Year: 2010

More about the Quality of Films

In “The Quality of Films over the Decades,” I compare my ratings of 1,900-plus feature films with the ratings given those same films by IMDb users:


An obvious reason for the difference is that many IMDb users, unlike me, have a strong taste for films of the 1940s through the mid-1970s. I, on the other hand, generally prefer the films of 1932-1942 (the “Golden Age”) to what has been produced since. (My high marks for films of 1920-1931 are based on small samples, and should be ignored for purposes of this discussion.)

It is evident, however, that I am in step with IMDb users with regard to the average quality of films produced from 1975 to 1995. I am less enthusiastic than IMDb users about the output of the last 15 years. (The jump in my ratings for 2009-2010 reflects limited viewing.)

That I am selective in what I choose to view is born out by the following graph:

The blue bars denote the ratings given by IMDb viewers to some 113,000 feature films. The average rating assigned to all of those films is 5.8, in contrast with the 7.1 assigned by IMDb users to films I’ve rated (my average rating, 6.8). The distribution of the red and green bars, relative to the blue ones, attests to my selectivity in choosing films to watch.

It is the difference between the red bars and the green bars that I find most interesting. Because of my selective viewing habits, I have given ratings of 8, 9, or 10 to 13 percent of the films I’ve rated; whereas, IMDb users apply ratings of 8, 9, or 10 to less than 6 percent of the same features. The picture then changes. I am less generous with ratings between 5 and 7, and more willing to apply ratings below 5.

It gives me solace, for two reasons, to know that the average rating for all feature films at IMDb is only 5.8. First, it means that I haven’t missed much by being selective. Second, it means that the average viewer (at least the ones who rate films at IMDb) is willing and able (at least somewhat) to tell what’s good, what’s bad, and what’s indifferent.

Finally, there’s a good reason for being selective: It prevents a sad waste of time. If the average length of the 113,000 features rated at IMDb is 105 minutes (1.75 hours), it would take about 100 years (at five hours a day, five days a week) to watch every film all the way through. That’s a lot of popcorn.

The Body-Scan Brouhaha, Revised and Extended

Here.

The Body-Scan Brouhaha

REVISED AND EXTENDED 11/21/10

I am sympathetic to those who detest the thought — and intrusiveness — of body scans and pat-downs.

One solution — which has the ring of rationality — is to allow airlines to offer flights with varying degrees of preflight screening, and to price the flights accordingly. But that solution is unworkable; there just aren’t enough flights going to the same place at about the same time to afford the traveler a real choice for any particular trip.

It is evident that travelers are paying the price for political correctness, and that the price is getting too high for a lot of them. In a case like this, I take vociferous opposition by some travelers, together with the outraged outpourings of columnists and editorialists, as evidence that the silent majority is fed up. (See, for example, this, this, and this.) Now, the question is whether there will be enough outrage among members of Congress to put a stop to the foolishness and follow the lead of the Israelis.

On this issue, I blame Geogre W. Bush, who wanted to seem so even-handed toward Muslims that he wouldn’t overrule then-sectrary of transportation Norman Mineta’s anti-profiling policy. Once TSA’s screening policy headed in that direction, a Democrat administration certainly wasn’t about to reverse it.

The answer, it seems to me, is to adopt El Al’s way of doing things:

Passengers are asked to report three hours before departure. All El Al terminals around the world are closely monitored for security. There are plain-clothes agents and fully armed police or military personnel who patrol the premises for explosives, suspicious behavior, and other threats. Inside the terminal, passengers and their baggage are checked by a trained team. El Al security procedures require that all passengers be interviewed individually prior to boarding, allowing El Al staff to identify possible security threats. Passengers will be asked questions about where they are coming from, the reason for their trip, their job or occupation, and whether they have packed their bags themselves. The likelihood of potential terrorists remaining calm under such questioning is believed to be low (see microexpression).[38]

At the check-in counter, passengers’ passports and tickets are closely examined. A ticket without a sticker from the security checkers will not be accepted. At passport control passengers’ names are checked against information from the FBI, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Scotland Yard, Shin Bet, and Interpol databases. Luggage is screened and sometimes hand searched. In addition, bags are put through a decompression chamber simulating pressures during flight that could trigger explosives.[39] El Al is the only airline in the world that passes all luggage through such a chamber.[40] Even at overseas airports, El Al security agents conduct all luggage searches personally, even if they are supervised by government or private security firms.[41]

….

Critics of El Al note that its security checks on passengers include racial profiling[51] and have argued that such profiling is unfair, irrational, and degrading to those subject to such screening. Supporters of El Al argue that there is nothing inherently racist about passenger profiling and that special scrutiny of Muslims may often be necessary for security purposes.

The alternative — which, I gather, libertarian purists would prefer — is to drop screening altogether because, after all, how much risk is there, really? Well, libertarian purists are the kind of people who would have us disarm because, after all, no one is threatening to invade the country, right?

When I get on an airplane, everyone else on that plan (except my wife) is a potential threat to me. I am willing to put up with security measures of the right kind. I am not willing to put up with unnecessarily intrusive measures, which are inflicted on me and most of my fellow travelers simply because “our” government refuses to focus on the source of the threat.

An Encounter with a Marxist

A post by David Henderson at EconLog reminds me of an exchange I had with a former neighbor, who is among a circle of acquaintances whom my wife and I occasionally join for dinner. In the post, Henderson quotes Robert Heilbroner:

Indeed, the creation of socialism as a new mode of production can properly be compared to the moral equivalent of war–war against the old order, in this case–and will need to amass and apply the power commensurate with the requirements of a massive war. This need not entail the exercise of command in an arbitrary or dictatorial fashion, but certainly it requires the curtailment of the central economic freedom of bourgeois society, namely the right of individuals to own, and therefore to withhold if they wish, the means of production, including their own labor. [Italics added]

The former neighbor, who acquired a Ph.D. in economics in the early 1960s, is a Marxist who views the world through the lens of class conflict. His world is a world in which the “bad guys” — rich capitalists and their cronies in government — victimize the rest of us, often with the aid of duped victims.

Because, in the former neighbor’s view, everything is rigged by the “bad guys,” he is unable to acknowledge  that competition and mutually beneficial voluntary exchange, fueled by the continuous emergence of innovations and entrepreneurs,  prevents the very kind of rigged game that he rightly abhors. It is not free markets but state action — taxation and regulation — that stands in the way of economic progress and widespread prosperity

The former neighbor see the solution to the non-problem through his Marxist lens. That solution is to use the power of the state to do the right thing — as long as he is judge of what is right, of course.

