans to easy grading to re-segregation to protect them from feeling “different” or “inferior”). If discrimination solely on the basis of race is wrong, it is wrong when it favors blacks just as much as when it favors whites. Reverse discrimination and special treatment are also condescending toward blacks – which hasn’t gone unnoticed by some of them.

Another development – and a dangerous one for liberty and the advancement of knowledge – is the use of government power (or the implied threat to use that power) to censor views that government officials dislike. This kind of censorship, which is carried out through Big Tech firms and broadcast media, may be meant to protect the public from potentially harmful “misinformation”. But the urge to control information knows no bounds and it can just as easily be used to construct “narratives” that are favorable to the regime in power by suppressing valid information that would discredit the regime. Big Tech and broadcast media already do this to a great extent, though mainly because of the political leanings of the executives in charge of those institutions. But it would take almost no effort on the part of government officials to turn many news and information outlets into a government propaganda machine. (Shades of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and many other despicable tyrants.)

Finally, China, Russia, and Iran have relentlessly built military capabilities that can be used to blackmail the U.S. government into granting military and economic concessions to those nations. (Russia’s war in Ukraine hasn’t stopped its development of sophisticated weaponry, such as its hypersonic missiles and new space weapon.) There is no indication that our adversaries will settle for “peaceful coexistence”; their aim is dominance. Despite that, the U.S. government has persisted in allowing U.S. armed forces to become relatively weaker than those of its adversaries. (Clinton’s budget-balancing at the cost of defense, and the coddling of the Iranian regime by the Obama-Biden administrations are underreported scandals.)

In sum, beginning in the late years of the 19th century, government in America began to lose its way: imposing huge costs on American citizens through growth in size and power, while also failing to maintain the forces necessary to deter potential enemies.

None of that has changed in the 21st century, but the burden on Americans has redoubled because of a quixotic effort to control the climate, a similarly quixotic effort to erase gender differences, and the possibly successful quest to build a permanent Democrat majority.

It has taken more than a century for America to make the transition to what the proverbial man from Mars would describe as a regulatory-welfare state run by a cabal of power-lusting politicians and bureaucrats and their mentors and enablers in the “education”-media-information complex. Too many Americans, unfortunately, don’t see America for what it has become because it has changed gradually. And at every step along the way, those with a stake in the regulatory-welfare state have declared it to be in the public interest and defended it as the product of “our democracy”. Their version of democracy amounts to this: Do as we say, we know what’s best for you. No side has a monopoly on that kind of thinking, but the regulatory-welfare state enables its realization through the extra-constitutional enactment and enforcement of rules that micromanage the economic and social affairs of Americans. That is the darkness in which democracy dies.

Everything written above represents my long-held views. They predate by two decades the emergence of Donald Trump as a candidate for president in 2015.

Trump is (undeservedly) vain, crude, and inarticulate, and he has a disgraceful sexual history. But despite those things, he is the only president since Ronald Reagan who has tried to stem the tide of government overreach and under preparedness. Trump’s record as president was far from perfect, but he got some things going in the right direction; for example, less regulation, more (real) military spending, and a serious effort to stem illegal immigration. You may dislike his Supreme Court appointments because of the effect they have had on certain issues, but the overall effect of those appointments has been and will be to restrain government power, which has grown far beyond its constitutional bounds.

It is Democrats, for the most part, who favor the policies that I abhor. Because Trump is viewed as a threat to those policies, and to Democrats’ hold on power in DC, there has been since he announced his first run for the presidency a “get Trump” movement. It began in earnest with the false “Steele dossier” that was ordered up by Hillary Clinton’s campaign. It continued with the Mueller investigation, two impeachments, and incessantly negative reporting about Trump’s presidency by pro-Democrat media outlets. It has culminated in what are not coincidental civil and criminal charges against Trump.