I understand that point of view, even though I abhor and disrespect it. But my tolerance for Marxist rhetoric drops to zero when I am told — as the former neighbor told me — that state action to redistribute income (through Social Security, for example) is a matter of “sharing” within “the community.”

I pointed out, rather heatedly, that when government — which enjoys a monopoly of force — effectively puts a gun to my head and says “share,” that isn’t sharing. Nor does government represent a “community,” for a community — to be worthy of the name — must be a voluntary association, not a group of citizens bound by the power of government to compel “sharing.”

The discussion ended there. Not because I instantly converted a long-standing Marxist to libertarianism, but because he saw the fury in my eyes and the set of my jaw.

The quotation from Heilbroner reminded me of the contretemps with my former neighbor because of their shared attitude: We know what’s good for you, and we’re willing to use the power of the state to make it so. Such individuals can claim, with a straight face, to be on the side of “the people” only because their arrogance allows them to equate force with benevolence.

The American League’s Greatest Hitters: Part II

SUPERSEDED BY “THE AMERICAN LEAGUE’S GREATEST HITTERS: III“

UPDATED 12/08/11

When last seen, the best of the American League’s greatest hitters were:

Adjusted Nominal Player Years in AL Batting average % change # change
rank* rank (all-caps, Hall of Fame; From To Nominal Adjusted in BA in rank
* indicates active)
1 12 Ichiro Suzuki* 2001 2010 .331 .353 6.2% 11
2 1 TY COBB 1905 1928 .366 .353 -3.9% -1
3 2 Shoeless Joe Jackson 1908 1920 .356 .351 -1.3% -1
4 10 NAP LAJOIE 1901 1916 .336 .333 -0.9% 6
5 3 TRIS SPEAKER 1907 1928 .345 .331 -4.0% -2
6 16 ROD CAREW 1967 1985 .328 .331 0.9% 10
7 11 EDDIE COLLINS 1906 1930 .333 .326 -2.2% 4
8 6 BABE RUTH 1914 1934 .343 .324 -6.1% -2
9 8 LOU GEHRIG 1923 1939 .340 .323 -5.4% -1
10 18 JOE DIMAGGIO 1936 1951 .325 .322 -0.7% 8
11 4 TED WILLIAMS 1939 1960 .344 .319 -7.9% -7
12 15 WADE BOGGS 1982 1999 .328 .319 -2.8% 3

I left the earlier post hanging on the question of how the top hitters would compare when their batting averages were adjusted further, for age. I now have some of the answers.

To get the answers, I quantified the relationship between adjusted batting average and age for the 120 hitters considered in the earlier post. (As a reminder, those hitters attained nominal lifetime averages of .285 or better in at least 5,000 plate appearances in the American League. Their averages take into account long-term and year-to-year changes in playing conditions, as well as differences among ballparks at a give time and over time.) Here is the relationship, in graphical form:


I used the equation shown on the graph to adjust each hitter’s annual batting average according to the age at which he attained the average. If the “normal” hitter peaks at 28, as the equation suggests, averages attained before and after the age of 28 are “understated.” That is, if a player hits .300 at the age of 20, that’s equivalent to hitting .315 at the age of 28; and if a player hits .300 at the age of 40, that’s equivalent to hitting .341 at the age of 28.

My analysis of age-adjusted batting average has yielded two key findings, thus far. The first finding, which is captured in the following graph and its accompanying table, is that the top averages for ages 18-41 were accomplished by just seven different players. This graph compares the year-by-year, age-adjusted averages for each of the seven players:


For ease of viewing, I omitted the five players (Speaker, Carew, Collins, Ruth, and Gehrig) who never hold the top spot at any age, despite their impressive career averages. The top hitters at each age are as follows:

Age-adjusted
Age Player BA
18 Cobb .267
19 Cobb .336
20 Cobb .369
21 Jackson .392
22 Cobb .395
23 Cobb .399
24 Cobb .387
25 Cobb .397
26 Cobb .391
27 Cobb .380
28 Cobb .379
29 Lajoie .383
30 Cobb .396
31 Cobb .387
32 Cobb .369
33 Suzuki .377
34 DiMaggio .362
35 Lajoie .414
36 Suzuki .364
37 Lajoie .373
38 Williams .398
39 Williams .343
40 Cobb .357
41 Boggs .343

Given that information, it shouldn’t surprise you to learn that Ty Cobb returns to the top of the heap when his single-season averages are age-adjusted, and weighted by his at-bats in each season, to obtain an age-adjusted lifetime average. Here is the age-adjusted list of top-12 career batting averages:

Batter Age-adjusted career BA
1 Ty Cobb .3639
2 Shoeless Joe Jackson .3559
3 Ichiro Suzuki* .3582
4 Nap Lajoie .3405
5 Tris Speaker .3313
6 Rod Carew .3307
7 Ted Williams .3306
8 Eddie Collins .3258
9 Babe Ruth .3236
10 Lou Gehrig .3228
11 Joe DiMaggio .3223
12 Wade Boggs .3190
* Through 2010 season; before .272 average in 2011 reduced career BA by .0054.

I have not extended my analysis to include the 2011 season, but it is clear that Suzuki now belongs in 3rd place. The loss of .0054 from his nominal career BA in 2011 is far greater than his age-adjusted lead (.0023) over Jackson through 2010.

Time Out

It’s not that I’m going “on hiatus” as they say in blogworld. It’s just that I have a couple of things to “share” that aren’t about politics or economics. I maintain, and occasionally update, a blog called Americana, Etc., which is about “baseball, history, humor, language, literature, movies, music, nature, nostalgia, philosophy, psychology, and other (mostly) apolitical subjects.” (Actually, I do address history, language, literature, music, philosophy, and psychology here, but not in an apolitical way.)

In a relative frenzy of activity at Americana, Etc., I added yesterday (after two weeks’ work) a post in which I compare the greatest hitters in the history of the American League. (That’s a baseball thing-y, in case you’re wondering.) The title of the post, oddly enough, is “The American League’s Greatest Hitters.” Here’s a teaser: Ichiro Suzuki supplants Ty Cobb as the best all-time hitter — batting-average-wise — in the history of the American League. To find out why, and to see the entire list of 120 top hitters, click on the link in the sentence before last. [UPDATE: With a further adjustment to take age into account, Ty Cobb reclaims his title as the all-time American League batting champion. Ichiro Suzuki drops to second place. Shoeless Joe Jackson remains in third place. Details here.]

Today’s entry is “The Quality of Films over the Decades,” in which I revisit and reaffirm earlier posts to the effect that movies have been in a long decline since 1942.

Thank you for your kind attention.

-30-

The Quality of Films over the Decades

I have written before about my judgment of the quality of films in various eras. In 2007, I characterized the eras from 1933 to then as follows:

  • the Golden Age (1933-1942) — 179 films seen, 96 favorites (54 percent)
  • the Abysmal Years (1943-1965) — 317 films seen, 98 favorites (31 percent)
  • the Vile Years (1966-present) — 1,496 films seen, 359 favorites (24 percent)

Favorites are films that I have rated 8, 9, or 10 on IMDb’s 10-point scale.

I offered the following explanation for what I saw as a steady decline in quality after 1942:

  • The Golden Age had deployed all of the themes that could be used without explicit sex, graphic violence, and crude profanity — none of which become an option for American movie-makers until the mid-1960s.
  • Prejudice got significantly more play after World War II, but it’s a theme that can’t be used very often without boring audiences.
  • Other attempts at realism (including film noir) resulted mainly in a lot of turgid trash laden with unrealistic dialogue and shrill emoting — keynotes of the Abysmal Years.
  • Hollywood productions sank to the level of TV, apparently in a misguided effort to compete with that medium. The garish technicolor productions of the 1950s often highlighted the unnatural neatness and cleanliness of settings that should have been rustic if not squalid.
  • The transition from abysmal to vile coincided with the cultural “liberation” of the mid-1960s, which saw the advent of the “f” word in mainstream films. Yes, the Vile Years have brought us more more realistic plots and better acting (thanks mainly to the Brits). But none of that compensates for the anti-social rot that set in around 1966: drug-taking, drinking and smoking are glamorous; profanity proliferates to the point of annoyance; sex is all about lust and little about love; violence is gratuitous and beyond the point of nausea; corporations and white, male Americans with money are evil; the U.S. government (when Republican-controlled) is in thrall to that evil; etc., etc. etc.

How do things look now? About the same, on the whole, after another look at my ratings, which now extend into 2010.

I compared my ratings of individual movies with the ratings given the same movies by hundreds, thousands, and (sometimes) tens of thousands of viewers. Here’s how our ratings compare, year by year and overall, from 1920 through 2010:


I’m not surprised that my ratings, on average, are lower than those of other viewers, on average. Assuming that the difference is merely a matter of tough grading on my part, I scaled up my ratings so that my overall average is the same as that of others who rated the same films. The result:


The band of vertical bars across the middle of the graph indicates the normal range of the annual ratings. Points above the vertical bands are in the upper 1/6 of my ratings; points below the vertical bands are in the bottom 1/6 of my ratings.

I find it a bit shocking to see that there is a period during the vile years with normalized ratings above 100 percent of the IMDb average, specifically, 1978 through 1997. On the other hand, the first graph shows that I considered the films of that period generally inferior to the films of earlier periods. Moreover, going back to the first graph, it is evident that there was a consensus (of which I was part) about the vileness of the Vile Years (give or take a few of them).

So, I will stick to my guns, with one amendment — the Golden Age began in 1932:

  • the Golden Age (1932-1942) — 184 films rated, 110 favorites (60 percent)
  • the Abysmal Years (1943-1965) — 284 films rated, 107 favorites (41 percent)
  • the Vile Years (1966-present) — 1,425 films rated, 416 favorites (29 percent)

Will movies ever get better? Only time — and a lot of movie-viewing — will tell.

Undermining the Free Society

Apropos my earlier post about “Asymmetrical (Ideological) Warfare,” I note this review by Gerald J. Russello of Kenneth Minogue’s The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life. As he summarizes Minogue, Russello writes:

The push for equality and ever more rights—two of [democracy’s] basic principles—requires a ruling class to govern competing claims; thus the rise of the undemocratic judiciary as the arbiter of many aspects of public life, and of bureaucracies that issue rules far removed from the democratic process. Should this trend continue, Minogue foresees widespread servility replacing the tradition of free government.

This new servility will be based not on oppression, but on the conviction that experts have eliminated any need for citizens to develop habits of self-control, self-government, or what used to be called the virtues.

How has democracy led to “servility,” which is really a kind of oppression? Here is my diagnosis.

It is well understood that voters, by and large, vote irrationally, that is, emotionally, on the basis of “buzz” instead of facts, and inconsistently. (See this, this, and this, for example.) Voters are prone to vote against their own long-run interests because they do not understand the consequences of the sound-bite policies advocated by politicians. American democracy, by indiscriminately granting the franchise — as opposed to limiting it to, say, married property owners over the age of 30 who have children — empowers the run-of-the-mill politician who seeks office (for the sake of prestige, power, and perks) by pandering to the standard, irrational voter.

Rationality is the application of sound reasoning and pertinent facts to the pursuit of a realistic objective (one that does not contradict the laws of nature or human nature). I daresay that most voters are guilty of voting irrationally because they believe in such claptrap as peace through diplomacy, “social justice” through high marginal tax rates, or better health care through government regulation.

To be perfectly clear, the irrationality lies not in favoring peace, “social justice” (whatever that is), health care, and the like. The irrationality lies in uninformed beliefs in such contradictions as peace through unpreparedness for war, “social justice” through soak-the-rich schemes, better health care through greater government control of medicine, etc., etc., etc. Voters whose objectives incorporate such beliefs simply haven’t taken the relatively little time it requires to process what they may already know or have experienced about history, human nature, and social and economic realities.

Why is voters’ irrationality important? Does voting really matter? Well, it’s easy to say that an individual’s vote makes very little difference. But individual votes add up. Every vote cast for a winning political candidate enhances his supposed mandate, which usually is (in his mind) some scheme (or a lot of them) to regulated our lives more than they are already regulated.

That is to say, voters (not to mention those who profess to understand voters) overlook the slippery slope effects of voting for those who promise to “deliver” certain benefits. It is true that the benefits, if delivered, would temporarily increase the well-being of certain voters. But if one group of voters reaps benefits, then another group of voters wants to reap benefits as well. Why? Because votes are not won, nor offices held, by placating a particular class of voter; many other classes of them must also be placated.

The “benefits” sought by voters (and delivered by politicians) are regulatory as well as monetary. Many voters (especially wealthy, paternalistic ones) are more interested in controlling others than they are in reaping government handouts (though they don’t object to that either). And if one group of voters reaps certain regulatory benefits, it follows (as night from day) that other groups also will seek (and reap) regulatory benefits. (Must one be a trained economist to understand this? Obviously not, because most trained economists don’t seem to understand it.)

And then there is the “peace–at-any-price–one-world” crowd, which is hard to distinguish from the crowd that demands (and delivers) monetary and regulatory “benefits.”