In the case of E. Jean Carroll, her suit against Trump was made possible by the passage of law in New York that extended the statute of limitations on Trump’s alleged acts against Carroll — for the obvious purpose of bringing a case against Trump. Would Carroll’s charges, or any of the other charges, been brought against a former president who was a Democrat? I doubt it very much. But to keep Trump out of power, various Democrat officials (in an amazing concert of legal synchronization) have put into practice the Stalinist-era slogan “show me the man and I’ll show you the crime”. Almost anyone can be charged with and found guilty of a crime. It’s just a matter of digging into his record, cherry-picking it for items that can be made to seem sinister, ignoring and suppressing exculpatory evidence, stretching the law to fit the supposedly incriminating facts, and finding a compliant judge and jury. The Carroll case fit that template, as did the “hush money” case, and as do the other legal actions against Trump.

What has happened and is happening to Trump can happen to anyone. It is of a piece with Democrats’ no-holds-barred approach to the Constitution and laws stand in the way of gaining and holding onto power. If Trump is stopped and if Democrats retain power – and reinforce it by importing voters, censoring the opposition, vote-buying (what else is student-debt cancellation?), assuaging blacks, and who knows what else – opposition to the regime itself will become criminalized. You can bet on it because the only thing that has kept America from becoming a despotism isn’t a mythical thing called the “American character”, it has been the rule of law and the willingness of opposing factions to abide by it. That willingness disappeared in the run up to the Civil War. It is disappearing again.

All of that is why, if Trump is on the ballot in November, I will vote for him. As imperfect as he is as a person and political operator, he would nudge America in the right direction. If there were a better GOP candidate than Trump – one who is less obnoxious, more articulate, and with less personal baggage, but who is dedicated to the Constitution, to prosperity and liberty for Americans, and to military preparedness – I would vote for him or her. But there doesn’t seem to be such a candidate on the horizon.

In sum, my preference for Trump has nothing to do with the man and everything to do with restoring prosperity, liberty, and safety from domestic and foreign predators. To put it another way, a vote for Trump is a vote to make America great again. It is also a vote to save democracy — the real kind in which citizens are sovereign.

I have said nothing about Biden because his sins – though many and possibly greater than Trump’s – are beside the point. As a politician, he is no better or worse than any Democrat who might replace him on the ticket or succeed him if he is elected and fails to finish his second term.

My devout wish it to have a Republican (Trump if necessary) occupy the White House and try, with the help of a Republican-controlled Congress, to prevent America from going down the drain. This may be the last chance for America’s reprieve from the dustbin of history.

Trump vs. Biden: 12a (Rethinking the “Battleground” States)

There’s a new spate of articles about Trump’s lead in the polls for so-called battleground States: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Yes, Trump is still leading in all seven States, if you take an average of polls reported at RealClearPolitics. Here’s how the five-poll averages look for Trump:

  • Arizona – up by 5.2 points and rising
  • Georgia – up by 5.0 points and rising, but below earlier peak
  • Michigan – up by 0.6 point and falling, well below earlier peak
  • Nevada – up by 5.6 points and rising
  • North Carolina – up by 5.8 points and falling, somewhat below earlier peak
  • Pennsylvania – up by 2.6 points and rising, but below earlier peak
  • Wisconsin – up by 0.6 point and falling, somewhat below earlier peak.

Only the leads in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, and North Carolina are statistically significant (lower bound of 95-percent confidence interval is greater than zero).

Adjustments for pollsters’ political biases — which I haven’t made — might make things look better for Trump. But the real problem with the “battleground” polls is their paucity. This can be seen by contrasting a metric I devised for nationwide polls with similar metrics for the “battleground” polls.

The metric is the change in each pollster’s results from poll to poll. For example, in the Morning Consult poll that was conducted May 3-May 5, Trump was up by 1 point. He was up by 1 point in the next Morning Consult poll which was conducted May 10-May 12. That counts as zero gain on the average date of the later poll: May 11. The full tally for all polls reported at RealClearPolitics since August 2023 looks like this:

Here’s a similar graph for Pennsylvania, which the most heavily polled of the “battlegrounds”:

That’s not much to go on, is it?

What to do? I’m inclined to ignore the polls for individual States and keep my eye on the nationwide polls. But I will be more demanding of myself when I declare that Trump might win with a small lead or deficit in those polls.

As I say in the updated version of “Trump vs. Biden: 2“,

The statistical relationship in the graph [below] is meaningless. What can be meaningful is a narrow margin of victory (or loss) in a few States. This underlines the lesson from “How Good Are the Presidential Polls?“: Even a large lead in nationwide polls doesn’t signify victory in the Electoral College.

Well, the relationship isn’t quite meaningless. Here’s how it looks with a 90-percent confidence interval (which happens to encompass 100 percent of the data because the underlying distribution isn’t normal):

What this means is that I will be confident of a Trump victory (270 or more electoral votes) only if it looks like he will get 53 percent (or more) of the two-party popular vote, nationwide. A tally of at least 54 percent (a margin of at least 8 percentage points) would be convincing. (That’s close to my finger-to-the-wind estimate of 9 percentage points in “How Good Are the Presidential Polls?“, wherein I assessed the accuracy to the nationwide polls for the presidential elections of 2004-2020.)

If Trump doesn’t rack up a big margin, the Dems will be able to manufacture enough votes in key States to steal the election — again.

Trump vs. Biden: 12 (Further Adjustments and Updated Results)

UPDATED 04/30/24

The latest results for the so-called battleground States are positive for Trump. I’ll get to those after I review the national polls. I’ll then remind you how Trump can win the election even if he “loses” the meaningless nationwide tally of popular votes.

NATIONAL POLLS

I introduced a new metric in Trump vs. Biden 11: the change in each pollster’s results from poll to poll. For example, Trump was tied with Biden in the Quinnipiac poll that was conducted on April 18-22, and was down by 3 points in the Quinnipiac poll of March 21-25. That counts as +3 on the average date of the later poll: April 20. The full tally for all polls reported at RealClearPolitics since August 2023 looks like this:

Keep your eye on the red line. It spent a lot of time in negative territory from the middle of March to late April. But it’s now back in positive territory.

Now, for the overall polls. I am dropping the “poll of polls”, which aggregates all national polls reported by RCP, regardless of bias and frequency. It is too easy for polls often-published polls with a strong bias (usually pro-Democrat) to make things look worse for Trump than they actually are. (Demoralization of Trump voters is a main objective of such polls.) From here on out, I’m sticking with two, more selective, bias-adjusted measures of the nationwide balance between Trump and Biden.

First is a collection of all polls report by RCP, with two adjustments. I use only the latest results from each pollster, to avoid overrepresentation. I adjust the results by the average of the anti-GOP bias reported by RCP for 14 nationwide polls. I add that value (3.3 percentage points) to Trump’s 5-poll average. Here are numbers, which include the results of all nationwide polls reported by RCP as of today:

 

Trump slipped somewhat from the middle of March to early April. The trend since then is positive.

The other collection of nationwide polls that I am keeping tabs on is a smaller set, in which each poll is adjusted for the amount of bias shown by the same pollster in 2020:

In this case, Trump’s rebound is clear and convincing.

“BATTLEGROUND” POLLS

The other bit of good news for Trump is that he is doing better in the “battleground” States than he was when I last wrote about them (here). All of the polls underlying my previous report were conducted in March. There is now a new round of polls, conducted in April. In general, it looks better for Trump:

THE BOTTOM LINE

Can Trump win the election without “winning” the meaningless nationwide tally of popular votes? Of course he can, thanks to the Electoral College. He did it 2016, when he “lost” to Hillary Clinton by 2.1 percentage points. He almost did it in 2020, when he “lost” to Joe Biden by 4.5 percentage points. And he would have won in 2020 except for “election interference” by the Democrats on a massive scale. You can read all about that here. I’ll save you the trouble of wading through more than 200 links. Here’s the punch line:

Through a combination of information control, partisan management of election processes, outright fraud, ballot harvesting, and failure to apply election laws on the books, the presidential election of 2020 was stolen by a cabal of super-rich elites, crooked politicians, crooked lawyers, and judges who either didn’t want to hear the truth or were blinded to it by partisan considerations. For a systematic treatment of much of the chicanery mentioned in the preceding sentence, see Mollie Ziegler Hemingway’s Rigged: How the Media, Big Tech and the Democrats Seized Our Elections. Regarding outright fraud, see “Last Thoughts on Voter Fraud” (The Adventures of Shylock Holmes, December 11, 2020) and “The Most Secure Election in American History?” (Gatestone Institute website) for thorough wrap-ups.