So, here we are:

  • Many particular benefits are bestowed and many regulations are imposed, to the detriment of investors, entrepreneurs, innovators, inventors, and people who simply are willing to work hard to advance themselves. And it is they who are responsible for the economic growth that bestows (or would bestow) more jobs and higher incomes on everyone, from the poorest to the richest.
  • A generation from now, the average American will “enjoy” about one-fourth the real output that would be his absent the advent of the regulatory-welfare state about a century ago.

Americans have, since 1932, voted heavily against their own economic and security interests, and the economic and security interests of their progeny. But what else can you expect when — for those same 78 years — voters have been manipulated into voting against their own interests by politicians, media, “educators,” and “intelligentsia”? What else can you expect when the courts have all too often ratified the malfeasance of those same politicians?

If this is democracy, give me monarchy.

Finding Order in Chaos

Here is an apparently random plot of daily changes in an index:

Can such randomness yield an orderly outcome? To find out, click “Read more of this post.”

Continue reading “Finding Order in Chaos” →

Asymmetrical (Ideological) Warfare

Leftists are  kind, caring, and generous — because they say they are. Conservatives and libertarians are none of those things — because the possession of such traits is a question of behavior, not rhetoric.

Leftists dismiss human imperfection, while finding perfection in their vision of the world as they want it to be. Conservatives and libertarians understand human imperfection and offer only a vision of betterment through striving.

The rhetoric of leftism — when it is not downright hateful toward non-leftists — has wide appeal because to adopt it for one’s own and to echo it is to make oneself feel kind, caring, generous — and powerful — at a stroke. It matters not whether the policies that flow from leftist rhetoric actually make others better off. The important things, to a leftist, are how he feels about himself and how others perceive him.

It is easy for a leftist to seem kinder, more caring, and more generous than his conservative and libertarian brethren because a leftist focuses on intentions rather than consequences. No matter that the consequences of leftist dogma could match their stated intentions only if Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy ruled the world.

In the leftist’s imagination, of course, government is Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy. Government, despite the fact that it consists of venal and fallible humans, somehow (in the leftist’s imagination) wields powers that enable it to make “good” things happen with the stroke of a pen and at no cost.

Or if there is a cost, it is to be borne by those despised “rich,” who dare to acquire more than their “fair share” of income and wealth. Leftists seem know who is “too rich” and what is a “fair share” by mysterious intuitions that are inaccessible to mere mortals. Leftists seem to have acquired a fine knowledge of what others deserve to earn, though that knowledge seems not to have kept many a leftist from scrambling up the ladder of material prosperity. It’s all right to be “rich” if you proclaim your heart to be in the right place.

By the same token, it is all right to dictate the terms and conditions of human striving– what is made, how it is made, whether it is made, how much of it is made, how much of it may be consumed, etc. — as long as one’s heart is in the right place. The leftist, you see, is compelled to protect mere mortals (the unwashed masses) from themselves. That is because the leftist cannot grasp the the concepts of personal responsibility and betterment through (sometimes) bitter experience.

Such realities have no meaning for the leftist. For him, human progress is attained by the magical powers of government, which can raise up the impoverished, cure the stricken, and banish strife from the land. It is up to government to do such things because, in the view of a leftist, nothing that happens to anyone (or to anyone who is on the left’s list of favored groups) is his fault — it is the fault of “society” or the uncaring, unkind, ungenerous exploiters who (in the left’s imagination) control society. (The ultimate irony is that the uncaring, unkind, and ungenerous exploiters are the leftists who, when not held in check, write the rules by which we mortals live.)

In sum, the true nature of leftism is a blend of Utopianism and power-lust. Thus, in the left’s view of things, human wants can be met, but only without mussing the face of the Earth; people can live and work wherever they choose, as long as it is in compact cities in which government owns the only means of transportation; people can say what they want and associate with whom they please, as long as they say nothing to offend certain kinds of persons and are forced to associate with them, like it or not. (The list goes on, but that is more than enough to make my point.)

The idea of allowing individuals to make their own way (and sometimes to fail in the process of trying), to become sick and die because of the “lifestyles” they prefer, and to avoid one another (usually for very good reasons) is beyond the ken of the leftist. Imperfection — in the mind of a leftist — is impermissible. Individuals must not be allowed to fail, to become ill, or to harbor ill feelings (except toward the enemies of leftism). The antidote to failure is to arrange our lives and business affairs as the leftist would like to see them arranged. All in the name of kindness, compassion, and generosity, of course.

The ideal person — to a leftist — is not a human being but a cog in the left’s design for the world.

Related posts:
Fascism with a “Friendly” Face
Penalizing “Thought Crimes”
Parsing Political Philosophy
Utilitarianism vs. Liberty
The Near-Victory of Communism
Tocqueville’s Prescience
Accountants of the Soul
Rawls Meets Bentham
The Left
The Divine Right of the Majority
I Want My Country Back

The American League’s Greatest Hitters

Through a painstaking series of adjustments for changes in playing standards and conditions, and for differences among ballparks, I have reassessed the single-season and career batting averages of the American League’s top hitters. The reassessment covers 120 players whose career average in the American League is at least .285 in at least 5,000 plate appearances.

I will devote a future post to a detailed explanation of the adjustments. In this post, I give an overview of the adjustments and present a revised ranking of the 120 players. I also discuss — but do not adjust for — the effects of age on the revised batting averages and relative standing of players.

I make three kinds of adjustments to nominal (official) BA. One adjustment is a time constant, which captures gradual changes from 1901 to the present that have worked against batters. Such changes would be the improvement of fielding gloves (which have made it harder to get hits, while also raising fielding averages), the introduction of night baseball, and the gradual increase in proportion of games played at night.

A second adjustment is an annual factor that captures the up-and-down swings in the relative difficulty of hitting. These swings have occurred because of changes in the ball, the frequency of its replacement, the size of the strike zone, and the height of the pitching mound, and perhaps other factors.

A third adjustment — one that is unique to each team-park combination — reflects the relative ease or difficulty of hitting in the various parks that have been used in the American League. In many cases the adjustment factor for a given park changes during the years of its use because of significant changes in the dimensions of the field.

The following graph combines the effects of the first two adjustments into a single number for each season. A value greater than 1 means that each hitter’s nominal average for that season was increased to some degree. A value less than 1 means that each hitter’s average for that season was decreased to some degree.


The largest upward adjustments affect averages compiled in the “deadball” years of 1902-1909 and 1913-1916, and in the “era of the pitcher,” from 1962 through 1975. The largest downward adjustments affect averages compiled in the first two years of the AL’s existence and the “lively” ball era, which — judging from the numbers — began in 1919 and lasted through 1938.