Let’s hope that an army of better-armed poll-watchers and lawyers working for the GOP can keep it from happening again.

In any event, it’s my view that if the average of the final ten (unadjusted) polls gives Trump a lead of 1 or more points, he will win the election.

Stay tuned.

Trump vs. Biden: 11 (A New Metric)

In “Trump vs. Biden: 10” I highlighted the tightening of the race (according to nationwide polls). Changes in the 15 days since that post have been slightly in Trump’s favor. Below are results, which I have parsed in three ways:

  • all polls, unadjusted for bias (with polynomial fits for smoothing)
  • the latest version of each pollster’s result, unadjusted for bias
  • the latest version of each pollster’s result, adjusted for bias (using each pollster’s bias in 2020)

Here’s a fourth way to look at the results:

The values represent the change in Trump’s lead (or deficit) since the preceding poll by the same pollster. The typical margin of error for a poll (statistical estimate of the accuracy of the poll) is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Most of the movements are within that range. Therefore, what all of the preceding graphs point to is a race that is now essentially tied.

Well, it’s tied if the polls aren’t picking up “hidden” Trump voters — Trump voters who aren’t telling pollsters their true intentions. If there are enough such voters to swing the election to Trump, it won’t become evident until the votes are counted.

Until then, I can only tell you what the polls are saying.

Israel vs. Iran: 2

The New York Times reports:

President Biden and his team, hoping to avoid further escalation leading to a wider war in the Middle East, are advising Israel that its successful defense against Iranian airstrikes constituted a major strategic victory that might not require another round of retaliation, U.S. officials said on Sunday.

The administration’s position is one of these two things:

  • Disinformation, which is meant lull Iran into the belief that the U.S. doesn’t want war with Iran and will not help Israel if it attacks Iran. (What would happen in the event of a counterattack by Iran?)
  • The real position of the administration, which is meant to deflect Iran from acting against the U.S. or its overseas interests if Israel attacks and Iran counterattacks. (Again, what would happen in the event of a counterattack by Iran?)

I believe the second to be the administration’s real position. It is consistent with its efforts to mollify Iran. It is consistent with the eternal belief of leftists that mortal enemies can be reasoned with and bought off. It is of a piece with the delusion that the elimination of capital punishment and general leniency in sentencing will result in less crime.

In neither case does the administration acknowledge the central fact that Iran (among other countries and non-state actors) wants the elimination of Israel in particular and of Jews in general.

Israel’s leaders today grasp that central fact. If they ever lost sight of it, the events of October 7, 2023, have emblazoned it in their souls. Given that, Israel will not relent in its efforts to eliminate the threat posed by its main enemy: Iran.

The only question in my mind at this point is what Israel will do to accomplish the demise or defeat of the Islamic regime in Iran. For that is what it will take to at least blunt if not eliminate the threat from Iran, and the support that Iran gives to other states and non-state actors who seek Israel’s demise.

Ignore what the Biden administration says about Israel vs. Iran. Keep your eyes on Israel.

Israel vs. Iran: 1

These are my first thoughts about the domestic politics of the conflict. Subject to change as events unfold.

A strong and unyielding defense of Israel, followed by an attack on Iran and its nuclear facilities will clinch the election for Biden, regardless of what happens to Hunter. It will be rally ’round the president (shades of BHO’s “heroics” re Hurricane Sandy in the days before election 2012). The House GOP won’t even muster the votes to send a bill of impeachment to the Senate. Trump will storm and rage to no avail.

If Biden wins big enough, the Senate won’t flip to the GOP and the Dems will win a comfortable margin in the House. More trillions will be wasted on the Quixotic war on “climate change”. The already deep divisions in the U.S. will deepen, but the Dems will be in charge and won’t care.

Election 2024: The Bottom Line

As promised.

Joel Kotkin’s “The Coming Revolt against Woke Capitalism” gets at much of what’s at stake in of the coming election:

In virtually every field, the midwives of [the West’s] demise are not working-class radicals or far-right agitators, but, as the late Fred Siegel called it, the ‘new aristocratic class’, made up of the well-credentialed and the technologically and scientifically adept.

Virtually every ideology that’s undermining the West has its patrons in these ruling cognitive elites. This includes everything from the purveyors of critical race theory and Black Lives Matter to transgender activists and, perhaps most egregiously, campaigners for the climate jihad. In each case, these elite activists reject the market traditions of liberal capitalism and instead promote a form of social control, often with themselves in charge. The fact that these ideologies are destructive, and could ultimately undermine the status of these very elites, seems to matter little to them….

The current cadre of elites seem uniquely hostile to meritocracy and individual rights – values that once stood at the heart of liberal, capitalist societies. Rather than promote upward mobility for the plebs, they want to divide them into ‘identity’ groups based on race, sexuality and gender. Black Lives Matter, the enforcers of critical race theory, for years enjoyed lavish support from top tech companies, including Microsoft, Cisco and TikTok. It also became a poster child for a host of nonprofits, like the Tides Foundation, which in turn gets much of its money from oligarchs and their descendants, including George Soros and the MacArthur, Hewlett, Ford, Packard and Rockefeller foundations.

Nowhere is the gap between the elites’ political activism and the interests of the public more evident today than when it comes to the overhyped climate crisis. To a remarkable extent, the current ruling oligarchy in tech and on Wall Street have embraced the ideology of Net Zero, even though this threatens to undermine Western industrial power and raise the cost of living for the masses. Elite opinion, in general, is far more engaged on climate issues than the general population. In one recent poll, those living with graduate degrees in big dense cities and making over $150,000 a year are far more likely to favour such things as rationing meat and gas than the vast majority of Americans….

The clear hypocrisy of the greens does not go unnoticed by the masses. Those same elites who demand climate austerity for the many are widely known to enjoy the use of private jets, build $500 million yachts and own numerous, often enormous mansions. The fact that the most recent climate confab, COP28, had a session on ‘responsible yachting’ tells people all they need to know about the hypocrisy of the super-rich.

The damage being done by the oligarchs’ green agenda is now fuelling a rebellion from the beleaguered European, British and American middle and working classes. Many are becoming increasingly sceptical of elite environmentalism, just as they have been consistently hostile to woke ideas on law enforcement, transgender issues and racial quotas.

Public hostility towards what Adrian Wooldridge has labelled ‘the progressive aristocracy’ is now all too clear. In the US, there are declining levels of confidence in large corporations, tech oligarchs, big banks as well as the media. Similar patterns can be seen in the EU and the UK. This disquiet has led to such things as the 2016 election of Trump, the Brexit vote and the rise of populist parties and farmers’ protests across Europe.

So far, the elites seem barely aware of this discontent. This may stem from the fact that the oligarchs and their minions live in a very different reality from most people. They are shielded from the consequences of the policies they promote, whether from the job losses brought about by eco-austerity, or the rising crime and disorder resulting from efforts to ‘defund the police’ and the refusal to penalise street crime. They live in closeted, gentrified urban neighbourhoods, elite leafy suburbs or country retreats.

The elites’ arrogance could turn out to be their greatest liability. Those outside the charmed circle may often seem ill-mannered, but they are not stupid. They know they are being assaulted by people with greater resources, who favour ever more controls on everyday behaviour, on small businesses and on speech….

Like French aristocrats before the revolution, the oligarchs talk largely among themselves. They seem unaware that they may be financing fashionable causes that may threaten ‘their own rights and even their existence’, as Alexis de Tocqueville said of the Ancien Régime….