The final adjustments — for differences in parks — range widely. For example, Red Sox hiiters (including Ted Williams) suffered a penalty of 5.9 percent for the 1934-2010 seasons, when Fenway Park acquired its present dimensions. By contrast, Yankees who played in the original Yankee Stadium from 1923 through 1973 earned a boost of 4 percent because the original park (despite its short foul lines) was inimical to batters (including Joe DiMaggio).

The following graph captures the total effect of the three adjustments. Each point represents one of the 120 hitters.

The pattern, which the curved line emphasizes, is consistent with the adjustments summarized in the first graph. The points don’t fall neatly on the curved line for three reasons: (1) variations in the length of players’ careers, (2) variations in the numbers of at-bats across seasons (and thus in the weight attached to a season in compiling a career average), and (3) the park-adjustment factor, which varies widely from park to park and (sometimes) for a particular park, if its configuration changed significantly.

How did the various adjustments affect the rankings? First, as would be expected because of the inflation of batting averages in the 1920s and 1930s, those decades are over-represented among the 120 hitters, as shown in the following table. (“Median year” refers to the decade in which a player’s median year occurs. For example, Ty Cobb’s career spanned 1905-1928, so he is counted as a member of the 1911-1920 decade in the following table and the one after it.)

Distribution of Hitters, by Decade
Median year Number Percent
1901-1910 2 1.7%
1911-1920 7 5.8%
1921-1930 17 14.2%
1931-1940 21 17.5%
1941-1950 8 6.7%
1951-1960 8 6.7%
1961-1970 3 2.5%
1971-1980 8 6.7%
1981-1990 10 8.3%
1991-2000 22 18.3%
2001-2010 14 11.7%
120 100%

The adjustments to nominal batting averages did a good job of rectifying the bias toward players of the 1920s and 1930s:

Average Rank, by Decade
Median year Nominal Adjusted Change*
1901-1910 28 17 11
1911-1920 22 23 -1
1921-1930 29 65 -36
1931-1940 44 83 -39
1941-1950 60 63 -3
1951-1960 84 54 30
1961-1970 83 43 40
1971-1980 86 49 37
1981-1990 79 52 27
1991-2000 79 64 15
2001-2010 58 79 -21
* Positive number represents improvement (higher average rank); negative number represents slippage (lower average rank).

Until someone convinces me otherwise, I conclude that the top hitters of the “deadball” era really were great by comparison with those who came later. They are not alone at the top, however. Among the top 10 in the following table are a contemporary player (Ichiro Suzuki), a player of recent memory (Rod Carew), and three Yankees who enjoyed great years in the 1920s and 1930s (Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, and Joe DiMaggio). Here, then, are all 120 hitters, listed in the order of adjusted rank:

Adjusted Nominal Player Years in AL Batting average % change # change
rank* rank (all-caps = Hall of Fame; asterisk = From To Nominal Adjusted in BA in rank
active)
1 12 Ichiro Suzuki* 2001 2010 .331 .353 6.2% 11
2 1 TY COBB 1905 1928 .366 .353 -3.9% -1
3 2 Shoeless Joe Jackson 1908 1920 .356 .351 -1.3% -1
4 10 NAP LAJOIE 1901 1916 .336 .333 -0.9% 6
5 3 TRIS SPEAKER 1907 1928 .345 .331 -4.0% -2
6 16 ROD CAREW 1967 1985 .328 .331 0.9% 10
7 11 EDDIE COLLINS 1906 1930 .333 .326 -2.2% 4
8 6 BABE RUTH 1914 1934 .343 .324 -6.1% -2
9 8 LOU GEHRIG 1923 1939 .340 .323 -5.4% -1
10 18 JOE DIMAGGIO 1936 1951 .325 .322 -0.7% 8
11 4 TED WILLIAMS 1939 1960 .344 .319 -7.9% -7
12 15 WADE BOGGS 1982 1999 .328 .319 -2.8% 3
13 47 Don Mattingly 1982 1995 .307 .318 3.3% 34
14 74 MICKEY MANTLE 1951 1968 .298 .317 6.0% 60
15 7 HARRY HEILMANN 1914 1929 .342 .315 -8.9% -8
16 30 Derek Jeter* 1995 2010 .314 .314 0.1% 14
17 5 GEORGE SISLER 1915 1928 .344 .313 -9.8% -12
18 36 Edgar Martinez 1987 2004 .312 .312 0.1% 18
19 25 KIRBY PUCKETT 1984 1995 .318 .311 -2.1% 6
20 89 EDDIE MURRAY 1977 1997 .295 .311 5.1% 69
21 99 Thurman Munson 1969 1979 .292 .310 6.1% 78
22 53 PAUL MOLITOR 1978 1998 .306 .310 1.2% 31
23 35 Magglio Ordonez* 1997 2010 .312 .310 -0.6% 12
24 31 Harvey Kuenn 1952 1960 .313 .309 -1.4% 7
25 44 Roberto Alomar 1991 2004 .309 .308 -0.4% 19
26 9 AL SIMMONS 1924 1944 .337 .308 -9.3% -17
27 17 EARLE COMBS 1924 1935 .325 .308 -5.6% -10
28 68 Minnie Minoso 1949 1964 .300 .307 2.4% 40
29 70 Joe Judge 1915 1934 .299 .307 2.7% 41
30 45 SAM CRAWFORD 1903 1917 .309 .307 -0.5% 15
31 55 Tony Oliva 1962 1976 .304 .307 0.7% 24
32 92 Mickey Rivers 1970 1984 .295 .306 3.7% 60
33 38 Baby Doll Jacobson 1915 1927 .311 .305 -1.9% 5
34 83 Carl Crawford* 2002 2010 .296 .305 2.8% 49
35 67 Julio Franco 1983 1999 .301 .304 1.3% 32
36 54 GEORGE BRETT 1973 1993 .305 .304 -0.3% 18
37 56 Paul O’Neill 1993 2001 .303 .304 0.1% 19
38 48 HOME RUN BAKER 1908 1922 .307 .303 -1.2% 10
39 72 Cecil Cooper 1971 1987 .298 .303 1.7% 33
40 20 SAM RICE 1915 1934 .322 .303 -6.2% -20
41 14 HEINIE MANUSH 1923 1936 .331 .303 -9.1% -27
42 32 BILL DICKEY 1928 1946 .313 .303 -3.3% -10
43 101 Lou Piniella 1964 1984 .291 .302 3.9% 58
44 29 Cecil Travis 1933 1947 .314 .302 -3.9% -15
45 103 Carney Lansford 1978 1992 .290 .302 4.1% 58
46 41 LUKE APPLING 1930 1950 .310 .302 -2.8% -5
47 50 Stuffy McInnis 1909 1922 .307 .302 -1.7% 3
48 114 Bill Skowron 1954 1967 .286 .301 5.2% 66
49 98 Luis Polonia 1987 2000 .292 .301 3.0% 49
50 84 Garret Anderson 1994 2008 .296 .301 1.5% 34
51 79 AL KALINE 1953 1974 .297 .300 0.9% 28
52 52 GEORGE KELL 1943 1957 .306 .300 -2.2% 0
53 34 Manny Ramirez* 1993 2010 .312 .300 -4.1% -19
54 81 Bernie Williams 1991 2006 .297 .299 0.7% 27
55 64 Frank Thomas 1990 2008 .301 .299 -0.8% 9
56 13 JIMMIE FOXX 1925 1942 .331 .298 -11.1% -43
57 97 Mike Hargrove 1974 1985 .292 .298 1.8% 40
58 42 Bobby Veach 1912 1925 .310 .298 -4.2% -16
59 60 Alex Rodriguez* 1994 2010 .303 .297 -2.0% 1
60 91 Kevin Seitzer 1986 1997 .295 .297 0.6% 31
61 105 John Olerud 1989 2005 .289 .297 2.5% 44
62 102 NELLIE FOX 1947 1963 .290 .297 2.2% 40
63 107 Wally Joyner 1986 2001 .289 .296 2.4% 44
64 104 Harold Baines 1980 2001 .289 .296 2.2% 40
65 112 Carlos Guillen* 1998 2010 .286 .296 3.2% 47
66 116 ROBIN YOUNT 1974 1993 .285 .295 3.4% 50
67 119 Gene Woodling 1946 1962 .284 .295 3.6% 52
68 90 LOU BOUDREAU 1938 1952 .295 .294 -0.3% 22
69 111 Raul Ibanez 1996 2008 .286 .294 2.8% 42
70 120 YOGI BERRA 1946 1963 .284 .294 3.5% 50
71 86 Kenny Lofton 1992 2007 .296 .293 -1.0% 15
72 23 HANK GREENBERG 1930 1946 .319 .293 -8.8% -49
73 93 Albert Belle 1989 2000 .295 .293 -0.8% 20
74 94 Pete Runnels 1951 1962 .294 .292 -0.7% 20
75 82 Shannon Stewart 1995 2008 .297 .292 -1.5% 7
76 66 Ivan Rodriguez 1991 2009 .301 .292 -3.0% -10
77 110 Mickey Vernon 1939 1958 .287 .292 1.8% 33
78 95 Hal McRae 1973 1987 .293 .292 -0.4% 17
79 96 Tony Fernandez 1983 2001 .293 .292 -0.4% 17
80 115 Miguel Tejada* 1997 2010 .286 .292 2.0% 35
81 22 MICKEY COCHRANE 1925 1937 .320 .291 -10.0% -59
82 78 Mike Sweeney 1995 2010 .298 .291 -2.4% -4
83 21 CHARLIE GEHRINGER 1924 1942 .320 .290 -10.5% -62
84 80 Buddy Lewis 1935 1949 .297 .290 -2.5% -4
85 49 George Burns 1914 1929 .307 .289 -6.2% -36
86 26 GOOSE GOSLIN 1921 1938 .316 .289 -9.4% -60
87 58 Mike Greenwell 1985 1996 .303 .288 -5.1% -29
88 51 Johnny Pesky 1942 1954 .307 .287 -6.7% -37
89 24 EARL AVERILL 1929 1940 .318 .287 -10.8% -65
90 88 Juan Gonzalez 1989 2005 .295 .287 -3.0% -2
91 43 John Stone 1928 1938 .310 .287 -8.0% -48
92 19 Ken Williams 1918 1929 .324 .286 -13.1% -73
93 100 Ken Griffey 1989 2010 .291 .286 -1.8% 7
94 65 Billy Goodman 1947 1961 .301 .286 -5.2% -29
95 28 Bibb Falk 1920 1931 .314 .286 -10.0% -67
96 113 Willie Wilson 1976 1992 .286 .286 0.0% 17
97 108 Rafael Palmeiro 1989 2005 .288 .285 -0.8% 11
98 59 Buddy Myer 1925 1941 .303 .285 -6.1% -39
99 69 Michael Young* 2000 2010 .300 .285 -5.3% -30
100 73 JIM RICE 1974 1989 .298 .285 -4.6% -27
101 39 Bob Meusel 1920 1929 .311 .285 -9.2% -62
102 46 Gee Walker 1931 1941 .307 .283 -8.6% -56
103 62 Ben Chapman 1930 1941 .302 .282 -7.1% -41
104 27 Jack Tobin 1916 1927 .315 .282 -11.5% -77
105 117 Alan Trammell 1977 1996 .285 .282 -1.2% 12
106 76 Mo Vaughn 1991 2000 .298 .281 -5.8% -30
107 106 Chuck Knoblauch 1991 2002 .289 .281 -2.7% -1
108 33 JOE SEWELL 1920 1933 .312 .281 -11.0% -75
109 37 Bing Miller 1921 1936 .311 .281 -10.9% -72
110 85 Bob Johnson 1933 1945 .296 .280 -6.0% -25
111 109 Johnny Damon* 1995 2010 .287 .280 -2.8% -2
112 118 CARL YASTRZEMSKI 1961 1983 .285 .279 -2.2% 6
113 61 Hal Trosky 1933 1946 .302 .278 -8.6% -52
114 40 Joe Vosmik 1930 1944 .311 .278 -11.6% -74
115 71 Sam West 1927 1942 .299 .276 -8.2% -44
116 77 Pete Fox 1933 1945 .298 .276 -8.0% -39
117 75 Dom DiMaggio 1940 1953 .298 .276 -8.1% -42
118 63 JOE CRONIN 1928 1945 .302 .275 -9.7% -55
119 87 Doc Cramer 1929 1948 .296 .274 -7.9% -32
120 57 Charlie Jamieson 1915 1932 .303 .274 -10.8% -63
* The adjusted rank considers only the 120 players listed here. Players not listed could outrank some of the players near the bottom of the list.

The names of Hall-of-Famers are capitalized to draw your attention to several who were enshrined mainly on the strength of grossly inflated batting averages.

There is more work to be done, especially with respect to age. Consider, for example, Shoeless Joe Jackson, whose career ended at age 30. Had Jackson continued to play until he was 40, say, his career average would have declined, and with it his position on the list.