Already among Democrats, the party with most oligarchic support, more of its registered supporters favour socialism over capitalism. At the same time, the echo of 1789 was evident in the so-called gilets-jaunes (yellow-vest) protests against higher fuel taxes in the winter of 2018-2019. Recent protests by farmers in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy all reflect concerns about the impact of elite policies on ordinary people’s livelihoods….

For all their faults, the elites of industrial-era Britain and America at least provided opportunities for the middle and especially the working class. They helped create powerful economies that, ultimately, and with some political cajoling, produced unprecedented mass affluence. In contrast, today’s oligarchs and their ‘expert class’ allies offer nothing more than subsidies and handouts – or what Karl Marx referred to as ‘the proletarian alms-bag’.

In the coming decade, we need a politics that rejects the assumption of superiority and right to rule from our oligarchic rulers. There is still time, despite the power of the elites, to champion democracy, liberal values and the dream of upward mobility. ‘A man may be led by fate’, wrote the great Soviet-era Russian novelist Vasily Grossman, ‘but he can refuse to follow’. The future course of history is never inevitable, if we retain the will to shape it.

Ironically, the coming presidential election is almost certain to pit a billionaire who detests the elites against a professional politician-kleptocrat who is in thrall to them.

Kotkin’s piece is excellent insofar as it lays bare the hypocrisy of the elites and the damage that they are doing and will do to the lives and livelihoods of hard-working citizens. Among those things, to which Kotkin gives fleeting mention are:

  • massive, almost unhampered immigration from the south, which flouts the law and burdens the working classes while providing cheap labor for the upper classes;
  • governance by the administrative state, which is becoming an arm of woke capitalism (especially when Democrats are in charge);
  • the effects of the administrative state and “woke capitalism” on three main engines of liberty and prosperity: open and candid discussion of ideas, discrimination on the basis of ability and performance (not skin color or political views);
  • and markets that reward those who meet the demands of consumers as against the demands of woke capitalists and the administrative state.

Also at stake is the defense of law-abiding Americans from mobs within and enemies without. Woke capitalists and their political cronies seem bent on loosing the mobs and collaborating with the enemies.

For much more about the choice ahead and about what will happen if Trump loses, see “What Happened to America?“, “James Burnham’s Misplaced Optimism“, and “The Suicide of the West Accelerates“.

See also (just for starters): “Economics: The Bad News about Growth“, “1963: The Year Zero“, “The Hardening of Ideological Affiliations in America“, “The Pardoxes and Consequences of Liberty and Prosperity“, “How the Constitution Was Lost“, “Leftism: The Nirvana Fallacy on Stilts“, “Why Trade Doesn’t Deter Aggression“, “The Black-White Achievement Gap and Its Parallel in the Middle East“, and “Grand Strategy for the United States“. For much more, go to “Index of Posts” and browse to your heart’s content.

Trump vs. Biden: 10 (The Race Is Tightening)

Contrary to cherry-picked results presented on some right-wing sites (and I don’t use “right-wing” as a smear phrase), Trump is sliding relative to Biden.

Let’s start with the small picture, Trump’s standing in the so-called battleground States: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Here’s are the trends in each of those States, going back to October 2023:







I used 3-poll averages because of the paucity of polls in some States. Only in Pennsylvania is Trump clearly improving his edge over Biden.

The results in most of the battleground States mirror the national results, which I have parsed in three ways:

  • all polls, unadjusted for bias (with polynomial fits for smoothing)
  • the latest version of each pollster’s result, unadjusted for bias
  • the latest version of each pollster’s result, adjusted for bias (using the pollsters’ bias in 2020)

The results, in that order, are below. Because of the greater number of nationwide polls, I have used 5-poll averages.

 

These aren’t pretty pictures if you don’t want Biden to win.

Finally, there are the betting odds. Trump had a 16 percentage-point lead over Biden in the immediate aftermath of the Hur report, which depicted Biden (accurately) as a befuddled old man with a poor memory. That edge has shrunk to 5 percentage points — the smallest it has been since mid-November.