Ichiro Suzuki didn’t play in the U.S. until he was 27. Would his career average be even higher if he had crossed over the Pacific in his early 20s? He is atop the list because of his post-32 performance, relative to Ty Cobb’s.

Then there is the case of Ted Williams, whose average and ranking slipped markedly because he enjoyed the friendly confines of Fenway Park. But Williams, who also hit well in his “old age,” missed a lot of peak batting time during WWII and the Korean War.

I will end, for now, with this tantalizing comparison of Suzuki, Cobb, Jackson, and Williams:


Cobb’s consistent brilliance from age 22 to age 32 borders on the amazing. Williams was a great “old” hitter, as Suzuki is proving to be. It is evident that Jackson, despite the closeness of his average to Cobb’s, probably wouldn’t have caught Cobb, unless he had finished in a Suzuki-like manner.

ADDENDUM:

Final, age-adjusted BA for the top-3 all-time AL hitters:

Cobb 0.363919
Suzuki 0.358241
Jackson 0.355946

Go here for details.

The Deficit Commission’s Deficit of Understanding

There are only three problems with the work of the Deficit Commission to date, as it has been revealed to us in the co-chairs’ briefing slides:

  • It will not survive the onslaught of special interests because it contains something to offend almost everyone, from homeowners, lenders, builders, and realtors (kill the mortgage interest deduction, indeed) to affluent retirees (bend the SS benefits curve downward, indeed).
  • It proposes higher taxes.
  • It aims at too many spending targets, and misses the elephant in the room: “entitelment” commitments, namely, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid (and their promised expansion via Obamacare).

The looming debt crisis and the cycle of dependency on government can be solved and broken, respectively, through the straightforward act of announcing that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits will shrink steadily toward zero. The degree and rate of shrinkage would vary according to the age of the prospective recipient; for example:

  • Everyone now over the age of 55 would receive their current or currently promised benefits, as adjusted for inflation but not for wage growth (see next item).
  • The costly wage-parity feature of Social Security would be abolished. (Why should we subsidize retirees to keep up with the Joneses?)
  • Future benefits for persons aged 25 to 55 would be reduced on a sliding scale: from 95 percent for 55-year-olds to 5 percent for 25-year olds.
  • There would be no future benefits for persons under the age of 25.

The costs would be defrayed by a unified payroll tax, which would rise (initially) to cover persons who are older than 55 when the plan is adopted. The tax would decline — by law — as persons who are 55 and younger when the plan is adopted become eligible for benefits (or not, as the case may be).

How would individuals fund retirement and pay for health care when they have retired? A plan like the one I’ve outlined would be a great inducement to save more — and individuals could save more without sacrificing consumption as the payroll tax declines. Unlike the Social Security Ponzi scheme — where one’s “contributions’ merely pay off those who got in earlier — the higher rate of saving would generate economic growth and, thus, real returns on saving (as opposed to the phony returns on SS “contributions”). As for health care, insurance companies could get back into the business of competing to insure older Americans. And I have no doubt that joint ventures by insurance companies and health-care providers would lead to innovative and less costly ways of delivering medical care.

Following the tradition of William of Ockham, I shun the turgid, Rube-Goldbergish proposal of the Deficit Commission in favor of a frontal attack on the main cause of the deficit problem: “entitlement” commitments.

Related posts:
Economics – Growth & Decline
The Economic and Social Consequences of Government

Estimating the Rahn Curve: Or, How Government Inhibits Economic Growth

Incorporated in this post.

More about the “Permanent Democrat Majority”

The following graphs underscore the point of the preceding post: Wishful thinking on the part of reality-based “progressives” to the contrary, there is no long-term trend toward a “permanent Democratic majority.” There is, if anything, a trend toward the GOP, which began in the 1950s.

What Happened to the Permanent Democrat Majority?

The election returns on November 2 tell a bigger story than massive disaffection with big government. They also point to a rising Republican majority. Consider, for example, the trend in the GOP’s percentage of House seats since the post-Depression lows of 1964 and 1974-76:

The 1964 low was an aberration, caused by LBJ’s landslide win over Barry Goldwater — a candidate whose then-“extreme” views went mainstream only 16 years later, with the election of Ronald Reagan. The backlash from Watergate led to the routs of 1974-76. And my trained eye tells me that 2008 was another aberration — a pause in a swing toward the GOP that began in the 1950s. So much for the “permanent Democratic majority” of which reality-based “progressives” love to boast.

Will the GOP’s fortunes rise indefinitely? Of course not — only a reality-based “progressive” would make that kind of claim. But the GOP will do well if it truly becomes — and remains — the party of limited government. It is the promise of government-light that propelled the GOP to a majority in 1994 and kept it there most of the time since.

That is the message of November 2. I urge Republican members of Congress to heed it.

Election 2010: Post-Mortem

UPDATED 11/05/10

This is a followup on my election-morning predictions, a prognosis about the next two years, and a diagnosis of the “progressive” disease.

I expected the GOP to gain eight seats in the Senate. But that prediction ran aground on the narrow wins by Democrats Michael Bennet and Harry Reid in Colorado and Nevada. The race in Washington hasn’t been decided, but it seems that Patty Murray will retain her seat.  The Alaska seat will wind up in GOP hands — it’s just a question of whose hands. So, when the dust settles, the GOP will have gained 6 seats and the Dems will retain a majority. That’s as good as it was likely to get. And it’s good enough, because with 47 seats (and only two or three RINOs in the mix) the GOP will command a cloture-proof minority.

Things turned out better in the House. I expected the GOP to end up with 237 seats. But when the dust settles on 10 9 undecided races, the GOP probably will hold between 239 seats (the current count) and 242 seats (adding 3 races now led by GOP candidates). Needless to say, the GOP will command the agenda in the House. The incoming tide of new Republican members will put a lot of pressure on GOP leaders to undo what Pelosi and company wrought. The stumbling blocks will be the Democrat-controlled Senate and the veto pen of BHO.

Republicans gained a lot of ground in the States, as indicated by the pickup of 12 governorships. (The Democrat pickup in California makes little difference in cloud-cuckoo-land, where the main difference between Arnold Schwarzenegger and his successor, Moonbeam Brown, is their accents.) Greater GOP strength at the State level will mean two things: more resistance to the expansion of federal power, and redistricting of the House in ways favorable to future Republican prospects.

The next two years at the “seat of government” (SOG) in D.C. will be filled with GOP initiatives to roll back the Obama agenda, name-calling by Democrats, and (I hope) gridlock combined with some rollback of Obamacare.

The next two years also will be filled with rationalizations by “progressives,” who — in so many words — will blame the backwardness of the American electorate for the events of November 2. “Progressives,” like their putative leader in the White House, already have adopted the myth that things would have turned out differently if only they had found a way to get their “message” across. Well, they did get their “message” across:

  • Pork disguised as stimulus, which did not and will not stimulate because the economy isn’t a hydraulic mechanism that responds automatically to pump-priming.
  • Financial regulations that will make it harder for Americans to borrow money.
  • A Rube Goldberg plan for reforming the health care “system” that will make it harder for Americans to obtain insurance and less rewarding for doctors and other providers to deliver medical services.

Such is “progressivism” at work: Good intentions (to put the best face on it) thwarted by unintended consequences because “progressives” believe that “hope and change” trump the realities of economic (and social behavior) — realities that “the masses” are able to grasp, if only viscerally.

Moreover, there was — and is — the disdain in which “progressives” hold “the masses,” who exist (in the “progressive” imagination) to be talked down to and led by the hand to the promised land of economic and social bliss — as it is envisioned by “progressives.”

I have news for “progressives.” When you talk down to most adults — and even to a lot of children — they quickly perceive three things: (a) you don’t respect their intelligence and (b) you are therefore trying to do something that’s against their interest. You really lose them when you promise things that they know (or suspect) will cost them liberty as well as money.

“Progressives” seem to believe in economic stability at any price, including the price of liberty and prosperity. A lot of “the masses” aren’t buying it. Good for them.

We’re from the Government, and We’re Here to Help You

I once said this:

Think of yourself as a business. You are good at producing certain things — as a family member, friend, co-worker, employee, or employer — and you know how to go about producing those things. What you don’t know, you can learn through education, experience, and the voluntary counsel of family, friends, co-workers, and employers. But you are unique — no one but you knows your economic and social preferences. If you are left to your own devices you will make the best decisions about how to run the “business” of getting on with your life. When everyone is similarly empowered, a not-so-miraculous thing happens: As each person gets on with the “business” of his or her own of life, each person tends to make choices that others find congenial. As you reward others with what you produce for them, economically and socially, they reward you in return. If they reward you insufficiently, you can give your “business” to those who will reward you more handsomely. But when government meddles in your affairs — except to protect you from actual harm[*] — it damages the network of voluntary associations upon which you depend in order to run your “business” most beneficially to yourself and others. The state can protect your ability to run the “business” of your life, but once you let it tell you how to run your life, you compromise your ability to make choices that are right for you.
__________
* “Actual harm” consists of actions (force, verbal and physical intimidation, fraud, theft) against persons and/or their legitimate interests (family, property, business). It is the proper business of the state to defend citizens from harm, and to deter harm. The state may preemptively defend citizens from predators (foreign and domestic) who clearly intend to inflict harm, and who possess or are in the process of obtaining the means of inflicting it.

A key shortcoming of statutes and regulations is that they impose one-size-fits-all rules on the behavior of individuals and businesses. Thus “helpful” statutes and regulations turn out to be unhelpful because they substitute rigid rules for the application of local knowledge and on-scene judgment to unique circumstances.

Here’s a simple but not far-fetched illustration of how legal rigidity causes much unseen harm. Suppose that a regulator in Washington D.C. reads a study which “proves” that left turns are more dangerous than right turns. The regulator then proposes a safety measure forbidding left turns. The measure, which applies to the States as a condition of federal funding, is approved by the regulatory agency following an outpouring of support from “public safety” advocates. The result:

The “better” way of making a left turn requires additional travel distance, and thus additional risk; two additional turns, each of which involves risk; and crossing traffic, which involves further risk (especially if the crossing is unaided by a traffic signal). Then there are the additional costs in fuel, tire wear, and time that the owners and drivers of vehicles must bear.

Such is the “helpful” nature of government. For more, see this post and follow the links therein.

Today, the Battle Begins

The GOP will win big, but that’s only the beginning.

Republicans in Congress must prove their commitment to limited, fiscally conservative government. And the Republican Party must make a compelling case to Americans that limited, fiscally conservative government is the only sure route to liberty and prosperity. If those conditions aren’t met, today’s resounding victory at the polls will be a hollow one.

Here are my final predictions.

  • Based on current Intrade odds on individual Senate races, it looks like the GOP will gain seats in Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, North Dakota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. This will cut the Democrat majority in the Senate from 59-41 to 51-49, and leave that body in gridlock.
  • In the House, the GOP will gain about 60 seats and a majority of 39 seats (237-198) to 41 seats (238-197). (For details of my sources and methods, see “One Week Hence” and “Will the GOP Take the House?“)

Tomorrow

UPDATED AND REVISED 11:00 PM (CT)

Rasmussen’s net unpopularity rating of Obama was -11 as of this morning, which is about as good as it gets these days. If that number were to hold on election morning, it would point to a GOP majority of 232-203 in the House.* That would represent a net gain of 53 seats for the GOP.**

HOWEVER, Rasmussen has just released the result of his generic congressional ballot for 10/31/10, which gives GOP House candidates a 12-percentage-point edge over their Democrat rivals. Allowing for some backsliding (10 percent of respondents remain noncommittal), I forecast a GOP edge of 7.4 percentage points. That translates into a 237-198 majority for the GOP — a net gain of 58 seats.

Over in the Senate, the Intrade odds on individual races indicate a 50-50 split, with a few races hanging in the balance. That would be a gain of 9 seats for the GOP.

I will issue my final predictions tomorrow morning.
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* For details about sources and methods, see “One Week Hence” and “Will the GOP Take the House?”

** Republicans currently hold 178 seats. In addition, a seat that had been held by a Republican is vacant. I therefore use 179 as a baseline for computing GOP gains.

Scare Tactics at Work

First, there’s the well-timed al Qaeda plot. Then, there’s the Stewart-Colbert “Sanity” rally.  Both are efforts to scare independent voters away from GOP candidates on November 2.

Al Qaeda’s leaders evidently assume that America’s independent voters will emulate Spain’s voters, and rally to the party of appeasement. There may be some truth in that. With a full day to absorb the news of the aborted terror plot, Obama’s unpopularity index suddenly improved from -17 to -13 — a swing that is well outside the normal range. (For the electoral implications of this shift, see the updated version of “One Week Hence…“.) Or it could be that some independent voters are having second thoughts as election day approaches. In any event, the bomb plot was well-timed and almost certainly pushed some voters in the direction preferred by al  Qaeda.

The transparent aim of the “Sanity” rally was to shame independent voters away from an association-by-ballot with those “hate-filled, racist, fear-mongering” Tea Partiers.

How will it all turn out? We’ll know the answer to that question in less than 72 hours.