All of this is bad news if you are (as I am) fearful of the outright repression that would follow Biden’s re-election. What do I mean by that? Stay tuned.

Trump vs. Biden: 9 (A Fresh Look at the Numbers)

UPDATED 03/18/24 – 03/21/24

Something has been nagging me about the poll numbers that I’ve compiled and reported in several previous posts (e.g., here). That something is the lack of an adjustment for political bias. I’ve been reporting the statistical margin of error, but that’s not the same thing.

Every poll, biased or not, has a margin of error, which is a statistical measure related to sample size. But what the pollsters don’t tell you is that a margin of error, properly understood, is just an estimate of the accuracy of the polling results — assuming a random (unbiased) sample. That’s not what you get from most polls, which are designed (often deliberately) to slant results toward the candidates of a certain party — usually the Democrat Party. A margin of error doesn’t account for bias.

In 2008, Bush’s average margin for polls conducted in the seven days before election day (with no double-counting of pollsters) understated Bush’s margin in the nationwide popular-vote tally by 1.0 percentage point. Similar analysis for succeeding elections yielded these result: Obama 2008, overstated by 0.1 percentage point (effectively equal); Obama 2012, understated by 3.2 percentage points; Clinton 2016, overstated by 1.6 percentage points; Biden 2020, overstated by 3.2 percentage points. With the exception of 2012, when Obama’s cheap (taxpayer-funded) “heroics” in the aftermath of Hurrican Sandy coincided with the final runup to election day, the bias favoring Democrats has grown.

With that background out of the way, I hereby introduce a new metric that I will use for polling trends. First, I will use a 5-poll average. I had been using 10-poll average, which can span polls conducted over a two-week period, or longer. The 10-poll average also (often) includes more than one poll by the same pollster. I then switched to a 3-poll average, with no double-counting of any pollster’s results. But a 3-poll average is too “jumpy” (unstable). A 5-poll average (with no double-counting) seems like a good compromise.

Second, after computing the 5-poll average, I adjust it by adding 3.2 percentage points to Trump’s margin relative to Biden. That value (the final polling bias against Trump in 2020) corrects for growing pro-Democrat bias, which is probably greater than 3.2 percentage points this year. The result, I believe, is closer to the truth than the polls (on average) would have it because of the prevailing bias toward Biden (and Democrats, generally).

Without further ado, here’s how things look:

Trump’s margin actually peaked last fall, dipped significantly, rebounded somewhat, and dipped again. We’ll see if it rebounds again — and if my revised method yields an estimate that’s close to the actual outcome of Election 2024.

Trump vs. Biden: 4

UPDATED 11/21/23

RealClearPolitics maintains a running tally of presidential election polls (among many others). RCP has also assessed the pro-Democrat or pro-Republican bias of the final presidential-election polls issued by major pollsters in 2016 and 2020. On average, the polls were biased toward the Democrat nominee by 2.3 percentage points.

As the pollsters release their results, I adjust Trump’s lead/deficit for bias. I then construct a moving average of the adjusted results, where the average represents Trump’s adjusted margin for the 10 most recent polls (taking the mid-point of each polling period as the date of each poll).

I then convert that 10-poll average to an estimate of Trump’s share of the two-party popular vote. For example, an average margin of +4 indicates a 52-48 split of the popular vote, that is, Trump gets 52 percent of the popular vote.

Finally, I apply my algorithm for the relationship between the GOP candidate’s share of the electoral vote and his share of two-party popular vote.

The estimates of popular-vote and electoral-vote shares don’t account for the margin of error in pollsters’ findings or the margin of error in my estimate of electoral votes. But the movement of the estimates may be taken as indication of the movement in voters’ preferences between Trump and Biden (or whoever might become their parties’ nominees). It is that movement which I will report from time to time.

Here is the first report, which begins with a clutch of polls that were completed in mid-August, when polling season seems to have begun in earnest: